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Abstract
The UK 2008 Climate Change Act transferred a global policy issue into national 
legislation, establishing unprecedented targets for reducing emissions justiÞed by 
scientiÞc evidence. The Act prompted a question: could such stretching targets be 
achieved? This question is addressed through an embedded case study within the 
East Midlands region between 2010-2011. The research makes an original 
contribution to knowledge, taking an interpretive, decentred approach to 
subnational climate policy implementation, focusing on the policy meanings created 
and acted upon during the introduction of the Cameron GovernmentÕs austerity and 
localism agendas. These meanings are recovered using a mix of conversational 
interviews and meeting observations with policy actors.
Subnational climate policy met signiÞcant challenges in being translated into action, 
being seen as peripheral to local policy concerns. Managers attempted to ÔembedÕ 
climate policy within local authority practice, but were met with resistance and 
passivity stemming from climate policyÕs diverse meanings amongst policy actors.
Performance management was important in symbolising rational policy-making, 
rather than for its instrumental effectiveness. This brießy raised the priority of 
climate policy, but where locally compelling political arguments for implementation 
were absent, programmes became vulnerable to budget cuts. With stronger local 
arguments focusing on kindred policy areas such as fuel poverty and reducing local 
authoritiesÕ own energy use, vulnerability was reduced. Localism brought such 
arguments into focus, as regional partnerships weakened and the National Indicators 
performance management framework was removed. Responses to these 
developments highlighted how perceptions of the location and ßow of power 
contributed to meaning construction.
The shift to kindred policy aims brings into question the plausibility of climate 
change targets predicated on scientiÞc evidence rather than local policy meanings. 
The endurance of local climate policy is explained as a policy myth, enabling short-
term continuity with the promise of longer term change.
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1. Why study the meaning of 
climate policy?
In early 2011, the Þeldwork for this research was well underway. I was engaged in a 
particularly intensive period of research, criss-crossing the country to interview key 
individuals involved in climate change mitigation policy. I spent my waking hours (and 
some of my sleeping ones) thinking about what the challenge of reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions meant to local and regional policy-makers. I took a break from my 
deepening immersion in the world of subnational climate policy to meet a friend, 
who I will call Finn, in the local pub. Finn asked what I was researching, so I explained 
that I had just come from interviewing a local authority manager about the 
organisationÕs climate change policy. Finn looked incredulous at the entire scenario, 
remarking: 
ÒClimate change? What can the city council do about climate change?!Ó
The riposte was said partly in jest, but its meaning was clear, summarily dismissing 
the idea of local climate policy which I had come to take for granted during the 
research. How could the local authority of a modestly sized English city do anything 
meaningful about the global problem of climate change? 
1.1 Why study meaning?
FinnÕs remark pulled me up short. I recount it here to illustrate two key concepts 
which underpin this research:
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1. The concept of subnational climate change can be interpreted in diverse 
ways. In the above example, local authority climate policy was a given for 
me. For Finn, it was a category that had not even occurred to him as 
existing, let alone one that Ômade senseÕ. As this research will demonstrate, 
considering the meanings of such categories to different individuals is a 
crucial constituent of investigating the social world.
2. The idea of local climate policy carries inherent contradictions. Climate 
change is generally understood as a global issue, with policy discussions 
being dominated by negotiations at the United Nations and European 
Union. The effects on climate from rising greenhouse gas emissions arise 
from the global aggregate of such gases; temperature changes are not 
conÞned to the parts of the world where the emissions originated but are 
diffused across the Earth. Environmental problems do not respect national 
boundaries. 
The importance of diverse interpretations and meanings, with particular regard to 
how they play out around the contradictions of local climate policy, are a key theme 
of this research. This focus on meanings is not just theoretical, but based upon the 
observation that Òinterpretation is ubiquitousÓ in social interactions (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006a, p.15). 
1.2 Why study subnational climate policy?
The focus on local and regional climate change policy, taken together as subnational 
climate change policy, is prompted by the passing of the UK 2008 Climate Change 
Act. The Act (s.1) states that it is the Secretary of StateÕs duty to ensure that the 
UKÕs emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are at least 80 per 
cent lower in 2050 than in 1990.1  The Act marked a landmark in the development 
of climate policy, and Òa tremendous successÓ for the environmental groups who had 
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1 This target was heavily inßuenced by scientiÞc evidence regarding the limit required on atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentration if global temperature rises were to be kept to acceptable levels. See 
section 2.7.1
campaigned to have such targets enshrined in law (Big Ask, 2008). This research is 
motivated by a desire to look beyond this success, to discover the ways in which 
policy has been transferred into action. In short: how could such stretching, 
unprecedented targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions be achieved? This question 
identiÞes closely with a traditional ÔstagistÕ view of public policy in which agenda-
setting and legislation are followed by implementation:
Figure 1. The essence of a ÔstagistÕ approach to the policy process
Source: Yanow (1996 p.17)2
This research will highlight the limitations of this representation of the policy 
process by showing how the meanings of climate policy created and acted upon by 
individuals within government have roots stretching back a long time before the 
ActÕs passing. However, as a commonly used heuristic within both public policy and 
political science (e.g. Chapman, 2012; Hardman, 2012), the concept of 
implementation will be used as a means of framing the research questions which this 
research addresses.
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2 Yanow, a critic of the stagist approach, deliberately omits the feedback loop between 
implementation and agenda-setting (usually intermediated by an evaluation phase) which is often used 
to turn the process into a cycle (e.g. Parsons, 1995, p.77). YanowÕs simpliÞed model is useful here as 
the Climate Change Act 2008 only permits the 2050 target to be amended as a result of 
Òdevelopments in scientiÞc knowledge ... or international law or policyÓ (p.2), not as a result of the 
experiences of implementation.
1.3 Research questions
This research takes as its focus the English East Midlands and the regional agencies 
and local authorities operating within it. In general, regional and local tiers of 
government have a history of activity in environmental issues, sustainable 
development and, latterly, climate change policy (Bruyninckx et al., 2012). In 
particular, the East Midlands was chosen as an exemplar case of such activity, having 
been the Þrst region to have all of its local authorities sign the Nottingham 
Declaration, which committed them to develop plans for addressing Òthe causes and 
impacts of climate changeÓ and to Òcontribute, at a local level, to the delivery of É 
the target for carbon dioxide reduction by 2010Ó (Nottingham Declaration on Climate 
Change, 2005).3
Following the initial motivation of investigating implementation of the Climate 
Change Act, three main research questions will be addressed: 
1. What factors do subnational actors Þnd the most important in 
implementing climate change mitigation policy? 
2. How do actorsÕ perceptions of change affect implementation of policy? 
3. To what extent is subnational policy implementation driven by the centre?
As well as providing an in-depth case study of an English region and its local 
authorities, practical knowledge of policy actions Ôon the groundÕ will illuminate 
similar cases elsewhere (Griggs and Howarth, 2012, p.170).
18
3 A fuller exposition of the choice of case study can be found in Section 4.2.
1.4 Limits to this study
So far, this introduction has established the subject of the study, the approach to be 
adopted and the questions to be answered. This section identiÞes three important 
limits to the research: the demarcation between mitigation and adaptation within 
climate change policy, the scientiÞc evidence for climate change, and the atmospheric 
gases covered by policy. 
1.4.1 Mitigation and adaptation
The climate change literature has been strongly characterised by a separation 
between mitigation (reducing greenhouse gas emissions to reduce the severity of 
climate change impacts) and adaptation (improving the resilience of society to these 
impacts) (Cohen et al., 1998, pp.359-360). This separation remains within current 
approaches to policy, including the most recent reports by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Metz et al., 2007; Parry et al., 2007), the UKÕs Committee 
on Climate Change (2011a; 2011b; 2012) and the National Indicator (NI) 
performance management framework for local authorities, which included separate 
indicators for reducing carbon emissions from local authority operations (NI185), 
across the geographical areas of local authorities (NI186), and for planning 
adaptation to climate change (NI188) (Department of Communities and Local 
Government, 2008, p.51).
Policy-makersÕ attention to mitigation has been much greater than that afforded to 
adaptation, with some critics arguing that the latter has been a ÒtabooÓ subject 
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representing a tacit admission of defeat in averting dangerous climate change (Pielke 
Jr. et al., 2007, p.597). This research acknowledges that the separation between 
mitigation and adaptation is a potential weakness in the current approach to climate 
change policy, and that mitigation may be more fruitfully thought of as part of 
societyÕs wider adaptation to the climate impacts still to arise from historic 
emissions (Cohen et al., 1998, p.,360; Wigley, 2005). However, to make the research 
subject manageable within the resource constraints of doctoral study, it was decided 
to set aside adaptation policy and focus on mitigation.4 As a consequence, and for 
the sake of readability, the term Ôclimate policyÕ is used throughout this research as a 
convenient shorthand for Ôclimate change mitigation policyÕ.
1.4.2 Climate science
ScientiÞc evidence has played a pivotal role in the problematisation of climate 
change (Demeritt, 2001, p.307) with great emphasis placed on the consensus 
amongst climate scientists regarding the role of human activity in increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions and the consequential rise in global temperatures 
(Oreskes, 2004). Against this, some in the Þeld of climate science have suffered 
persistent criticism for their use of data (e.g. Montford, 2010) and of alleged 
malpractice (Grundmann, 2012; Nerlich, 2010). Such criticism has been ampliÞed in 
the media by journalistic norms of personalisation and dramatisation (Boykoff, 2011, 
20
4 For an overview of adaptation, see Pelling (2011). More focused studies of adaptation include a 
detailed case study of South East England (Keskitalo, 2010), a focus on issues within compact cities 
(Williams et al., 2010), the potential for links between national, subnational and urban governance 
(Corfee-Morlot et al., 2011) and a focus on the role of local authoritiesÕ planning function (Measham 
et al., 2011).
pp.99-120). 5 While scientiÞc knowledge plays a key role in the creation of climate 
policy meanings, it is not within the scope of this research to offer a critique of the 
scientiÞc evidence base. Rather, this research notes the recent controversies but 
regards disagreement over climate science as a proxy for disagreement over climate 
policy (Pielke Jr., 2005, p.954), arguing that while the scientiÞc evidence is constantly 
evolving, the available evidence is compelling enough to make climate change a public 
policy priority. However, this does not necessarily equate with support for the 
decarbonisation policies and targets which have been derived from this evidence 
(Pielke Jr., 2009, p.6).
1.4.3 Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
The term Ôgreenhouse gasesÕ refers to those atmospheric gases which absorb and 
emit thermal infrared radiation, trapping heat within the atmosphere (the 
Ôgreenhouse effectÕ) and increasing global surface temperatures (Baede et al., 2007, 
pp.81-82). While the UK reports annually on a national inventory of ten greenhouse 
gases, reporting at local authority level is restricted to carbon dioxide (MacCarthy 
and Watterson, 2010, p.1; p.8). This is justiÞed by the level of uncertainty in local 
reporting of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide, and the latterÕs status as 
the gas possessing the greatest global warming potential (AEA Technology, 2008, p.
15).
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5 See von Storch (2012) for an insight into the obstacles to reßection on such criticism in the 
academic literature.
1.5 Structure and argument of the thesis
Chapter 2.  A history of climate policy: from the United Nations to the East Midlands sets 
the scene for the Þeld of study. It identiÞes the emergence of concern within the 
scientiÞc community and its development into a global policy issue. It shows how 
climate change subsequently became a policy issue within supranational, national and 
subnational government in the UK. Particular focus is placed on developments since 
2008, with the passing of the Climate Change Act and the subsequent introduction 
of NIs monitoring local carbon emissions. It is established that climate policy has 
been made using a rational policy-making approach, with targets derived directly 
from the scientiÞc evidence and passed down from central to subnational 
government. The challenges of implementing such policy is a central theme of the 
thesis. 
Chapter 3.  Interpretation and policy: a decentred approach develops an approach to 
researching the scene set in Chapter 2, speciÞcally through an analysis of meaning in 
public policy. It outlines the roots of positivism and interpretive approaches while 
highlighting the extent to which the two have become intermingled. Examples of 
interpretive approaches in the arts are used to illustrate the broad differences they 
make to the study of public policy. The implications of an interpretive approach on 
the study of public policy are then discussed, focusing on Bevir and RhodesÕs 
decentred approach. Finally, this approach is linked to the well-established Þeld of 
implementation studies. The chapter argues that an interpretive approach is well 
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suited to ÔwickedÕ problems, such as climate change, which affect large numbers of 
actors and are likely to foster multifarious interpretations.
Chapter 4.  Transparency and trust: applying interpretive theory to research design and 
practice covers research methods, showing how the theoretical approach in Chapter 
3 is operationalised within the scene in Chapter 2. In particular, it explains the 
researcherÕs task of choosing in three areas: the setting of the case study, the 
methods for accessing information, and the methods for data analysis. It makes the 
case for choosing the English East Midlands as the research setting and details the 
key participants from the region. The choices of conversational interviews and 
meeting observations as research methods are explained. The experiences of using 
these research methods in the Þeld are then reßected upon. Moving from Þeldwork 
to deskwork, three key categories for analysis are identiÞed: objects, acts and 
language. Finally, the differences an interpretive approach makes to research design 
and practice are summarised.
Chapter 5. Moving to the mainstream? Embedding climate policy discusses the global, 
scientiÞc roots of the issue outlined in Chapter 2 in conjunction with the 
entrenchment of fossil fuel use in society. Taken together, these explain how climate 
change and other environmental issues are seen as apart from, rather than a part of, 
mainstream local policy concerns. In short, climate change is often interpreted as 
being an Ôextra-localÕ policy issue. The separateness of climate change is used to 
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explain the idea of policy embedding, a term which local managers used to describe 
their own practices, in preference to Ôpolicy implementationÕ.  
Two cases of embedding within local authorities are examined. First, the 
introduction of an environmental management system highlights the diverse 
meanings of policy for the climate change ÔexpertsÕ within the specialist policy team 
and the climate change ÔamateursÕ within a department focused on service 
provision. The case highlights the gap between policy and practice, showing how 
Service 1 saw the implementation of policy as contingent on its primary task of 
service delivery. This resistance to new policy is explained by showing how Service 
1Õs understanding of climate change was anchored in professional identity. Second, 
there is an analysis of the practice of inter-departmental board meetings to aid 
policy implementation in local authorities. It is argued that passivity was prevalent 
and that the meetings functioned as policy rituals, embodying tacit meanings beyond 
those expressed openly. One such meaning was that of a policy myth: the 
persistence of the rational, Ôevidence-basedÕ model of public policy alongside a 
continued prioritisation of economic growth based upon abundant fossil fuels. The 
emergence of this myth enabled policy work to continue, despite its inherent 
contradictions.
Chapter 6. Flawed indicators and kindred policies continues this theme of practices 
which enable policy work, focusing on the indicator NI186, which measured local 
area carbon dioxide emissions. The indicatorÕs ßaws are analysed, and contrasted 
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with its adoption by seven out of the nine local authorities. Managers chose to 
include the indicator in their local priorities despite being aware of the ßaws, a 
course of action explained by the importance of establishing climate change within 
the prevailing Ôaudit cultureÕ of local government. NI186Õs role as evidence 
supporting local policy is discussed, showing how indicator data was the ÔwrongÕ 
evidence for motivating action in the absence of political consensus. The ÔrightÕ 
evidence was the use of political argument, rather than data, to persuade councillors 
and the public of the need to act. 
The chapter then goes on to highlight two Ôkindred policiesÕ - reducing fuel poverty, 
and energy management of local authoritiesÕ own estates - which provided stronger 
local arguments for action than mitigating climate change. In both cases, the barriers 
to the policies leading to reduced carbon emissions are discussed, highlighting the 
potential weakness of using costs as a driver for behaviour change.
Chapter 7.Meaning and power in the policy network reviews the development of the 
climate policy network within the East Midlands, which has been marked by 
increased institutionalisation and weak links with central government. Conditions 
changed signiÞcantly with the Cameron GovernmentÕs abolition of key regional 
agencies and the NI framework, creating new meanings within the network. These 
meanings are analysed using the Memorandum of Understanding, a government 
document which attempted to establish a new framework for local climate policy 
within the new localism agenda. Three key themes are identiÞed: vagueness of 
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language, dislocation between the national and local and the role of power in 
motivating partnership working.
Power is also used to explain local councillorsÕ attitudes to central regulation, 
showing how inconsistency in a councillorÕs stated policy preferences can be 
explained through their own political weakness. While the meanings created by 
actors remained key, they have also revealed the importance of power in shaping 
those meanings. In particular, network membersÕ meanings were situated within a 
context shaped by the policy agendas of two government departments outside of 
the network: the TreasuryÕs austerity programme and the Department of 
Communities and Local GovernmentÕs localism agenda.
Chapter 8. Decentring climate policy summarises what the research has contributed to 
knowledge in terms of theoretical development, methodology and empirical 
Þndings. The three research questions are answered, followed by a review of the 
decentred approach as applied to climate policy and how extending explanation into 
an exploration of policy myths can provide a fuller account of continuity and 
change. Finally, two sections look to the future. First, the implications of the research 
are assessed for studies of policy implementation. Second, the future direction of 
subnational climate policy is discussed.
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2. A history of climate policy: 
from the United Nations to the 
East Midlands
2.1 Introduction
This chapter traces the journey of climate policy from a global issue to becoming 
the subject of subnational concern and local performance management targets, 
setting the policy context for this research. Within this journey, some key phases are 
identiÞed:
¥ developing concern across a range of environmental issues, giving rise to the 
concept of sustainable development as a policy issue;
¥ the emergence from the scientiÞc literature of climate change as an urgent 
environmental policy issue;
¥ the adoption of these concerns at a local level, particularly through local 
authoritiesÕ work on Local Agenda 21 (LA21) which expanded capacity and 
enabled many councils to introduce policies aimed at reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions;
¥ the later expansion of regional governance organisations and their role in 
climate policy; and
¥ the introduction by national government of speciÞc targets for local authority 
carbon dioxide emission reduction.
Running through this history is a tension between the global and scientiÞc roots of 
the issues, and the attempts by subnational policy-makers to translate them into 
locally relevant policy. The chapter will examine the tools used to try to localise 
climate change as an issue in the late 1990s and 2000s: the Nottingham Declaration 
and National Indicators (NIs) covering local authorities, the programmes and 
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strategies of regional organisations and partnerships, and the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment which governs the carbon dioxide emissions of speciÞc organisations. 
The chapter concludes with a reßection on the development of climate policy since 
the late 1980s, and how its focus on the scientiÞc notion of greenhouse gas 
emissions has placed climate policy at a distance from social and political concerns.  
is a recurring theme within the data presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This chapter 
provides context for the understanding that climate policy was interpreted as an 
extra-local concern by policy actors. The persistence of such an interpretation is key 
in explaining the processes of continuity and change within subnational policy. 
2.2 Global concern for the earthÕs environment 
and climate
Evidence of human behaviour causing environmental deterioration exists from 
prehistoric times; the earliest intercontinental movement of species had dramatic 
effects on indigenous populations and ecosystems (Held et al., 1999, pp.382-383). 
The development of the industrial economy in the late eighteenth century heralded 
a new era of environmental impacts as a result of human behaviour as coal became a 
widely used energy source, and pollution, deforestation and species extinction all 
increased (Simmons, 2008, pp.112-113). The mid-twentieth century marked the 
beginning of an acceleration in these trends, with rapidly increasing consumption in 
developed countries and industrial production expanding to many developing 
countries. With these trends came an emerging awareness that the means and pace 
of economic development could not be sustained indeÞnitely without severely 
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impacting on the earthÕs capacity for supporting life, leading to the emergence of 
sustainable development as a means of continuing human progress with greater 
regard for environmental limits (Study of Critical Environmental Problems, 1970; 
Meadows et al., 1974; International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, 1980; Lele, 1991).
A key aspect of global change resulting from human development was the rise in 
coal, oil and gas usage (Held et al., 1999, p.391; Simmons, 2008, pp.172-175), with 
global energy usage increasing by a factor of 16 over the course of the twentieth 
century (Prins et al., 2010, p.28). The emissions concomitant with fossil fuel usage 
began to be recognised in the scientiÞc literature as possibly adding to carbon 
dioxide and other atmospheric gases responsible for transmitting heat by radiation, 
otherwise known as the Ògreenhouse effectÓ (Study of ManÕs Impact on Climate,
1971; Sawyer, 1972).  While there had been scientiÞc interest in climate change for 
over two hundred years, only in the second half of the twentieth century did the 
understanding develop that such change could be dangerous to humans (Hansen et 
al., 1981; Kellogg, 1987; Hulme and Turnpenny, 2004, p.107). The US National 
Academy of Sciences published an assessment of the relationship between carbon 
dioxide and climate which it said Òmay be comforting for scientists but disturbing for 
policymakersÓ (Charney et al., 1979, p.vii), but it was not until 1988 that climate 
change emerged on to the policy agenda signiÞcantly, with the establishment of the 
United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and a powerful 
Congressional testimony by Professor James Hansen, an atmospheric physicist from 
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the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Jaspal and Nerlich, 2012). 
Hansen told Congress that ÒitÕs time to stop wafßing so much and say the evidence 
is pretty strong that the greenhouse effect is hereÓ, raising the media proÞle of the 
issue (quoted in White and Radford, 1988). Following this, Prime Minister Thatcher 
began to address the issue in her speech to the 1988 Conservative Party conference 
(Thatcher, 1988), in Prime MinisterÕs Questions (e.g. Hansard, 2 May 1989, col.15) and 
in a speech to the 1990 World Climate Conference where she proposed Òa joint 
international effort to curb greenhouse gases É and carbon dioxideÓ and that the 
UK was prepared to adopt Òthe demanding target of bringing carbon dioxide 
emissions back to this yearÕs level by the year 2005Ó (Thatcher, 1990). The latter 
speech was a response to the Þrst reports of the IPCC, which provided a weight of 
evidence that further convinced policy-makers of the need for action (Hulme and 
Turnpenny, 2004, p.107). The UKÕs response to the 1992 United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development, commonly known as the Rio Summit (Laffertey, 
2001, p.1), was a commitment to a small reduction in greenhouse gases which would 
only be enough to postpone projected temperature rises by 4-5 years (OÕRiordan 
and Rowbotham, 1996, p.260). While this represented a modest response, this 
marked the beginning of a new set of domestic policy responses to an agenda which 
had been set in the scientiÞc community and politically negotiated at a global level.
2.3 The European role in climate policy
Besides the United Nations, UK climate policy was subject to another supra-national 
inßuence: its membership of the European Union (EU). Greater integration within 
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the EU is in part a response to the pressures exacted on nation states by 
globalisation; their interests are better served by compromising within the EU in 
order to negotiate internationally as a single bloc, rather than having greater 
freedom of position but carrying far less political weight (Cope, 1999, pp.51-52).6 
The importance of the global dimension within climate policy prompted the EU to 
follow this path at negotiations prior to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997. The EU overcame their lack of legal competency in environmental policy to act 
as a single bloc and advocate tougher emissions targets than many other actors 
were arguing for (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, pp.12-13). This emerging leadership in 
global negotiations can be traced back to a core of EU member states with strong 
environmental traditions such as Germany and Sweden, which spurred the EU as a 
whole to improve environmental protection and raised standards in EU laggard 
states (Bradbeer, 2001, p.91; Connelly and Smith, 2003, p.274). The UK was seen as 
part of the latter category in the 1980s, attracting Þerce criticism within the EU for 
its part in the acid rain controversy which spurred it into taking a more active role 
when climate change appeared on the policy agenda (Hajer, 1993, p.43; Cass, 2007, 
pp.40-42). In particular, the UK encouraged the development of an emissions trading 
group for businesses in the late 1990s (Jordan et al., 2003a, p.189). sensing an 
opportunity for British business and Þnancial services to gain "Þrst-mover 
advantage" in an area of potential international growth (Smith, 2004, p.89; Glachant 
and de Muizon, 2006, p.5).  Although government enthusiasm was as much motivated 
by the potential for economic advantage as emissions reduction, such an attitude 
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6 Globalisation is a contested notion. A diversity of conceptions and misconceptions about 
globalisation can be found within the discourses of elite political opinion (Smith and Hay, 2008).
supported the notion of a newly energised approach to environmental policy within 
the UK.
The support for emissions trading proved to be well-placed, with the EU starting 
their own Emissions Trading Scheme in 2005. The policy was initially formulated at 
European level then 'handed down' to national governments to implement through 
the setting of National Allocation Plans capping the number of permits available for 
trading (House of Commons Environment Audit Committee, 2007a, p.22). It was at 
this stage that the policy's effectiveness in reducing emissions foundered, as most 
countries set targets very close to their usual levels of emissions. While the UK did 
impose a more restricted number of permits to be traded than most, the aggregate 
cap was too weak to deliver any reduction in emissions during its Þrst phase (House 
of Commons Environment Audit Committee, 2007a, p.22-24).  Although the trading 
scheme has been described as the UK's "cornerstone" climate policy (House of 
Commons Environment Audit Committee, 2007a, p.16), local and regional bodies 
have had no involvement in its implementation, with national government instead 
taking up the role of 'local implementer'. 
Within the overall target agreed by the EU at Kyoto, the UK agreed to a target of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 12.5 per cent by 2012, using 1990 levels as a 
baseline. While the choice of baseline was in part due to the availability of data, using 
1990 was also favourable to the UK as it marked the beginning of a 13 per cent fall 
in greenhouse gas emissions up to 2000 caused by a shift from coal to natural gas 
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supplies (Jordan, 2002, p.346; Liverman, 2009, pp.290-291). This shift in supplies along 
with the effects of the 2009 recession means the UK is likely to signiÞcantly exceed 
its Kyoto target, although there are doubts whether decarbonisation can be 
maintained without such one-off events (ENDS Report, 2010). Uncertainty over 
climate policy intensiÞed after attempts to agree on a successor to the Kyoto 
Protocol at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit ended without a binding agreement to 
cut emissions in the future (United Nations Framework on Climate Change, 2009; 
Bodansky, 2010; Rogelj et al., 2010).
2.4 Local environmental policy
As well as being a watershed year for global climate policy, 1988 was also a time of 
signiÞcant development for environmental policy within local government, with 
Kirklees Metropolitan Council becoming the Þrst local authority to undertake an 
environmental audit of its own activities, publishing its report the following year 
(Church and Young, 2001, p.107; Connelly and Smith, 2003, p.340). There followed an 
upsurge in interest in local environment policy with the publication of a number of 
advisory reports (Ball and Wright, 1991, p.81). The most inßuential of these reports, 
Environmental Charter for Local Government, set out a systematic approach to 
alleviating the environmental effects of local government operations (Friends of the 
Earth, 1989; Jay, 1991; Tuxworth, 1996, p.284). This nascent local agenda was largely 
overlooked by the national governmentÕs Þrst environmental strategy, This Common 
Inheritance (Department of the Environment, 1990). The publication echoed Prime 
Minister ThatcherÕs interest in climate change with a dedicated chapter on ÒGlobal 
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Warming and the UKÓ (Department of the Environment, 1990, pp.63-78), but where 
opportunities were identiÞed for improved energy efÞciency in council housing and 
schools, there was little offered in the way of support to local authorities seeking to 
make progress (Department of the Environment, 1990, pp.285-287; Ball and Wright, 
1991, p.82).
While these developments pertained speciÞcally to environmental protection and 
tackling speciÞc environmental issues in local areas, the wider agenda of sustainable 
development gained a Þrmer foothold in the local government agenda after the 
agreement of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) at the 1992 Rio Summit (Laffertey, 2001, p.1). 
Sustainable development can be broadly deÞned as the integration of societyÕs 
environmental, social and economic needs in the present day, meeting them in a way 
that does not compromise future generationsÕ capacity to meet their own needs 
(World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p.8; Levett, 1998; pp.
295-296; National Audit OfÞce, 2010, p.8). LA21 was the part of a wider Òaction plan 
for sustainable developmentÓ agreed at Rio explicitly designed for local authorities 
to implement, seeking consultation with communities to Þnd ways of advancing 
sustainable development locally (Laffertey, 2001, p.1).  Although there were no 
statutory duties attached to LA21, a wave of Òearly adopterÓ local authorities took 
up the challenge of developing a plan and introducing more sustainable ways of 
working within their area (Church and Young, 2001, pp.108-109). National 
government continued to show little interest in these local developments, and 
although this meant there was little in the way of central funding to support local 
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activity such disengagement may not have hindered policy development. Local 
government had seen its powers cut back by the centre which may have made LA21 
an attractive option for local authorities seeking to expand their inßuence into new 
areas (Tuxworth, 1996, p.294). In a 1996 survey, almost 40 per cent of local 
authorities strongly supported LA21 and almost 50 per cent more offered Òmore 
tentative supportÓ (Tuxworth, 1996, p.281).
Although LA21 took a holistic view of sustainable development, covering social, 
economic and environmental issues, responsibility for its implementation often sat 
within local authoritiesÕ environment departments (Bond et al., 1998, p.776; 
Tuxworth, 1996, p.281). Coming at a time when local authorities were beginning to 
recognise their own environmental impact through internal audits, LA21 was often 
pigeonholed as another aspect of environmental policy rather than something to be 
considered within multiple aspects of local policy (Connelly and Smith, 2003, p.346). 
Building on the audit approach reßected local authoritiesÕ belief that they could not 
implement LA21 without Ògetting oneÕs own house in orderÓ (Wild and Marshall, 
1999, p.160). This inward-facing work was challenging enough but efforts to expand 
LA21 work into the community proved even more difÞcult, where high expectations 
were soon grounded by the challenges experienced in obtaining widespread public 
involvement in the sustainable development programme (Wild and Marshall, 1999, p.
161). As well as the danger of a narrow focus on their own activities, local 
governmentÕs response to LA21 continued to be dominated by environmental issues 
at the expense of a wider consideration of the linkages with the social and 
economic. This reßected the national context, where the Department of the 
EnvironmentÕs guidance on sustainable development indicators suggested 105 
environmental and only 13 social and economic indicators (Bond et al., 1998, p.774; 
Levett, 1998, p.298).
While much of LA21Õs implementation became more focused on environmental 
issues than was originally intended, it did stimulate local ofÞcers and residents to 
develop their awareness of the environment and its relationship to social and 
economic issues (Church and Young, 2001, pp.125-126). Local authorities had 
responded to an international agreement which speciÞcally sought to transfer the 
concept of sustainable development to local areas. Despite the problems faced by 
local authorities in meeting the ambitious sustainable development agenda, LA21 
marked a step change in their environment policy activity, altering the way such 
issues were perceived and how they could be Ôjoined-upÕ to a more holistic approach 
to local policy (Church and Young, 2001, p.126). These developments prepared the 
ground for local governmentÕs response to climate change as it continued to emerge 
as a global issue.  As progress on LA21 continued steadily during the 1990s, climate 
change also continued to develop as a national policy issue. As research within the 
UK clariÞed the potential impacts of climate change, the focus shifted to what action 
could be taken to avert the threat, establishing climate change as a signiÞcant public 
policy issue (Hulme and Turnpenny, 2004, pp.107-111).
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Like sustainable development before it, climate change was placed within the remit 
of central governmentÕs environment department (Þrst, the Department of 
Environment, then the Blair GovernmentÕs Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions). OfÞcers working within local government were likely to 
be specialists, working within an area of policy over a number of years (Gains, 2009, 
p.54). This was the context for the emergence of Òwilful individualsÓ in local 
environmental policy, who developed environmental expertise and enthusiasm 
working on LA21 throughout the 1990s and seized on climate change as a new 
manifestation of that agenda (Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2005, p.20-22). This 
minority of council ofÞcers created the local conditions for increased action on 
climate change, aided by the new prominence of environmental issues brought about 
by LA21, but in the absence of any agreement similar to the latter which interpreted 
global issues speciÞcally for the local context. 
The absence of a document equivalent to LA21 for climate change reßected the 
separateness of the sustainable development and climate change discourses. While 
sustainable development attracted some ecocentric criticism for being excessively 
anthropocentric (Gladwin et al., pp.886-889), the explicit links made between human 
activity, environmental limits and economic development provided a political context 
which clariÞed potential policy responses (Cohen et al., 1998, pp.357-358). 
Conversely, the IPCCÕs inßuential reports were more narrowly focused on the 
effects of greenhouse gas emissions under less complex scenarios of future 
development and growth and without reference to the socio-economic context in 
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which policy decisions had to be made. While one might have expected this to make 
the climate change discourse less relevant for policy-makers, the more scientistic 
worldview that it espoused was of greater appeal than the complex social linkages 
implied by a focus on sustainable development (Cohen et al., 1998, p.359). Climate 
change could be more easily problematised than sustainable development through a 
focus on greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn could be easily incorporated into a 
performance management framework, an approach which had become increasingly 
the norm in dealing with new policy issues (Hoggett, 1996, p.23).
Similarly to LA21, some local authorities interpreted the emergence of climate 
change as a public policy issue in the late 1990s as an opportunity for policy activism 
in the absence of any guidance from national government. However, any enthusiasm 
to act was constrained by an absence of relevant policy competences (in particular, 
restrictions on revenue raising and allocation) which left UK local authorities with 
Òprobably uniquely unfavourable circumstances for the implementation of local 
policiesÓ (Collier and Lfstedt, 1997, p.38). At the national level, the Blair 
GovernmentÕs election in 1997 provided an opportunity for new climate policies to 
be introduced; its manifesto committed to a tougher reduction target than Kyoto, 
requiring new measures if it were to be met (Smith, 2004, p.85). Policy measures 
were given impetus by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution with the 
Blair Government committing itself to its recommendation of a 60 per cent cut in 
UK carbon dioxide emissions by 2050; a marked increase in aspirations from 
previous governments driven by the evolving scientiÞc evidence on the level of 
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emissions required to limit global warming to an acceptable 2ûC (Lorenzoni et al., 
2008, pp.105-108; House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2007a, p.
31, Jordan, 2002, p.346; HM Government, 2006, p.4).  However, these developments 
were not expanded to the local level, with the potential contribution of councils to 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions overlooked by central government before 2006 
(House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008a, p.6; HM Government, 
2006, pp.106-109).
2.5 Regionalising climate change
The Government OfÞces established by the Major Government in 1994 marked a 
step towards increased regional activity (Wilson and Game, 2006, p.182), but it was 
the early years of the Blair Government which heralded a much sharper focus on 
regions as a spatial unit of governance, with the introduction of Regional Assemblies 
which were intended to form a new tier of elected government, and Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) with the responsibility to drive economic growth 
(Wilson and Game, 2006, pp.89-92). Regions were seen as a means of improving the 
integration of policy in key strategic areas such as planning and transport, both of 
which had implications for climate policy. On their introduction in 1998, one of the 
RDAsÕ Þve purposes was to Òcontribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development in the United KingdomÓ (Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, s.
4), although no linkages were speciÞed either with local authoritiesÕ existing LA21 
work or other regional organisations (Gibbs and Jonas, 2001, pp.280-281). A 
statutory duty appeared to be a step forward for the embedding of sustainable 
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development in regional policy, although analysis of supporting policy documents and 
guidance suggested a very narrow deÞnition of sustainability in which environmental 
protection was a means of achieving further economic growth (Gibbs, 2000, pp.
15-16). 
While RDAs had responsibility for Regional Economic Strategies, the Regional 
Assemblies produced Regional Spatial Strategies which covered social and 
environmental issues along with planning (Pearce and Ayres, 2009, p.550). The 
separation of these elements between parallel strategies and organisations 
highlighted that sustainable development, emphasising the interlinkages between the 
economic, social and environmental, was hard to implement as a priority issue within 
the new regional tier of governance. Including the regional Government OfÞces, 
there were three signiÞcant regional bodies with overlapping agendas and ambiguous 
relationships, often resulting in a reluctance to lead on speciÞc issues (Sustainable 
Development Commission, 2005, p.6; Pearce and Ayres, 2009, p.551) and feeding into 
concerns that insufÞcient capacity existed at both regional and local levels for 
effective implementation of national climate policy (Demeritt and Langdon, 2004, pp.
334-335).
As the evidence base around climate change impacts for the UK became more 
concrete, so the issue became established on the regional policy agenda as it had for 
local authorities. The East Midlands Sustainable Development Round Table, an 
independent body with members from regional agencies, local authorities, voluntary 
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organisations and business, commissioned the regionÕs Þrst report analysing the 
potential impacts of future climate change and the effects of new national 
greenhouse gas emission targets (East Midlands Sustainable Development Round 
Table, 2000, p.1; Devine-Wright et al., 2001, pp.165-166). With the demise of the 
Round Table, the East Midlands Regional Assembly (EMRA) developed climate change 
as a policy area as part of the Integrated Regional Strategy, moving from one small 
sub-section of the Environment Strategy (EMRA, 2002, pp.37-39; EMRA, 2003a, pp.
31-33) to becoming a primary consideration within the Energy Strategy two years 
later (EMRA, 2004, p.3). The Energy Strategy attracted some funding from the 
Department for Trade and Industry, which constituted the Þrst central government 
funding directed towards regional climate change mitigation work (Chadwick, 2012). 
During this process a Climate Change Steering Group emerged with members from 
a similarly wide representation as the previous Round Table (Climate East Midlands, 
2009). That such a group could be drawn together with little associated budget 
reßected the appetite within the region for trying to address the issue. The group 
was successful in attracting new members, with the number of attendees increasing 
from 11 to 19 between 2003 and 2006 (EMRA, 2003b; 2006). However, this 
increased participation also led to a loss of focus for the Steering Group and moves 
by the larger regional organisations - EMRA, East Midlands Development Agency 
(EMDA), Government OfÞce and Environment Agency - to develop a regional 
programme of action on climate change (EMRA, 2007). These organisations went on 
to form a slimmed down East Midlands Regional Climate Change Partnership 
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(EMRCCP) which superseded the Steering Group and published the Þnal 
Programme of Action (EMRCCP, 2009; Chadwick, 2012).
These changes took place against a background of the national governmentÕs 
subnational review in 2007, which made only perfunctory references to climate 
change and lacked detail on local and regional approaches to the issue (HM 
Treasury, 2007a; Jones, 2008, p.1). Notably, the review failed to develop a previous 
White Paper identifying RDAs as Òthe leading strategic economic and sustainable 
development body in the regionsÓ with a key role in delivering energy policy and 
emissions reduction (Department for Trade and Industry, 2007, pp.276-277). The 
Local Democracy, Economic Development, and Construction Act 2009 which 
emerged from the subnational review did give RDAs responsibility for spatial 
planning within new single regional strategies which had to Òinclude plans to tackle 
climate changeÓ (HM Government, 2009, p.94). This approach sought to overcome 
the previous separation of environmental, economic and social considerations 
between Regional Assemblies (abolished by the new Act) and RDAs in the early 
2000s. However, bringing all strategic issues into a single organisation did not ensure 
a more Ôjoined-upÕ policy approach. The introduction of single regional strategies 
gave RDAs responsibility for the regional contribution to emission reduction 
without elevating such a goal to the same priority as economic considerations; 
RDAsÕ performance became judged in terms of Gross Value Added (equal to Gross 
Domestic Product, plus product subsidies, minus product taxes), an economic 
measure of contribution to the economy excluding social and environmental factors 
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(House of Commons East Midlands Regional Committee, 2009, p.39). Within the 
East Midlands, the reluctance of EMDA (or any other organisation) to lead on 
sustainable development continued to hinder policy, with critics highlighting that 
EMDA consistently elevated economic development above environmental 
considerations, a priority reßected in the absence of any environmental expertise on 
EMDAÕs Board (House of Commons East Midlands Regional Committee, 2009, pp.
35-39). While RDAs were originally conceived as contributing to sustainable 
development, EMDAÕs weak commitment to environmental concerns supported 
GibbsÕs argument that such an aim would evolve into Òbusiness-as-usual with a slight 
green tingeÓ (2000, p.17). For climate policy, the obligation to include it in the 
regional strategy did provide a stronger context for the new East Midlands Regional 
Climate Change Partnership to introduce its new Programme of Action (2009, p.8). 
The new partnership did formalise links in climate policy between EMDA and other 
regional organisations, through staff time and some funding, but the activity was 
peripheral in the context of EMDAÕs overall priority for economic growth.
Despite this generally pessimistic view, EMDA did develop the Regional Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare, intended to broaden the traditional focus on 
economic measurement to include environmental and social issues (EMDA, 2006, pp.
176-177). Discussion of the index highlighted the narrowness of Gross Value Added 
as a performance indicator, excluding key sustainability concerns such as 
depreciation of natural capital, which would be accelerated by increasing greenhouse 
gas emissions (House of Commons East Midlands Regional Committee, 2009, pp.
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37-39; Jones, 2008, p.2). For example, a large scale renewable energy infrastructure 
project would be unlikely to provide economic returns in the short term, but would 
be more highly valued within an assessment of its longer term contribution to 
sustainable development and emission reduction. 
A new addition to the regional tier in 2008 were the Regional Improvement and 
EfÞciency Partnerships, part of a joint national initiative by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and the Local Government 
Association (LGA) (DCLG and LGA, 2008). These Partnerships differed from other 
regional tier organisations and networks in focusing exclusively on local authorities, 
aiming to help them improve efÞciency, work collaboratively, innovate and build 
capacity (East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership, 2010). The 
Partnerships received dedicated funding totalling £4 million over two years from 
both DCLG and the Department for the Environment for Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) for climate change best practice programmes to support local authorities 
who had included climate change National Indicators in their Local Area Agreements 
(Pearce and Cooper, 2011, pp.200-201; DEFRA, 2008). This was the Þrst stream of 
funding from central to English local government dedicated to climate change 
policies and represented a notable increase in the resources available to local 
authorities in this policy area (National Audit OfÞce, 2007, p.4). 
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2.6 Localising climate change
Parallel with these regional developments, the local government response to climate 
change became more formalised under the banner of the Nottingham Declaration 
(Gearty, 2007, p.38), a voluntary agreement which committed signatory councils 
from across the UK to Òdevelop plans with our partners and local communities to 
progressively address the causes and the impacts of climate changeÓ (Nottingham 
Declaration on Climate Change, 2005). The increasing number of councils signing the 
Declaration demonstrated the rising priority of climate change as a local 
government policy issue and their desire to show their commitment to local 
residents as well as partner organisations (House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Committee, 2008a, pp.20-21). After its establishment by Nottingham City Council in 
2000 and a co-ordinated launch to all of local government in 2005, 340 local 
authorities in the UK had signed the Declaration by 2009 (Footitt et al., 2007, pp.
12-13; Gearty, 2007, p.9; HM Government, 2009, p.94). While a signiÞcant 
achievement for a document initially designed for one local authority, this still 
represented a Òlong tailÓ of local authorities who had not demonstrated any 
commitment to climate policy (Carty and Hislop, 2007, p.4). This was not the case in 
the East Midlands, which was the Þrst English region to have all of its local 
authorities sign the Declaration (EMRCCP, 2009, p.3). However, such commitment 
did not necessarily translate into actions. Desktop research undertaken by the 
Tyndall Centre in 2007 indicated that only a third of signatory councils in the UK 
had climate change strategies in place, few of which encompassed all areas of local 
authority control (Carty and Hislop, 2007, p.8). There was a danger that local 
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authority engagement with climate policy would not go beyond Òa framed copy of 
the declaration hung in the reception area of a council buildingÓ (House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008a, p.22). Whether or not this 
proved to be the case, the public nature of local authoritiesÕ commitment through 
the Declaration would prove signiÞcant in the negotiations of Local Area 
Agreements in later years.
The UK GovernmentÕs 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review set policy priorities 
up to 2011 through thirty Public Service Agreements, which established the basis for 
performance management within Whitehall up to 2011 (HM Treasury, 2007b). 
Climate change was identiÞed as a priority in its own right, forming the sole focus of 
Public Service Agreement 27 (HM Treasury, 2007c) while remaining environmental 
issues were bundled together in Public Service Agreement 28 (HM Treasury, 2007d). 
This encapsulated the rise of climate change up the national policy agenda to eclipse 
sustainable development and shift the focus of what could be loosely described as 
the Ôenvironmental agendaÕ (National Audit OfÞce, 2010, p.12). Public Service 
Agreement 27 made scant reference to sustainable development, explicitly casting 
climate change as a Òglobal issue that demands a global responseÓ and saying that the 
UK would Òadopt and promote policies which reduce greenhouse gas emissionsÓ 
within its own borders (HM Treasury, 2007c, p.3). The role of local government was 
conÞned to one paragraph (3.38), listing councilsÕ key areas of potential inßuence 
within climate change mitigation (HM Treasury, 2007c, p.15): transport, planning, 
development control, buildings control, waste authorities, service delivery, local 
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governmentÕs own estates, operations and supply chain, inßuencing local partners, 
and regeneration.
While highlighting key areas, the document did not set any level of ambition for local 
government policy or make any linkages between councils and other parts of the 
agreementÕs delivery strategy, continuing the trend of disconnect between the spatial 
tiers in both sustainable development and climate policy. However, the document did 
provide the context for the later introduction of performance management for local 
carbon dioxide emissions within National Indicators.
The Comprehensive Spending Review and Public Service Agreements set the 
context for the NIs introduced in 2008, intended to provide central government 
with a single set of measures to track local government progress in priority policy 
areas (DCLG, 2008, pp.5-7). Local authorities formed Local Strategic Partnerships 
with local stakeholders which negotiated Local Area Agreements (LAAs) to cover 
the period 2008-11 with the regional Government OfÞce, setting local policy 
priorities with targets measurable using NIs (DCLG, 2007, p.5). Two NIs covering 
carbon dioxide emissions were created in relation to Public Service Agreement 27 
as shown in Table 1 (DCLG, 2008, p.12).
    
Table 1. DeÞnitions of National Indicators relating to climate change mitigation
NI Title
185 CO2 reduction from local authority operations
186 Per capita reduction in CO2 emission in the local authority area
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Adapted from DCLG (2008, p.51)
NI185 had a narrow focus, reporting only emissions from a local authority's own 
operations (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009, p.55) (DECC). NI186 
was a broader measure based on new ofÞcial statistics issued by the OfÞce for 
National Statistics for area-wide carbon dioxide emissions per capita, but omitting 
large point emissions sources which were judged to be beyond the inßuence of local 
authorities, such as motorways and members of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(for example, large power stations) (DCLG, 2008, p.51). Out of 150 LAAs within 
England, 100 set targets for the reduction of either NI185 or NI186 over three 
years (Eadson, 2008, p.140). Such was climate changeÕs rapid rise to prominence that 
it was the Þfth most selected policy priority in LAAs, proving more popular than 
more established issues such as crime, childhood obesity and educational 
achievements (Schroeder and Bulkeley, 2009, p.324). 
Climate change indicators were even more prevalent in the East Midlands, featuring 
in all nine LAAs negotiated within the region (EMRCCP, 2009, p.15). Such 
widespread commitment should be seen in the context of the entire regionÕs local 
authorities signing the Nottingham Declaration.  While this was a voluntary, non-
binding document it opened the door to further policy development, converging 
with central government (through Government OfÞce) pressure to establish climate 
change mitigation within all local authoritiesÕ performance management regimes. 
Only two of the nine East Midlands LAAs selected NI185 as their indicator, the 
remainder choosing the wider NI186. On the surface, NI186 may have appeared the 
more sensible indicator to adopt; its area-wide focus meant that it already included 
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the local authority operations measured by NI185, enabling local authorities to get 
Òboth indicators É for the price of oneÓ and rendering NI185 superßuous (Pearce 
and Cooper, 2011, p.209). However, local authorities had concerns over NI186 
which, whilst not preventing inclusion of the indicator in LAAs, were to play a role in 
subsequent implementation. 
Targets set within the regionÕs LAAs amounted to an aggregate reduction of 10 per 
cent per capita in area-wide carbon dioxide emissions by 2011 (compared to 2005 
levels), mostly comprising the commitments made under NI186 (EMRCCP, 2009, p.
15). A national study supporting NI186Õs initial development found that the potential 
inßuence of local measures on emissions reduction was small in comparison to that 
of measures enacted nationally without local input (AEA Technology, 2008, p,36; 
Eadson, 2008, p.146):
1. Purely national measures but still inßuencing community emissions, (71.2 
per cent); 
2. National measures but can be improved in performance with inßuence by 
local authorities (25.9 per cent); 
3. Purely local measures implemented by local authorities or other 
organisations (2.8 per cent).
The second category seemed to provide the greatest potential for local inßuence 
but requires detailed analysis to discover the degree of inßuence organisations had 
in implementation. Even if the latter was signiÞcant, the overall picture was one of 
local performance under NI186 being largely determined by national policies. 
Central government estimated that by 2010, the second and third categories above 
would only produce a total reduction of 5.1 per cent on 2005 levels (DECC, 2009, p.
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56). Compared with the East MidlandsÕ aggregate target of 10 per cent, this suggests 
that organisations within the region had inßuence over only half of the emissions 
they had committed themselves to reduce.
The adoption of these indicators raises questions about the extent to which 
ÔgovernanceÕ is replacing government from the centre in climate policy. There is 
evidence that DEFRA (the government department then responsible for climate 
change mitigation) applied pressure on regional Government OfÞces to include 
NI186 in their LAAs, although other central government departments also lobbied 
for their indicators to be prioritised (Eadson, 2008, p.140; Pearce and Cooper, 2011, 
p.209). The East MidlandsÕ approach is described as Òbottom upÓ in that only local 
areas set targets for emission reduction, not the region as a whole (EMRCCP, 2009, 
p.15). The levels of these targets were negotiated locally; central government were 
involved in negotiations through Government OfÞce but did not intervene to ensure 
that the aggregated ambition of local authorities was equal to that implied by 
national policy (something that would be hard to do without universal sign-up to 
climate change indicators). Instead, central government control was imposed 
through the deÞnition of NI186, with local areas being unable to deviate from the 
single methodology set by DEFRA (Eadson, 2008, p.145). As well as applying the 
same criteria to diverse local areas, by focusing on reducing an areaÕs carbon dioxide 
emissions the indicator left local authorities and their partners trying to achieve 
outcomes which they had limited power to address.
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Greenhouse gas emissions enjoyed a privileged position in the construction of 
climate change as a policy issue which led to their adoption as a measure of 
performance in global policy (see pages 28-33). This Þltered down to the national 
and subnational levels, but had unintended consequences for local authorities. Within 
the range of greenhouse gases, the only local area data available when LAAs were 
introduced were for carbon dioxide emissions (this remains the case at the time of 
writing) (AEA Technology, 2008, p.2). Local authoritiesÕ policy options were in danger 
of being constrained by the lack of performance management data. By taking carbon 
dioxide emission reduction to be synonymous with tackling climate change, local 
areas risked diverting resources away from areas where they had greater inßuence 
over policy. For example, local authorities have statutory powers in waste 
management which could be used to reduce the release of methane from landÞll 
sites, a powerful greenhouse gas but not one measured within the NI186 
methodology (Eadson, 2008, p.145). This is similar to the Òoutput distortionsÓ 
chronicled in the literature on the Blair GovernmentÕs healthcare targets, a case of 
Òhitting the target but missing the pointÓ (Hood, 2006, p.516). In the case of NI186, 
hitting the target may not have constituted missing the point, carbon dioxide being 
an important contributor to climate change. Rather it would be attempting to hit the 
target that would be missing the point as local authorities had only peripheral 
inßuence over the level of emissions. Local actors faced a dilemma about doing the 
Òright jobÓ in terms of performance management - attempting to maximise this 
inßuence over their NI186 targets - or focusing on more effective policy ÔleversÕ 
which lay outside the boundaries of NI186 (Hoggett, 1996, p.24). These weaknesses 
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in NI186, and the role they played in subsequent policy activity, are discussed further 
in Chapter 6.
2.7 Legislating and regulating for climate change
While the subnational picture evolved, there were two further key developments at 
a national level: the passing of legislation establishing a legal basis for emission 
reduction targets, and the development of the Carbon Reduction Commitment, 
regulation to encourage organisations outside the EU Emissions Trading Scheme - 
including many local authorities - to reduce their own emissions.
2.7.1 Climate Change Act 2008 and the Committee on Climate 
Change
Parallel to the introduction of NIs, the Climate Change Act was passed in late 2008, 
making the UK the Þrst country in the world to establish legally binding targets for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 and 2050 (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change, n.d.). The Act also created the Committee on Climate Change 
(CCC), an independent public body consisting of academic experts from a range of 
disciplines which was responsible for setting carbon budgets which set the 
trajectory for reducing emissions in the years up to 2050 (Ares, 2008, pp.34-35; 
CCC, 2008, v; McGregor et al., 2010, pp.29-32). 
ScientiÞc evidence was at the heart of the UK GovernmentÕs emissions target prior 
to the Climate Change BillÕs introduction. In 2000, the Royal Commission on 
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Environmental Pollution recommended the UK should cut its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 60 per cent by 2050 (against 1990 levels), a marked increase on the 
aspirations of the 1992 Rio Summit stabilisation agreement (Lorenzoni et al., 2008, 
pp.105-108) and a Òbold challengeÓ to the Blair Government to set targets well in 
excess of their international and European obligations (Jordan, 2002, p.346). The new 
target was accepted by the Government as part of a global objective to keep the 
atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide below 550 parts per million, with a 
view to restricting the global mean temperature increase on pre-industrial times to 
2.3¼C by 2100 (Department for Trade and Industry, 2003, p.8; Committee on 
Climate Change, 2008, p.9). Such a rise would be slightly above the 2¼C which came 
to be regarded by policy-makers in later years as a Òguard railÓ against the most 
dangerous impacts of climate change (New et al., 2011, p.6). However, such a 
temperature rise would still be likely to cause worsening disease, crop yields, fresh 
water supply and ßooding for many parts of the world, as well as signiÞcant species 
extinction and the potential for irreversible decline of the Greenland ice sheet 
(Stern, 2007, pp.66-67).
The 60 per cent target was maintained as the BillÕs centrepiece until less than two 
months before its Royal Assent, when the Brown Government accepted the interim 
advice of the shadow CCC to increase the 2050 target to 80 per cent (Turner, 
2008; Committee on Climate Change, n.d.). The CCCÕs subsequent report speciÞed 
that they were Òresponding to developments in scienceÓ in recommending the 
increase (Committee on Climate Change 2008, p.31). It was notable that new 
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scientiÞc evidence could motivate such a change near the end of the BillÕs passage 
through Parliament, particularly as the government had rejected a Liberal Democrat 
proposal for an 80 per cent target earlier in the year (Ares, 2008, pp.46-47). The 
issue of climate change has long been constructed as a scientiÞc problem caused by 
the heat-trapping properties of greenhouse gases, while largely overlooking the 
political or economic dimensions that were more prevalent within previous 
discussions of sustainable development policy (Cohen et al., 1998, pp.360-361; 
Demeritt, 2001, pp.328-329). The narrow framing of greenhouse gas emissions as the 
ÔproblemÕ to be addressed has inevitably led to a focus on the reduction of these 
emissions as climate policyÕs raison dÕtre. This way of seeing climate change has also 
contributed to a focus on technological solutions (Eastin et al., 2011, p.24-25), 
manifested in the CCCÕs focus on the potential for emissions reduction by sector 
(e.g. surface transport, power, shipping) rather than by spatial area (CCC, 2008, pp.
116-133).
The narrow focus on scientiÞc evidence as a source for policy-making has resulted 
in legislation that sets an unprecedented, time-sensitive challenge for the UK 
Government. Meeting the 2050 target would require the reversal of almost constant 
growth in emissions since the Industrial Revolution (Stern, 2007, p.5) followed by an 
unprecedented level of decarbonisation. Successfully implementing the number of 
programmes required to do this is an exceptional challenge given the increasingly 
complex linkages in the public policy process across space and time, of which 
climate policy is an example (Helm et al., 2003, pp.447-448; Stern, 2007, pp.65-160; 
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Hill and Hupe, 2009, p.41). With such an unprecedented and ambitious policy 
commitment, there must be doubt about whether such targets are domestically 
attainable (Pielke Jr., 2009; New et al., 2011, pp.8-10), and whether they will turn out 
to be consistent with the broader aim of restricting the global temperature rise to 
2¼C (Bows et al., 2009, pp.9-11). 
In sum, the passing of the Climate Change Act reinforced the continued primacy of 
scientiÞc evidence, and the consequent focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, 
within the making of climate policy (Demeritt, 2001, p.310). While this mode of 
policy-making was consistent with restricting global temperature rises, it 
downplayed the political dimension of such policies (see Figure 2), a trend 
exacerbated by the introduction of the CCC as an independent, statutory body 
responsible for recommending policy goals as well as the policies required to 
achieve them. This deÞciency in political context was not an accidental feature of the 
CCC; it was established with the intent of recommending policy measures over the 
medium and long terms independent of short term political considerations. 
However, this brings with it a decreased relevance in the public sphere, particularly 
for subnational policy-makers who have received little guidance. The government 
attempted to Þll this gap in 2012 by requesting that the CCC offer guidance to local 
authorities (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2011, p.12; CCC, 
2012)7.
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7 The CCC report was consulted on and published subsequent to the period of research Þeldwork. It 
is considered further in Chapter 8.
2.7.2 Carbon Reduction Commitment
The Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) was originally conceived to start 
operating as a Ôcap and tradeÕ scheme in April 2010. Organisations were required to 
purchase allowances for their carbon dioxide emissions, a limited number being 
available from government with the ability to buy additional allowances from other 
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Figure 2. The development of UK climate policy
Source: CCC (2011, p.103)
organisations if the initial allocation was insufÞcient (Environment Agency, 2010, pp.
4-5).  The scheme regulates the largest public and private sector organisations which 
fall below the threshold for membership of the similarly market-based EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme or are not covered by Climate Change Agreements, covering most 
of EnglandÕs upper tier local authorities. 
The schemeÕs name was changed before launch to add the words Ôenergy 
efÞciencyÓ, suggesting a perception that the Þnancial beneÞts of action must be 
emphasised rather than an appeal to reducing emissions for their own sake. The 
CRC was Òdesigned to raise awarenessÓ for improving energy efÞciency and 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 
2010a). This echoed the successes attributed to the Climate Change Levy 
introduced in 2001, with the policy being at its most effective prior to full 
implementation as industry hurried to increase efÞciency in order to reduce the 
cost of the Levy once it was introduced (Ekins and Etheridge, 2006, p.2080; House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008b, p.11). Financial beneÞts are also 
provided by returning permit revenues to organisations according to their 
performance compared with other participants during the year (Environment 
Agency, 2010, p.4). The potential for bad publicity from poor performance has the 
potential to spur greater high-level action within an organisation than uncertain 
Þnancial beneÞts. 
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This policy design provided the basis for local authoritiesÕ planning on how best to 
respond to the CRC. However, the scheme was altered signiÞcantly in the early 
stages of the Þeldwork for this research project. The Þrst Comprehensive Spending 
Review under the new Cameron Government removed the trading element, 
signiÞcantly increasing the likely costs to local authorities (HM Treasury, 2010, p.62; 
Williams, 2010). The implications of this for local authorities are examined in section 
6.6.3 (see pages 225-228).
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has set out the historical context for researching subnational climate 
policy, from its emergence as a global issue in 1988 to its prominent position in 
public policy twenty years later. The developing strategic role of local authorities 
within the broader realm of environmental policy in the late 1980s became more 
concrete and widespread following the arrival of LA21. This development of local 
capacity and space for environmental policy was a precursor for the localisation of 
climate change as a policy issue. This extension of sustainable development from 
being primarily a global agenda to one having a strong local dimension was mirrored 
by later developments in climate change mitigation, which moved from being an 
issue driven by scientiÞc evidence and global negotiations to one also of interest to 
local policy-makers. Climate change Þtted well with the existing growth in local 
environmental concerns as it was typically painted as an environmental issue by 
national government, with climate policy documents being issued by governmentÕs 
environmental departments (Department of the Environment, 1994, 1997; DEFRA, 
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2006a, 2006b). However, without clear guidance on the local relevance of climate 
change as a policy issue, a piecemeal approach developed within local authorities 
with a large gap developing between the most active councils and the 'long tail' who 
were doing little or nothing to engage with the issue.
While the Blair Government provided new impetus in the shape of greater 
prioritisation and stronger targets for emission reductions, there remained a 
disregard for the role of local authorities in climate policy. In the continued absence 
of central government setting a clear role for local authorities, the Nottingham 
Declaration developed as a 'bottom-up' symbol of local government's commitment to 
the issue. The Blair Government was clearer on the responsibilities of the new 
regional organisations for sustainable development in conjunction with strategic 
issues such as economic growth, planning and transport. As with local authorities, an 
initial focus on sustainable development created the conditions for climate change to 
emerge as a regional policy issue. Within the East Midlands, this led to the formation 
of a new climate change partnership between a small number of regional actors 
which developed a regional Programme of Action.
Almost twenty years after climate change Þrst became prominent within global 
policy, its climb up the policy agenda was such that it became by far the dominant 
environmental issue within the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review, a set of 
documents which provided the context for the NIs and new local government 
performance framework. This marked the Þrst instance of explicit top-down 
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direction to local authorities on climate policy in the form of indicators by which 
the carbon dioxide emissions of local areas and local authorities could be measured. 
These provided a focus for local government action and targets for emissions 
reduction were enthusiastically adopted by local authorities across England and 
particularly within the East Midlands where all Local Strategic Partnerships made 
reducing emissions a core priority. This provides a key context for researching the 
work done by East Midlands councils in implementing climate policy, particularly 
with the focus being placed on the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions rather 
than other areas over which local authorities potentially hold more inßuence. 
More generally, the waxing and waning of sustainable development as a policy issue 
echoes Downs's issue-attention cycle, which proposed that environmental issues 
begin with expert knowledge, gain notoriety with public discovery before gradually 
falling in priority as the scale of the problem becomes clear and newer issues vie for 
a limited supply of public attention (1972, pp.39-42). The emergence of climate 
change overtook sustainable development as the environmental issue of primary 
concern to policy-makers in the 2000s as UK media coverage of climate change 
grew signiÞcantly (Boykoff, 2011, p.26). As local authorities begin to face the 
difÞculties of implementing policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, exacerbated 
by signiÞcantly reduced budgets (Travers, 2011, pp.8-9), climate change may suffer a 
similar decline in attention as sustainable development and other environmental 
issues have done previously (Lockwood, 2011).
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The 2008 Climate Change Act continued the trend for scientiÞc evidence providing 
the primary input for climate policy, setting policy goals and timeframes 
commensurate with modelling by climatologists looking to keep global temperature 
increases below levels seen as dangerous to society. While this appeared a rational 
approach, it risked understating the difÞculties of introducing measures which would 
bring about unprecedented decarbonisation across all areas of public policy. It is 
argued that this constituted a Òknowledge-driven model ... [where] ... it is assumed that 
research leads policyÓ, scientists providing the initial impetus before government 
investment brings a policy to fruition (Young et al., 2002, p.216, original emphasis). 
This rational-scientiÞc approach to policy-making again raises the question of the 
extent and effectiveness of climate policy implementation. 
In summary, focusing on carbon dioxide emissions as an indicator of progress places 
climate policy at something of a disconnect from more everyday issues of public 
policy. The late 2000s marked a period of enthusiasm for action to achieve signiÞcant 
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions but without strong guidance from the centre 
on how subnational actors could meet such ambitions. With the use of carbon-
intensive energy intrinsic to almost every aspect of society there was the potential 
for policy-makers to address a plethora of sources for carbon dioxide emissions. 
These various interpretations of climate policy could become further complicated 
by the emphasis on partnership working between local and regional actors. Rather 
than bringing about an agreement between partners on addressing climate change 
(Bulkeley and Kern, 2006, p.2255), partnerships may provide only a "shallow 
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consensus" displacing a discussion of the more fundamental economic and social 
implications of carbon reduction targets (Davies, 2009, p.81). Whereas sustainable 
development explicitly ties together the environmental, social and economic, climate 
policy rests far more on evidence from the scientiÞc world, leaving a gap with the 
socio-political world of public policy. Multiple, diverse interpretations can be 
expected to ßourish in each approach, but in sustainable development, the inclusion 
of social concerns holds out a greater prospect for such interpretations to be 
considered as part of the policy-making process. The rational-scientiÞc approach to 
evidence and targets embodied within climate policy implies that such 
interpretations are more likely to be seen as deviant than diverse, leading to the 
perception of an implementation ÔgapÕ. 
The next chapter develops these ideas further, with a review of the interpretive 
approach in the social sciences, a broad view of how this has been applied in the 
public policy literature, and a speciÞc examination of Bevir and RhodesÕs decentred 
approach and the its links to implementation studies.
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3. Interpretation and policy: a 
decentred approach
3.1 Introduction
The last chapter argued how climate change has become a prominent public policy 
issue since the late 1980s, with the UK introducing stretching targets for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the Climate Change Act and many local authorities, 
including all those within the East Midlands, committing themselves to reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions between 2008 and 2011 through Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs) and National Indicators (NIs). These targets reßected the general scale of 
decarbonisation ambition across much of the developed world, and although many 
stakeholders in climate policy were pleased that legislation had been introduced in 
support of these targets (Confederation of British Business, 2007, p.4, 2008; Trades 
Union Congress, 2007; Friends of the Earth, 2008; Joint Public Issues Team, 2008), it 
also opened up a new set of questions about how policies intended to contribute to 
emissions cuts were being implemented (Pielke Jr., 2010, pp.107-111). Put simply, 
could these ambitious new policies be acted upon Ôon the groundÕ? 
This chapter progresses from a macro-level discussion of theories of knowledge to 
focus down on the case for adopting a decentred approach to studying the 
subnational implementation of climate policy:
¥ tracing the roots of interpretive enquiry within the social sciences, and its 
inßuence in the production of a theory of knowledge;
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¥ the application of interpretive enquiry within public policy research, with a 
particular focus on the strengths and weaknesses of Bevir and RhodesÕs 
decentred approach;
¥ a re-examination of the decentred approachÕs strengths and weaknesses 
within the context of policy implementation studies; 
¥ how this critique impacts on the particular case of subnational climate 
change policy. 
The chapter will locate interpretive policy analysis within the broader debate around 
the theory of knowledge since the mid-nineteenth century. In doing so, it will 
establish the theoretical bases for the remainder of the thesis, demonstrating that 
regardless of the import one attaches to the concept of reality within the social 
world, interpretations are fundamental to understanding a Þeld of study. These 
insights will be taken forward into studies of public policy, critiquing the decentred 
approach with insights from alternative interpretive approaches and the policy 
implementation literature. 
3.2 Interpretive approaches to social science
3.2.1 The roots of positivism
To understand the Òinterpretive turnÓ from the positivist approaches pre-eminent in 
public administration and public policy studies (Rhodes, 2011a), it is helpful to review 
the developing critique of positivism across the social sciences in the second half of 
the twentieth century (Hawkesworth, 2006a).  The roots of positivism can be traced 
to the work of Auguste Comte (Benton and Craib, 2001, p.22), who saw all branches 
of human knowledge as passing through three stages of development: theological, 
metaphysical and positive (1853, pp.1-2). Comte characterised the Þrst two stages as 
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a vain search for forces which were inherent in all beings, before alighting on a third 
stage of using Òreasoning and observationÓ to discover laws founded on Òinvariable 
relations of succession and resemblanceÓ (1853, p.2). This positive philosophy, which 
came to be known as ÔpositivismÕ, sought to reduce these laws to the smallest 
number possible in a manner analogous to the natural sciences. While several 
branches of knowledge were seen as having undergone this transition, Comte 
regarded the study of social phenomena as remaining within the Þrst two stages 
(1853, p.7). Following Comte, positivist research has sought to apply natural science 
method within the social sciences; making objective knowledge claims based on the 
identiÞcation of causal relationships between variables (Haverland and Yanow, 2012, 
pp.403-404). In the practice of research, empirical data is collected and analysed in a 
manner assumed to be replicable across a range of circumstances, allowing research 
results to be comparable across cases and general principles to be derived and 
applied to other cases. Such principles can be treated as predictive of societal 
phenomena and used as the basis for disciplines within the social sciences (Benton 
and Craib, 2001, pp.26-27). This includes the branch of knowledge of interest in this 
project, public policy. The implication is that the human world can be known in the 
same way as the physical world, that the relationship between actors in the policy 
process can be understood in the same way as the relationships between atomic 
particles in a laboratory (Comte, 1853, pp.5-6). 
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3.2.2 From causation to meaning
Moving outside of the laboratory into the social world, the positivist search for 
correlation and causation in the relationship between variables meets two signiÞcant 
challenges. First, the researcher must control for variables which offer possible 
alternative explanations for a policy outcome (Haverland and Yanow, 2012, p.404). 
One review of the policy implementation literature identiÞed over 300 such 
variables (OÕToole, 1986, pp.185-188; Matland, 1995, pp.145-146). Second, even if it 
were possible to prove correlation in such a complex environment, such 
associations are unable to reveal causal mechanisms (Archer, 1998, p.69). While it 
may be possible to model relevant variables for a particular phenomenon, the 
complexity and contingency of societyÕs open systems mean such a model cannot be 
expected to provide general predictions of cases (Clegg, 2006).8 In response to the 
positivist approach, interpretivism marked an epistemological transformation in 
recognising the differences between the physical and human (social) world as 
subjects of knowledge, the former typiÞed by closed laboratory conditions of 
scientiÞc study, the latter being an open system containing multifarious variables 
(Archer, 1998, p.69; Clegg, 2006, p.185). This change marked a turn from a search for 
a phenomenonÕs causes to its meaning (Weber, 1922/1978, p.7). This meaning is 
contingent on an actorÕs particular position and perspective on an issue at a point in 
time (Weber, 1922/1978, p.21; Benton and Craib, 2001, p.82). The interpretive 
approach recognises that a number of different views of the same object can co-
exist and can be represented within an account presented by a researcher. 
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8 Variables within the social sciences are themselves constructed by the researcher, and do not have 
the same physical presence as variables in the natural sciences.
3.2.3 Interpretations and ways of seeing9
The development of interpretive epistemology within social sciences was mirrored 
by similar ideas in the arts (Berger, 1972a, p.155). One example each from the early 
and late twentieth century will be used here to represent interpretive ideas and as 
metaphors for undertaking interpretive enquiry within the social sciences. The cubist 
art movement emerged between 1906 and 1908 (Cooper, 1971, p.11), with artists 
such as Picasso, Braque and Gris seeking to undergo Òthe task of representing things 
as informatively, suggestively and from as many different aspects as 
possibleÓ (Museum of Modern Art, 2010).  Rather than seeking to faithfully represent 
a subject from a single perspective, the artist created a new representation from the 
overlapping of fragments from a variety of different perspectives.  The resulting 
image remained recognisably of the subject, while challenging orthodox notions of 
the relations between time and space. 
One example of this is The Breakfast, by cubist artist Jean Gris (see Image 1). GrisÕs 
re-editing of a typical breakfast scene provides an example of how the constituent 
elements of a particular subject may not Þt together in the way the viewer 
anticipates. Rather than sitting in the background, the striped wallpaper ßows across 
the table. The left edge of the foremost cup and saucer is not visible.
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9 Hatch and Yanow (2008) review the links between particular moments in art history, including 
cubism, and different methodological approaches in the social sciences. 
Source: Gris (1914)
The table which the scene rests upon appears to be an amalgam of two separate 
tables, with corners and legs found in unusual places. By drawing attention to a range 
of views with which one could view the breakfast scene, Gris reminds the viewer 
that a single perspective cannot provide the absolute truth of a subject; different 
angles bring some elements into the foreground while pushing others to the back. 
68
Image 1. A different way of seeing
By juxtaposing fragments of these views within one image, the role of the viewer is 
brought into focus. One cannot set oneself apart from the subject one is studying. 
Rather, the viewerÕs way of seeing is contingent on their position within the world 
judged in terms of criteria such as time, space and prior knowledge (Berger, 1972b, 
pp.16-19). 
Returning to our Þeld of study, public policy, we can contrast GrisÕs view with a 
depiction of a policy process from the literature:
Figure 3. The policy cycle: a ÔstagistÕ approach to studying public policy 
Figure 3, above, is a development of simple representation of the policy process in 
Figure 1. Rather than the latterÕs linear progression towards an end-point of 
implementation, Figure 3 closes the circle through an evaluation of the policy which 
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Adapted from Parsons (1995, p.77).
opens the way for an eventual reappraisal of the problem. Clearly, a diagram of the 
policy cycle is not intended to be aesthetically compared to that of any artistic 
work. However, they can be compared in their ways of seeing the world. The policy 
cycle presents the world as tidy, parcelling up particular aspects of policy-making 
into discrete phases (Parsons, 1995, p.79).  In contrast, while the overall subject of 
GrisÕs painting is discernible, there are unexpected intrusions and omissions and the 
relationships between the elements are harder to grasp. This messiness highlights 
the heuristic value of the policy cycle diagram but also acts as a reminder that such 
heuristics are not the only way to think about the social sciences. 
Highlighting that life itself does not resemble ideal types is not a novel observation 
(Weber, 1922/1978, p.10), and without the certainty provided by diagrams and causal 
relationships, understanding public policy could quickly become a thankless task, 
dissolving into a fragmented morass without any means of appraising the 
associations between them (Parsons, 1995, p.80). However, it is worth reafÞrming 
that neat typologies and diagrams can only go so far in aiding understanding of the 
social world, and that such heuristics may obfuscate if they offer an over-simpliÞed 
depiction of a policy issue. Gris offers an artistic interpretation which, while limited 
in its own way, allows for ßuidity, uncertainty and variability without losing sight of 
his aim to depict a simple breakfast scene. In the case of this research, the aim is to 
understand the complexity of climate policy implementation, an area of study where 
one can imagine an abundance of potential viewpoints yielding fresh insights into the 
process of public policy. 
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3.2.4 Multiple interpretations and The Matrix
CubismÕs focus on multiple perspectives continued to exert an inßuence in the late 
twentieth century. An example from the world of cinema illustrates how an 
interpretive approach can aid thinking about the research process. The Ôtime sliceÕ 
technique developed in the early 1990s by Macmillan (2009) placed multiple cameras 
around a subject and edited together the resulting still images, giving the impression 
of a single camera moving around the subject. The effect became common in popular 
cinema following its use in The Matrix (Wachowski and Wachowski, 1999), where it 
was known as Òbullet timeÓ (Green, 1999; Oreck, 1999; Cotton, 2011). Image 2 
shows the rig built on the Þlm set to create the effect.
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Image 2. Multiple cameras to create Ôbullet timeÕ effect on set of The Matrix 
Source: Cotton (2011)
The bullet time rig provides a metaphor for the interpretive research process within 
the social sciences. Each camera represents a different way of seeing the world. Two 
adjacent cameras may provide very similar views of the subject while cameras on 
opposite sides of the rig will reveal little or no material common to both views. The 
researcher cannot know how many ÔcamerasÕ they will look through during a 
project, and what they see through the lens will likely be less predictable than the 
Þxed view of a single subject shown in Image 2. The bullet time rig is a reminder that 
there are multiple perspectives on any one subject, although the practicalities of 
research will limit the number of ÔcamerasÕ that the researcher can look through; 
choices will have to be made about which to include and which to exclude. These 
choices may be based on ÕknownsÕ, such as time constraints, or ÔunknownsÕ, such as 
those potential perspectives which remain unnoticed by a particular researcher 
(these perspectives not necessarily being in such plain sight as the cameras shown in 
Image 2). Such perspectives may reveal themselves part way through the project 
requiring ßexibility in research plans and methods, or may remain hidden 
throughout. 
In using the bullet time rig as a metaphor for ways of seeing, it is important not to 
get carried away by the concept of a 360¼ view of a subject. Even if all the possible 
cameras focusing on the subject were visible and available to the researcher, it is not 
a means by which a detached, objective view point can be arrived at. The prior 
values and concepts held by the researcher still exert an inßuence on what they see 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, pp.204-205). The researcher attempts to take account of this 
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prior knowledge and their place in the world, and how they provide a backdrop for 
their way of seeing through particular lenses (Barton, 2006, p.70). To provide an 
example, in Image 2 imagine a line of people waiting behind the photographer to 
take their turn looking through that particular lens. Each person in the line will bring 
different banks of prior knowledge to the camera which will inßuence their way of 
seeing (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.27). If the subject visible through the lens was a 
dog, then a breeder may pay particular attention to how it compares to Kennel Club 
breeding standards, a veterinarian may concentrate on the dogÕs health, a cynophobic 
may Þnd that they focus on the size of its teeth, and so on. This echoes 
phenomenologyÕs notion of ÔlifeworldsÕ (Lebenswelt), the individualsÕ Þelds of 
consciousness which are used to produce and reproduce meaning in the world 
around them (Husserl, 1970 p.108; Yanow, 2006a, pp.12-13).10 It is this background 
knowledge that each of the viewers of the dog utilises to create their own meaning 
of the animal. This knowledge may derive from professional training in the case of 
the veterinarian, or personal experience in the case of the cynophobic (Yanow, 
2000, p.6). Similarly, researchers coming from different traditions of policy analysis 
will come to differing conclusions on the meaning of the subject being studied and 
the lessons (if any) which can be drawn for the future (Allison and Zelikow, 1999).  
This emphasis on multiple perspectives and meanings, both of actors within the Þeld 
being researched and the researchers observing them, leave us with a much messier 
picture than that presented by the positivist approach, and has implications for the 
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10 This is a broad re-interpretation of the term. For a critique of HusserlÕs original usage of the 
concept, see Carr (1970).
knowledge claims of research. By extension, eschewing generalisable models and 
embracing the messiness of Ôreal lifeÕ leaves the interpretive approach open to the 
charge of relativism which can only support description, not understanding: 
ÒScience gave way to sitting in on a multitude of local language games, 
which lacked common sense and thus were only amenable to aesthetic 
appreciation and never to practical evaluation.Ó (Archer, 1998, p.71)
Now, any Ôpractical evaluationÕ of othersÕ interpretations is dependent on sharing the 
same prior knowledge or Òforms of lifeÓ (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp.88-89, p.226). Our 
prior knowledge is borne of our experience and remains rooted within that 
experience (Husserl, 1913/1931, p.51; Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p.15). Hence, a 
shared understanding between individuals can only come through them having shared 
previous experiences. Where actors interpret a subject in different ways, one can 
attempt to bring them closer together by giving them the same texts to read. 
However, the actorsÕ reading of the new material is still contingent on their own 
prior knowledge, so a further background text is required to bring the 
interpretations together, and so on ad inÞnitum to form a Òhermeneutic 
circleÓ (Taylor, 1971, p.6). Such an argument implies that relativism is an inevitable 
consequence of interpretivism since the prior knowledge which people bring to a 
situation is contingent, leaving individuals only with the ability to appreciate, not 
evaluate. However, it is possible to withdraw from the ideal type described above by 
Archer and take a more nuanced approach to the role of interpretations within the 
social sciences.
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3.2.5 Resisting relativism
Returning to the example of the dog, hermeneutics argues that if a number of 
veterinarians observe the animal, they will all bring their own, particular bank of 
prior knowledge to the camera (see Image 2). As veterinarians, their observations 
are still likely to centre on the dogÕs health, but there may be differences between 
them based on their own specialist knowledge and experience; for example, holding 
specialist knowledge about animal opthalmology, dentistry or parasitology may lead 
to differences between veterinariansÕ observations of the same animal (American 
Veterinary Medical Association, 2012). Alternatively, there may be something outside 
of veterinary knowledge which they all observe in the dog; for example, wearing a 
dog jacket. This illustrates some of the interactions between knowledge and 
interpretations. Being a veterinarian will inßuence a certain way of seeing, but need 
not determine it (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.27). While the veterinariansÕ specialist 
knowledges may be important in some cases, they are unlikely to determine their 
way of seeing a dog jacket. Hermeneutics reminds us to be conscious of the 
differences between individualsÕ interpretations, but there will also be occasions 
when individuals have sufÞcient elements of prior knowledge in common for an 
interpretation to be shared. On many occasions, one might expect veterinarians to 
share broadly similar views of the dog, while veterinary specialisms will provide 
different insights at particular times.
Relativist approaches emphasise the innumerable and irreconcilable perspectives 
with which the world can be seen, contrasting with interpretivismÕs employment of a 
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restricted number of analytic categories, expressed as traditions (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006a, pp.7-9). There is a focus on the characteristics which are common to a set of 
actors, rather than those which separate them. While this shifts interpretivism away 
from postmodernists such as Lyotard and Baudrillard (Hay, 2011, p.171), it also 
appears to re-engage with the positivist trope of generalised categories (in this case, 
traditions). What maintains the interpretive approach as distinct from both 
positivism and relativism is the ßuidity of these categories as units of analysis. In the 
current example, traditions of dog breeding and veterinary practice could be 
identiÞed as the sources of knowledge upon which actors draw when interpreting 
the world around them. While such traditions would be sensible in a study of the 
position of dogs in society, they would be rather less sensible to employ in a study 
of climate policy.  Such traditions, based upon the reproduction of agentsÕ practices 
over time, should be (Bevir and Richards, 2009a, p.11; 2009b, p.138; Hay, 2011, p.177):
¥ treated as contingent concepts rather than Þxed typologies; 
¥ judged pragmatically in terms of the phenomena being investigated; and
¥ not the basis for generalised models within the social sciences.
Traditions provide a Òbridging conceptÓ from micro-level case studies to wider 
accounts of society (Bevir and Richards, 2009b, p.135),  providing a means of 
engaging with WittgensteinÕs concept of Ôfamily resemblancesÕ (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006a, p.167), described as Òa complicated network of similarities overlapping and 
criss-crossing; sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detailÓ (Wittgenstein, 1958, p.32).
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So we may be able to identify some resemblances between the implementation of 
local climate policy and other cases; for example, the actions of those within 
environmentalist or libertarian traditions may be similar across different areas of 
climate policy (Roe, 1994, pp.124-125). Rather than looking for rules and models 
which can predict such actions, we can Þnd reasons that certain aspects of these 
traditions can be found in different cases (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, pp.166-167).
3.2.6 Blurring the boundaries: critical realism and interpretivism
In setting out her critical realist approach to sociology, Archer presents her thinking 
as located between the two ÒextremesÓ of ÔpositivismÕ and ÔrelativismÕ (1998, p.71). 
While these have been used here to frame the discussion, one should not let such 
ideal types become Ôstraw menÕ. In particular, positivist thought has evolved in 
response to the rise of interpretivism within political science (Caterino and Schram, 
2006, pp.5-7). Using the Ôbullet timeÕ metaphor in Image 2, it is easy to dismiss 
positivists as restricting themselves to only one view of the world, that which can be 
determined to be objective truth. While such a dualism may aid the argument for a 
particular theoretical approach (Haverland and Yanow, 2012, pp.403-404), it 
oversimpliÞes the relationship between the natural and social sciences 
(Hawkesworth, 2006b, pp.153-154). ComteÕs initial proposition of using natural 
science methods in the social sciences was more nuanced than often portrayed, 
acknowledging that the positive method has different meanings in different branches 
of knowledge (Lenzer, 1998, p.lxxiv-lxxv). The importance of scepticism within the 
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natural sciences means that experimental results are regarded as provisional and 
dependent on subsequent replication and possible rejection (Laitin, 2006, p.39).
Critical realism sees this as a process of moving closer to understanding the real 
world. While accepting that this understanding is mediated through constructed 
models, rational judgement of the utility of such models brings the policy analyst 
ever closer to knowing their research subjectÕs factual nature, which exists 
independently of any individualÕs knowledge (Archer, 1998, p.71; Bates and Jenkins, 
2007, p.59; Marsh, 2008b, p.738). Put another way, even if a scientist understands a 
particular discovery to be such a truth, it still requires complementarity; that is, a 
complementary explanation through language (Laudan, 1971, p.51; Apel, 1972, pp.
22-23). Narrowing the gap with the interpretive approach, this critical realist 
position retains the foundationalist notion that there is a world of pure facts Ôout 
thereÕ but admits that humans are unable to access it in a pure sense. The 
interpretive view is a more nuanced one. While accepting that there is Òa real world 
Ôout thereÕÓ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2008, p.729), the premise does not imply that there 
are Ògiven truths, whether based on pure reasons or pure experienceÓ (Bevir and 
Richards, 2009a, p.7). Within climate policy, it would be hard to quibble that the 
events reviewed in Chapter 2 took place in the real world: for example, the 
Congressional testimony of James Hansen, the signing of the Nottingham Declaration 
by various local authorities, and the passing of the 2008 Climate Change Act. What is 
key is that taken in isolation these events do not make sense without the prior 
categories individuals bring to bear (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.28). It is the job of 
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the researcher to make sense of the events using them as the raw materials for the 
construction of their own account, making decisions on which facts to include and 
exclude and how they are linked (Collingwood, 1946, pp.131-133). These actions 
encapsulate the unique nature of society, being constructed from both objective 
facts and the expression of meanings through action (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p.
30).
Laitin accepts that narrative explanations are likely to be useful in supplementing 
Òformal analysisÓ but that it is the latter which must retain methodological primacy 
(2006, p.54). Rather than positivism being one of many theoretical interpretations 
which could be adopted, the argument is turned inside out: the social sciences must 
operate within a ÒscientiÞc frameÓ where interpretations function as an aid to 
positivist understanding (Laitin, 2006, p.54). While this represents an inversion of the 
interpretive critique, LaitinÕs position does have aspects in common with Yanow 
(2000), who emphasises that interpretivism involves methodological steps of a 
similarly careful nature to positivism. 
3.2.7 Taking the interpretive approach forward
This section has sought to outline the theoretical position on which this research is 
based. It has positioned an interpretive approach between two ideal types of 
positivism and relativism. It has also juxtaposed an interpretive approach within the 
arts - cubism - to suggest alternatives to network diagrams and heuristics as ways of 
seeing public policy, emphasising some of the weaknesses of a positivist approach. 
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However, this should not be equated with a dismissal of positivist thought. An 
interpretive position is reßexive in that it recognises the multiple perspectives with 
which one could gaze upon a subject, thus implying that a researcher can never hope 
to have the Ôcomplete pictureÕ. But by looking at differing perspectives, the 
researcher can develop a deeper understanding of the research subject and a 
stronger explanation of their results which speaks to a range of audiences.    
The mixing of theoretical traditions emphasises two characteristics of the 
philosophy of social sciences. First, one can say that the social sciences are 
themselves interpretive. The bullet time rig (see Image 2) has been adopted as a 
metaphor for the perspectives of actors within a particular research project, but 
could equally be used as a way of understanding different theoretical approaches: 
cameras could represent critical realism, post-structuralism, ethnomethodology, 
modernist empiricism and so on (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.54). The social sciences 
are non-paradigmatic in that they do not undergo the same revolutions or shifts that 
Kuhn (1970, pp.104-110) understood to took place in the natural sciences 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006a, p.64). Rather, different approaches to the social sciences can co-
exist, but may be so far apart as to be incommensurable (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979).11
Second, by moving beyond the ideal types and dualisms used as heuristic shorthand 
in the literature (e.g. Haverland and Yanow, 2012), this discussion has begun to 
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11 For two examples in public policy, see the exchange between Marsh and Smith (2000; 2001) and 
Dowding (2001), and between Marsh (2008a; 2008b) and Bevir and Rhodes (2008).
expose the overlapping and intermingling of various theoretical perspectives, which 
one can imagine to be not dissimilar to GrisÕs depiction of a breakfast scene (see 
Image 1). Articulating oneÕs perspective on the world is an important part of this 
research, but the blurring of theoretical boundaries demonstrates how difÞcult and 
unwise it is to tie oneÕs colours to a particular mast. Such discussions have a role in 
building cogent and convincing arguments, but should not be a straitjacket to 
subsequent development, particularly in the light of research Þndings Ôon the 
groundÕ (Seale, 1999, pp.475-476). With this in mind, the next section takes the 
interpretive approach and outlines its application within public policy. 
3.3 Decentring public policy
3.3.1 The interpretive tradition within public policy
The interpretive tradition has steadily gained ground within the Þeld of public policy, 
with studies in the symbolic nature of politics (Edelman, 1964), the interaction 
between policy analysis and values (Vickers, 1995; Rein, 1976), implementation as re-
interpretation of policy (Lipsky, 1980), policy analysis as critical, interpretive and 
empirical endeavour (Torgerson, 1986), the contribution of non-expert knowledge 
to policy analysis (Schmidt,1993), public policy as argumentative practice (Fischer 
and Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995), competition between policy narratives (Roe, 1994), 
policy as expression of identity (Yanow, 1996) and challenging the notion that actors 
can agree what is real within policy discourse (Fox and Miller, 1996). An extensive 
review of these contributions has been conducted by Yanow (2006a). While 
acknowledging the breadth of this evolving literature, this section focuses on the 
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contribution of Bevir and Rhodes to establishing an interpretive approach to 
studying British policy and politics, and the implications for such an approach on the 
study of policy implementation.
3.3.2 Bevir and RhodesÕs decentred approach
a) Overview
Bevir and RhodesÕ approach is to decentre governance, explaining policy actorsÕ 
beliefs Òby locating them against the background of traditions and dilemmasÓ (2012, 
p.202).  Their approach is an anti-foundationalist perspective, rejecting the concept 
of Òpure factsÓ within the social world in favour of a constructivist ontology, 
concentrating on how individuals make and remake their own meanings and beliefs 
(Bevir and Richards, 2009a, p.7). These constructions take place against the 
background of any number of political traditions, deÞned as sets of beliefs and 
practices which displays a degree of consistency and have been passed between 
generations (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, pp.8-9). Traditions are not static, ideal-type 
categories, but families of beliefs which change over time (Bevir et al, 2003, p.8), 
acting as a Þrst inßuence on individuals who use their Òlocal reasoning consciously 
and unconsciously to modify their contingent heritageÓ (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.
9). This gives rise to the concept of situated agency, recognising that individualsÕ 
actions cannot be wholly autonomous while being under the inßuence of traditions, 
but also that:
Òpeople have the capacity to adopt belief and actions, even novel ones, for 
reasons of their own. In doing so, they can transfer the social 
background.Ó (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.5)
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Bevir and RhodesÕ constructivist ontology demands a non-essentialist approach to 
deploying particular traditions within policy analysis. While drawing on Tory, Whig, 
Socialist and Liberal political traditions in explaining British governance reforms, the 
authors highlight how such traditions are contingent between particular cases and 
do not equate to a set of properties appearing in every instance of governance 
(2006a, p.166). 
b) Exogenous events
Bevir and RhodesÕ decentred approach highlights the weaknesses of using discrete 
variables in an attempt to explain change. By focusing on a limited number of 
variables, there is an implication that other variables are treated as external to the 
subject of study. However, treating factors as exogenous overlooks the role of 
interpretation in how actors interpret what is happening 'outside' of a particular 
model (Marsh and Smith, 2001, p.9). Such exogenous factors are cognitive 
constructions rather than existing as concepts in the real world (Parsons, 1995, p.
201). By accepting cognitive activity as inseparable from the social world, it is 
individuals who become the research subjects; exogenous (structural) factors are 
only given meaning through individuals' responses to them (Vickers, 1995, p.30; Bevir 
and Richards, 2009a, p.8). This recognises that, although this research focuses on a 
limited number of interlinked actors, these actorsÕ interpretations are not conÞned 
to the same boundaries set by the researcher. Adopting an interpretive approach 
implies that the boundaries placed around a research project due to limits in 
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resources and time are permeable. In other words, while the focus of the research is 
on a certain group of actors, the focus of those actors may be elsewhere.  
Bevir and Rhodes express this as a concern with the holistic nature of meanings; 
that is, in order to explain a particular observed phenomenon it is necessary to 
interpret it within a wider web of beliefs (2006a, pp.2-3). The decentred approach 
recognises that exogenous events are interpreted by individuals in different ways; for 
example, the act of central government cutting a local authorityÕs budget could 
prompt a variety of actions by local ofÞcers: focusing on Ôjoining upÕ government in 
order to ensure greater cooperation between policy silos or opting to marketise 
services as a means of increasing the efÞciency of public service delivery. However, 
such interpretations can only be fully understood within the web of beliefs and 
intersecting traditions which inßuence the actors involved. For example, joined-up 
government may be identiÞed with the Socialist tradition, whereas service 
marketisation belongs to a Liberal tradition of shrinking the size of the state (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2006a, p.77). However, this focus on contextualised interpretations, 
dissolving the barrier between exogenous and endogenous events, creates a fresh 
methodological problem. Even if one accepts the importance of actorsÕ internalised 
constructions of the social world, are concepts such as beliefs and assumptions 
researchable (Parsons, 1995, p.379)? A less structured approach to research 
methods can be taken, using conversational interviews to tease out the accounts and 
assumptions of practitioners (Young, 1979, pp.13-14). This has the potential to bring 
richer accounts of the ways policy is implemented, but using actorsÕ beliefs as the 
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basis for analysis makes the task of making sense of the data more challenging than 
for a more limited number of pre-deÞned variables.
By emphasising the importance of cognitive activity, the decentred approach offers 
an account of change which goes beyond the totalisation of structures towards a 
focus on individualsÕ intentional responses to events and dilemmas. However, can 
convincing answers to research questions be based upon these intentional 
responses alone? Glynos and Howarth offer a poststructuralist critique of this 
position, arguing that complete explanations must go beyond actorsÕ self-
interpretations and address the non-intentional dimension of actorsÕ responses 
(2007, p.83). That is not to say that they disagree with Bevir and RhodesÕ forceful 
argument for ÒspeciÞc studies of governance rather than comprehensive 
accountsÓ (2006a, p.175). Rather, Glynos and Howarth argue that the parameters for 
social science explanation can be expanded beyond self-interpretation and 
intentionality while avoiding overreaching into the realm of general causal laws 
(2007, p.83). This critique is important, as it seeks to challenge the notion that the 
agency of actors is necessarily central to explanation. The analysis in Chapter 7 of 
actorsÕ responses to localism and austerity will show that while actors interpret 
new circumstances in their own ways, these circumstances, rather than actorsÕ 
agency, will sometimes be the decisive pressure shaping the response to a dilemma 
(Finlayson et al., 2004, p.151). 
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c) Joining the dots: constructing interpretations
A key tenet of the decentred approach is the replacement of empiricism with 
constructivism (Bevir and Richards, 2009a, p.8). This emphasises that the contexts 
within which situated agents operate are ideational, rather than structural, 
differentiating the interpretive approach from critical realism which sees the latter as 
ontologically real (Hay, 2011, pp.166-167). This is not to say that Bevir and Rhodes 
entirely deny the existence of a Ôreal worldÕ, rather that events that do occur are 
only made sense of through the interpretations of actors, and that these 
interpretations may in turn alter the ideational contexts (traditions) which they 
function (see pages 77-81). 
This opens up the danger that focusing on actorsÕ own interpretations risks losing 
sight of the factual nature of their behaviour. Individuals may interpret events in 
different ways, but that does not preclude the existence of the event itself (Finlayson 
et al, 2004, pp.140-1). The salient facts within the Þeld of study are only given 
meaning by the interpretations given to them initially by research participants, and 
subsequently by the researcher. It is possible to move away from the idea of a 
researcher taking a ÔpureÕ objective viewpoint without rejecting the reality of the 
events themselves (see pages 71-74). Dowding is correct in that Òwe only have 
interpretationsÓ which also contain certain Òtruth-valuesÓ (Finlayson et al, 2004, p.
142). However, these truth-values cannot be alighted upon in an objective (in the 
positivist sense) manner as the world cannot be bracketed off from our own beliefs 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2008, p.729). Taking a decentred approach does not entail an 
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acceptance of relativism. The researcher can accept the inevitability of different 
interpretations, and the possibility of knowledge being mistaken, while still trying to 
Þnd the most appropriate means of explaining the research topic (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006a, pp.26-8; Archer, 1998, p.71). Rather, the interpretive researcherÕs role 
is to weave evidence from the Þeld into their own convincing interpretation. This 
can be critiqued with the introduction of new facts or linkages which the 
interpretation may or may not be able to resist or incorporate (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006a, p.29). Hence, more persuasive accounts can be provided regarding the 
salience of certain facts to a variety of actors, without ever claiming to have reached 
a deÞnitive exposition of the Þeld of study.
This interpretive process of agreeing upon, and making sense of, certain matter of 
facts within public policy is akin to a process of Ôjoining the dotsÕ, seeking to establish 
which linkages are important in order to build up a cogent, robust account of a 
policy issue. However, what the decentred approach is less clear upon is how these 
dots become joined together. In particular, the political aspects which are inherent 
within the process of joining the dots; deÞned as Òthe taking of decisions in a 
contingent and ÔundecidableÕ terrain, which involves radical acts of power and 
institutionÓ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.114). Crucial to this observation is the 
role of rhetoric, emphasising that it is intrinsic to the rejoining of the dots, not 
merely a neutral, post hoc means of reporting the rejoining (Howarth and Griggs, 
2006, p.30). For example, on page 154 it is highlighted how a local authority manager 
is able to distance themselves from the implementing climate change policy without 
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overtly contradicting the local authorityÕs aims, by describing climate change as a 
ÒtheoreticalÓ concern. And on pages 252-254, it is shown how the rhetoric used by a 
government minister to convey the localism agenda placed particular constraints 
upon the options available to climate change policy actors. These examples show 
that rhetoric needs to be considered beyond being something that actors deploy 
strategically in  order to act on their beliefs, as argued by Bevir and Rhodes (2006a, 
p.23). While rhetoric is often deployed strategically by actors, it is not separate from 
their beliefs. Rather, rhetoric is constitutive of their beliefs (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007, p.75).
d) Accounting for change
Within the decentred approach, Bevir and Rhodes identify dilemmas as key to 
understanding change:
ÒA dilemma captures the way in which situated agents are able to bring 
about changes in beliefs, traditions and practicesÉ. A dilemma arises for an 
individual or group when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs 
or practices and so forces a reconsideration of the existing beliefs and 
associated tradition. Political scientists can explain change in traditions and 
practices, therefore, by referring to the relevant dilemmas.Ó (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2006a, p.9)
Dilemmas cause actorsÕ beliefs to be Òpushed and pulledÓ in order to be reconciled 
with the traditions which inßuence their outlook on the world (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2003, p.37). This helps to justify Bevir and RhodesÕ use of ÔtraditionÕ rather than 
ÔstructureÕ as a counterpoint to agency; traditions imply a greater openness to being 
remoulded by actors than the notion of structures, which imply constraints.
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Three criticisms can be levelled at this approach to accounting for change. Firstly, 
Bevir and Rhodes appear to privilege the notion of change over stability (Marsh, 
2008a, p.254; 2008b, p.737), arguing that Òas individuals respond creatively to 
dilemmas, it follows that we will recognize (sic) change everywhereÓ (2006a, p.10). 
While it would be fruitless to argue with the assertion that many beliefs and 
practices change, it may be that a desire to recognise change everywhere implies a 
certain blindness to the extent to which circumstances may remain the same. 
Beyond certain ontological disputes over the nature of reality, the issue here is of 
where one draws the line between an agentÕs autonomy and the circumstances 
which constrain them. A decentred approach sees change as ubiquitous, with people 
Òdeveloping, adjusting and changingÓ traditions and practices, even if they do not 
realise it (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, p.10). MarshÕs critical realist critique agrees that 
these micro-level changes are taking place, but argues that the dominant political 
tradition is so deeply ingrained into institutions that it is much more resilient to 
such changes than a decentred approach suggests (2008b, p.737). In short, the 
question is whether change takes place within conditions of situated or constrained 
agency.
A second critique arises from this concern over actorsÕ relationship to change: how 
can dilemmas explain the resilience or otherwise of particular traditions over time? 
A decentred approach argues that people change their beliefs based upon local 
reasoning rather than any compelling causes, and that traditions are susceptible to 
such changes as they do not possess any inherent logic which Þxes their 
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development (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p.35).  The dilemmas which prompt these 
changes in beliefs are fundamental to explaining change, but cannot be reduced any 
further (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p.37). This emphasis is in tune with the decentred 
focus on change and dynamism outlined above. However, critics have worried that 
relying on self-interpretations to explain change in traditions falls short in providing 
an account of why some practices endure and some change, with the accompanying 
effect on the nature of prevailing traditions (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.108). 
A third and Þnal critique of the decentred approach to change focuses on the way in 
which traditions are deÞned. In short, traditions may be too blunt an instrument 
with which to explain change, and stand in the way of a ÒÞne-grained ethnography of 
political behaviourÓ (Wagenaar, 2012, p.94).  Whereas the critiques above accuse 
Bevir and Rhodes of privileging dynamism, the argument here is that deploying 
broad, easily recognisable political traditions from the literature smothers the 
potential for teasing out the dynamics of change sprouting from self-interpretation 
and practice. Wagenaar argues that the ethnographic sensibility of interpretive 
research inevitably challenges the kind of boundaries invoked by a study of broad 
traditions (2012, p.94). Ironically, a focus on political tradition may close down 
opportunities for fruitful new lines of enquiry by relying on well-worn narrative 
boundaries, rather than an attempt to move past such political heirlooms to make 
discoveries grounded in everyday practice. Bevir and Rhodes respond to WagenaarÕs 
remarks by emphasising the existence of multifarious traditions which are 
demarcated by researchers, based on the particular case they are trying to explain 
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(2012, p.204). However, for traditions to do any work at all as a bridging concept 
necessitates a return to examining the Òfamily resemblancesÓ between particular 
traditions (Wittgenstein, cited in Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, pp.166-167), which seems 
likely to presage a return to familiar typologies of political thought.
The remarks so far have provided a broad theoretical critique of the decentred 
approach. The next section re-examines its strengths and weaknesses within the 
context of policy implementation studies.
3.3.3 Interpretive implementation
a) Overview
The ÔdiscoveryÕ of policy implementation studies stemmed from a top-down view of 
the policy process inßuenced by WeberÕs ideal-type of a bureaucracy, where 
everyone shares the same norms and does what they are told (Hood, 1976, p.8; 
Parsons, 1995, pp.465-466). Those actors holding the power to formulate policy see 
subnational actors as responsible for implementing policy. However, Pressman and 
WildavskyÕs (1984) concept of the implementation deÞcit showed how the policy-
maker's "expectations ... are dashed" as an increasing number of linked organisations 
widen the divide between a policy-maker's intention and the outcome on the 
ground (Hill and Hupe, 2003, p.472). This focus has proved inßuential, leading to 
many "misery studies" in the implementation literature (Hill and Hupe, 2009, p.107). 
If policy-makers at the top have such a poor record of having their policies carried 
out in the way they intended, the implication is that actors must be inßuencing 
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policy at the implementation stage, strengthening the case for studying those policy 
practitioners at Ôstreet levelÕ (Lipsky, 1980).  This section takes the features of the 
decentred approach discussed above and examines their implication for the study of 
policy implementation.
b) Exogenous events
Heather Hill observes that the implementation literature has not evolved to account 
for the inßuence of actors not actively engaged in the ÔdoingÕ of public policy, thereby 
underplaying these actorsÕ inßuence on policy meaning (2003, pp.267-268). This 
echoes the already identiÞed weakness of drawing impermeable boundaries around 
research subjects, and is reinforced when considering climate change as a Òwicked 
problemÓ where there is no Òstopping ruleÓ limiting the number of actors potentially 
involved in policy implementation (Rittel and Webber, 1973, p.162; Hill and Hupe, 
2009, p.69). While the drive for a Ôjoined-upÕ approach to policy may have recognised 
the ÔwickednessÕ of climate change, it also implies a search for high-level strategic 
solutions which may be incompatible with the multifarious and contradictory facets 
of the policy problem (Hulme, 2009, pp.334-335). As is shown in Chapter 5, there 
are actors who will place very different meanings on policy implementation than 
those intended by the core climate change policy teams (see pages 153-165). These 
meanings can be fundamental to the progress made in implementation, 
notwithstanding the status of a particular policy Ôon paperÕ. Acknowledging the 
presence of multiple policy meanings implies that some form of agreement on 
interpretation must be reached if progress is to be made. In particular,  
Òimplementation of a policy designed to produce changes in the behavior [sic] of a 
92
target population depends on the ÔtargetÕ agreeing to the terms of 
transitionÓ (Yanow, 1990, p.222).
c) Joining the dots: constructing interpretations
Applying a logic of constructed interpretations to policy implementation has two 
key key implications. Firstly, that agents tasked with implementing policy are likely to 
hold diverse interpretations of the policyÕs meaning, a phenomenon overlooked in 
much implementation research (Hill, 2003, pp.267-268). As a result, policy language 
may be vague (Yanow, 1996, pp.129-131) or practical guidance scant (Matland, 1995, 
p.158). The top-down approach which typiÞed the early implementation literature 
implies that policy-makers should respond to this interpretive ßexibility with more 
tightly worded language or more prescriptive implementation guidance (Yanow, 
1993, p.55). However, policy-makers often keep language deliberately vague in order 
to encompass different actorsÕ values and meanings and help enable political 
agreement (Yanow, 1996, p.129; Matland, 1995, p.171). In many, perhaps most, cases 
multiple interpretations of a policy should be regarded as the norm, not an 
aberration, and seen as fundamental to the evolution of a policy (Yanow, 1993, pp.
55-56). As demonstrated in Chapter 2, climate policy holds the potential for such 
multivocality (Yanow, 1993, p.55), as the case for action has been largely based on 
scientiÞc knowledge of a kind which policy-makers may Þnd difÞcult to relate to. 
Terms such as Ôcarbon emissionsÕ and Ôcarbon mitigationÕ have a speciÞc meaning in 
their original scientiÞc sense, but take on new metaphorical meanings within the 
realm of public policy where they are relatively novel (Koteyko et al, 2010; Koteyko, 
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2011, pp.33-34). Such meanings are a key focus of analysis within policy 
implementation (Gains and Clarke, 2007, p.137). 
Secondly, if there are numerous, co-existing meanings of a policy, then we might also 
expect multiple deÞnitions of policy implementation itself. Top-down, bottom-up and 
hybrid models of implementation are no longer seen as in competition, but are 
merely different lenses which co-exist and supplement each other in a similar way to 
the multiple perspectives on view within GrisÕs cubist painting (see Image 1, page 68) 
(Yanow, 1990, p.221). If there ceases to be a single deÞnition of policy 
implementation, then there is also a question over who are acting as implementors. 
For example, the establishment of targets for local authority carbon reduction 
appeared to mark central government placing responsibility for policy 
implementation onto local government (see pages 45-52). However, as shown in 
Chapter 6, some local authority managers pushed back against this notion, arguing 
that they had relatively little power to enable emissions reduction, highlighting 
instead the potential for central government to use taxation to make progress on 
climate policy implementation (see pages 195-197).  
d) Accounting for change
The decentred approach to change suggests that the introduction of a new policy is 
likely to present a dilemma for those charged with implementation. This chimes with 
bottom-up models which emphasise how implementors adapt policy on the front 
line, rather than as envisaged by central government policy makers (Lipsky, 1980). So 
a decentred approach emphasises that policy change takes place during 
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implementation, not just as a result of central government decisions to begin or end 
particular programmes (Hogwood and Peters, 1980, p.35). However, if such 
implementation change equates to the dilution of a radical policy programme, then 
this may result in stability, rather than change, predominating overall. This 
foregrounds the concern raised in the previous section that a decentred approach 
privileges change over stability. For climate change, a policy area which implies a 
requirement for radical change if national targets are to be met, one might expect 
progress in implementation to be difÞcult, making a regard for stability as important 
as one for change. Related to this question of stability and change is the extent to 
which agency is situated or constrained.  For example, where local actors resist 
attempts at implementation, what do the concepts of dilemma and tradition explain 
about this process? This may support the decentred argument for the importance of 
self-interpretations, particularly where they form diverse meanings of the same 
policy to different groups (see pages 149-165). However, one might also argue that 
policies to rapidly reduce carbon emissions are outside of the purview of actors 
who operate within particular traditions of professional practice (see pages 
155-158). Instead of actors resisting implementation through their own agency, they 
are constrained, perhaps unknowingly by the weight of historical practice. Such 
accounts of implementation must also show how and why traditions inßuence 
actors, and consider whether a focus on dilemmas as responses to traditions 
provides a sufÞciently detailed explanation of why actors act as they do.
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3.3.4 Summary
This section has focused on Bevir and RhodesÕ decentred approach, a key part of the 
interpretive policy analysis literature over the last decade and a half. It has identiÞed 
three areas which highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the approach: 
addressing the notion of exogenous events, the importance of constructed 
interpretations and the ability to explain change. These areas have then been 
assessed in the context of the implementation literature. In short, the decentred 
approach provides a powerful rejoinder to studies of public policy which lean too 
heavily on formal models to explain change. In particular, a focus on diverse policy 
meanings is key to understanding the implementation ÔgapÕ between policy 
expectation and result as the Òongoing working out of societal values about the 
policy issue which is being implementedÓ (Yanow, 1990, p.225). In the light of these 
advantages, the decentred approach will be used as a framework within which 
research methods will be justiÞed (see Chapter 4) and empirical data analysed (see 
Chapters 5-7). However, the concerns set out above regarding Bevir and RhodesÕs 
treatment of political factors will be kept in mind, alongside a concern over how to 
explain how certain traditions prevail over time, and whether their notion of 
situated agency places too great an emphasis on the ability of actors to change their 
circumstances through self-interpretation. Having presented and analysed the data 
using the decentred approach, the importance of these theoretical concerns and will 
be assessed in a Þnal theoretical critique at the end of this thesis (see pages 
309-316).
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the interpretive approach within the social sciences and 
identiÞed the evolution and blurring of elements of the positivist and interpretive 
positions in the latter twentieth century. It has also used elements of interpretivism 
from the arts as metaphors for ways of seeing within public policy. Bevir and 
RhodesÕs decentred approach has been introduced as part of the interpretive 
tradition, identifying meanings as central to an understanding of public policy. These 
meanings are the product of an individual's beliefs within the context of political 
tradition. Applying these ideas in the Þeld of policy implementation, the researcher 
aims to understand how actors interpret the policy process, with particular 
attention paid to the gap between the evidence from the scientiÞc community and 
the knowledge base of policy-makers. The extent to which practitioners share each 
otherÕs interpretations and understandings is likely to be a key element of this 
process. 
Beyond this theoretical discussion, the suitability of the approach has been assessed 
for investigating climate policy. As a wicked problem, climate change spans out to a 
large number of actors. As well as a large number of actors potentially involved in 
climate change mitigation, such actors are drawn from a broad range of institutions 
as almost all areas of modern society entail the emission of carbon dioxide. This 
intensiÞes the multivocality likely to be found within climate policy implementation, 
as individuals draw on their own banks of prior knowledge to interpret what the 
scientiÞc constructions of Ôclimate changeÕ or Ôreducing carbon emissionsÕ mean for 
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them. The prior knowledge of policy practitioners is likely to be very different from 
that of those producing the scientiÞc knowledge and evidence which has driven the 
conception of climate change as a policy problem. These two broad ways of seeing 
climate change, as an unfolding area for scientiÞc research and as an issue for society 
to address, provide still greater space for diverse interpretations of climate policy. 
Understanding and explaining these interpretations is a necessary aspect of 
investigating policy implementation.
A recurring theme of this chapter has been the blurring of boundaries and the 
inherent weakness of many academic constructs in explanation. While the decentred 
approach seeks to address this through the notion of traditions, the ßexibility that 
this requires presents a different set of challenges in the realm of research methods 
to the more traditional testing of a ÔformalÕ model. The next chapter will 
demonstrate how such an approach can be applied to research design. 
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4. Transparency and trust: the 
interpretive approach to research 
practice
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter set out the interpretive tradition of enquiry upon which this 
research draws and its application within the public policy literature, with a 
particular focus on Bevir and RhodesÕs decentred approach. This chapter takes this 
approach into methodology, linking the theoretical discussion with the practicalities 
of ensuring both the data collection in the Þeld and the research results on paper 
are robust. In doing this, the researcher has to attend to the task of ÔchoosingÕ in 
three areas:
a) the case study;
b) methods for accessing information; and
c) methods for data analysis.
In any research project, these choices must be justiÞed, but the way in which this is 
done rests on the theoretical assumptions discussed in Chapter 3. By taking an 
interpretive approach, such justiÞcations must take a different form from criteria 
which have their roots in the positivist tradition (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.
113). The concept of ÔtrustworthinessÕ is used as a means of ensuring robust 
research without attempting to meet criteria such as validity, sampling frames and 
replicability, which are theoretically incommensurable with interpretive enquiry 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp.289-331).  Demonstrating researcher reßexivity is a key 
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ingredient of trustworthiness; examples of such reßection during Þeldwork and 
deskwork will be used to bring transparency to the researcherÕs task of making 
sense of climate policy (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, pp.100-109).
4.2 Choosing the case
While case study research may be Òone of the main ways in which public 
administration research is carried out todayÓ, one may identify the methodological 
literature on case studies as being too closely tied to positivist assumptions to be 
applicable to an interpretive approach (Haverland and Yanow, 2012, p.406). YinÕs 
widely cited text deÞnes case study research as Òan empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life contextÓ (2003, p.13). 
Although such terminology implies that a researcher can achieve a ÔrealÕ account of a 
particular case, Yin does acknowledge the difÞculties in establishing boundaries 
around research in the messiness of the social world, and that it may not be possible 
to generalise from a particular case study (2003, pp.13-17). However, YinÕs text pays 
little attention to interpretive approaches,12 so it is appropriate to draw on the 
earlier theoretical discussion of Chapter 3 to unpack the term Ôcase studyÕ. 
A key point of difference an interpretive approach makes to case study analysis is a 
focus on the meanings found within a particular case. In section 3.2.5 (see pages 
75-77), it was argued that traditions can be used as a bridge from these micro-level 
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12 Yin refers to the theoretical challenge to realism (e.g. Guba and Lincoln, 1989) in one paragraph in 
the third edition of Case Study Research (2003, p.15). The section is expunged from the fourth edition 
(2009, p.19)
meanings to identify macro-level family resemblances across society but cannot be 
used to produce generalised and predictive models. Traditions are constructed by 
the researcher based on micro-level research Þndings, with the value of the tradition 
as an analytical category primarily judged on their use within that case. This marks an 
inversion of YinÕs approach which states that Òa case study is an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenonÓ (2003, p.13). The identiÞcation of a 
general phenomenon precedes the selection of the case, the latter being an 
exemplar of the former (Haverland and Yanow, 2012, p.406). Beginning a project with 
a strong conception of what a particular research subject is actually a case of can be 
counterproductive, potentially closing down fruitful avenues of enquiry which 
present themselves during Þeldwork (Ragin, 1992a, pp.5-6).
At this point, a tension emerges between the interpretive approach being adopted 
and the projectÕs earliest foundations in a research proposal to the Economic and 
Social Research Council. The project was pitched and funded as one looking at 
subnational policy implementation (Cope, 2008). While the interpretive approach 
will be shown in this chapter as shaping Þeldwork and data analysis, it is also 
important to acknowledge the role of prior knowledge as embodied within initial 
research questions (see pages 72-75). Research can proceed with some basic ideas 
and themes in place, while acknowledging the likelihood of new ideas developing 
which may require new lines of enquiry to be followed.  To illustrate this, there 
follows an outline of the process of focusing down on the case being studied in this 
research (following Ragin, 1992b, pp.221-224).
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First, there is a broad interest in public policy as a concept Òwhich ßows through all 
the ways in which we organize [sic] our lifeÓ (Colebatch, 2002, p.vi) with a focus on 
Òthe public and its problemsÓ (Dewey, 1927). Second, there is an interest in UK 
climate policy following its rapid rise up the national agenda, as discussed in Chapter 
2 and exempliÞed by the utterances of leading politicians (Blair, 2004; Brown, 2008; 
Cameron, 2010b; HM Government, 2010, p.16), scientists (King, 2004; Beddington, 
2009), doctors (Boseley, 2009) and defence planners (Arnold-Foster, 2007), amongst 
others. Third, there is a recognition that within UK policy, the Climate Change Act 
2008 set stretching, possibly unachievable, targets for greenhouse gas emission 
reduction (Pielke Jr., 2009). This pulled the behaviours of policy actors subsequent to 
the passing of the Act into sharper focus. Following OÕToole (2000, p.273), one can 
characterise these behaviours which occur between the instigation and impact of a 
policy as Ôimplementation.13 Fourth, within the implementation of climate policy, we 
can look at a number of spatial levels of governance. For this case, the local and 
regional levels were identiÞed as signiÞcant following the global framing of climate 
change as a policy issue (see pages 28-33), the local tradition for wider 
environmental action (see pages 33-39) and government action attempting to bridge 
the gap between the two (see pages 39-52). Fifth, the East Midlands region of the 
UK was selected as a setting for subnational implementation of climate change 
mitigation policy. The region is geographically diverse, containing densely populated 
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13 The case of climate change mitigation is temporally stretched; that is, one may anticipate a number 
of decades before a reduction in emissions could impact on global temperatures (Wigley, 2005; 
Armour and Roe, 2011)
urban areas and an above average rural population, as well as showing signs of being 
the most advanced on local climate policy, having been the Þrst region to have all its 
local authorities sign the Nottingham Declaration (see pages 45-48). Sixth, and Þnally, it 
was established that it would not be possible to satisfactorily study all nine of the 
regionÕs upper tier and unitary local authorities to a similar depth with the 
resources available. This prompted the selection of a smaller number of local 
authorities within the region to be studied in greater depth. Following FlyvbjergÕs 
case study strategies, this Þnal selection of four local authorities was Òinformation-
orientedÓ (as opposed to random) with local authorities chosen according to which 
National Indicator (NI) they selected (NI185 measuring a local authorityÕs own 
emissions, NI186 measuring emissions across a local area), and whether they were 
covered urban or rural areas (2006b, p.230). Table 2 classiÞes the regionÕs local 
authorities by location and core NI, showing the number selected in each strata.
Table 2. East MidlandsÕ nine upper tier or unitary local authorities classiÞed by climate 
change National Indicator selection and location type
Urban Rural
NI185 0 2
NI186 3 4
Source: author calculations from Local Area Agreements (Derby City Council, 2010, 
p.4; Derbyshire County Council, 2010, p.24; Leicestershire Together, 2010, p.9; 
Lincolnshire County Council, 2010, p.37; Northamptonshire County Council, 2010, 
p.4; Nottingham City Council, 2010; p.43; Nottinghamshire Partnership, 2010, p.29; 
One Leicester, 2010, p.14; Rutland County Council, 2010, p.3)
The NIs for climate change mitigation were identiÞed at the start of the research as 
a signiÞcant element within local authority policy (see pages 45-52), having been 
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highlighted as the centrepiece of regional and local policy within the regional 
Programme of Action (East Midlands Regional Climate Change Partnership, 2009, p.
15). Seven out of the nine authorities adopted NI186 (area wide emissions) within 
their Local Area Agreements (LAAs), the remaining two adopting NI185 (local 
authority emissions from their own operations) as a core indicator. A local authority 
adopting NI185 was included in the sample to try to identify any difference in policy 
implementation associated with a narrower focus in emissions reduction. The 
second criteria for selection was whether local authorities were urban or rural, 
which one might expect to shape the policy priorities in particular ways. For 
example, it may be easier to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from private 
transport through increasing public transport provision in densely populated urban 
areas than sparsely populated rural ones. 
The sample was selected to represent the three cells in Table 1 containing a non-
zero value. As there were no urban local authorities with NI185, the urban/NI186 
sample was increased to two. Within these cells, selections were made according to 
an opportunity to learn from the differing emphases identiÞed in preliminary email 
exchanges with practitioners. This selection was closest to the Òextreme/deviant 
casesÓ example within FlyvbjergÕs strategies for selection, looking to Òobtain 
information on unusual cases, which can be especially problematic or especially good 
in a more closely deÞned senseÓ (2006b, p.230). An overview of the four local 
authorities is provided in Table 3.
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Sources: OfÞce for National Statistics (2012) and author calculations from interview data and policy documents.
Table 3. Overview of local authority sample
Local 
authority
Population 
(000s)
Area 
(000s 
hectares)
Density 
(people 
per 
hectare)
Relative rank 
based on 2007 
Index of 
Multiple 
Deprivation 
Number of 
policy 
priorities
Climate 
change 
policy
Core climate 
change 
National 
Indicator
Number of full 
time positions 
in climate 
change/energy 
team
City 1 200-350 7-8 30-45 1 (most deprived) 6-10 A part of one 
priority
NI186 6-10
City 2 200-350 7-8 30-45 2 >10 SpeciÞc 
priority
NI186 6-10
County 1 600-800 >200 0-5 4 (least deprived) 6-10 SpeciÞc 
priority
NI185 6-10
County 2 600-800 >200 0-5 3 0-5 A part of one 
priority
NI186 0-5
This process of case selection invokes broad analytical concepts and geographical 
boundaries taken from the initial research proposal. The subject for study is the 
implementation of climate policy at two spatial levels: the East Midlands region and 
an information-oriented sample of local authorities within that region. This is a 
starting point for the research rather than a predeÞnition of a general phenomenon. 
Identifying analytical concepts, such as traditions, which bridge between micro- and 
macro-level Þndings is part of the ongoing research process and not something 
determined at the projectÕs onset and remaining unchanging throughout (e.g. 
Flyvbjerg, 2006b, p.231). Ragin refers to this process as ÒcasingÓ (1992b, pp.217-226). 
Casing does not preclude an initial strategy for case selection; after all, one has to 
start somewhere. Carefully setting out the initial assumptions and ways of choosing 
the research subject in advance provides the researcher with the conÞdence to 
Òmomentarily feel bafßed and lostÓ when Þeldwork takes an unexpected turn 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2006, p.318). Research plans can be changed, but 
only if a plan already exists. Researchers inevitably enter a project with certain 
preconceptions about the research subject. The test of the projectÕs trustworthiness 
is whether these preconceptions are challenged and checked during the course of 
the project. Holding in mind this commitment to Þeldwork ßexibility, and having 
chosen the site for the research, the next choice to be made is in research methods.
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4.3 Choosing the methods
4.3.1 Interpretation and method
As discussed in Chapter 1, three research questions have been identiÞed to guide 
the research process:
1. What factors do subnational actors Þnd the most important in 
implementing climate change mitigation policy?
2. How do actorsÕ perceptions of change affect implementation of policy?
3. To what extent is subnational policy implementation driven by the 
centre?
In choosing research methods, one must acknowledge how an interpretive approach 
shapes the process of answering these questions. Hay identiÞes six of these 
methodological implications, of which three are of direct relevance to method 
choice (2011, p.169):
¥ Òthe goal of political analysis is to capture the meaning to political actors of 
their actions and practices ÉÓ;
¥ Òthis entails embedded research and an ethnographic method ÉÓ; and
¥ Òthough a focus on beliefs and meanings may entail a certain practical 
preference for qualitative techniques there is still value in quantitative 
methods.Ó
The argument that a focus on meaning entails embedded, ethnographic research is 
supported by many examples in the public policy literature (for example, Blau, 1963; 
Crozier, 1964; Lipsky, 1980; Yanow, 1996, Shore and Wright, 1997; Stein, 2004; 
Rhodes, 2011b). While ethnography is a term encapsulating many different meanings, 
one typical characteristic is the study of people in their Òeveryday contexts, rather 
than under conditions created by the researcherÓ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, 
p.3). A review of the contributions to a special edition of Public Administration on 
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decentred networks refers to many of the researchers adopting an Òethnographic 
methodÓ (Bevir and Richards, 2009b, p.135), yet the prevalent method within the 
literature covered in the review is the semi-structured interview (Davies, 2009; 
Durose, 2009; Gains, 2009; Poulsen, 2009). This is a much broader use of 
Ôethnographic methodÕ than implied by HayÕs formulation which, in the second bullet 
point above, explicitly links ethnography to the embedding of a researcher.14
While ethnographic methods entailing embedded research are well suited to an 
interpretive approach, they also presents two main risks. First, attempting to capture 
and represent as much detail as possible through the Ôthick descriptionÕ (Geertz, 
1973) of a research subject carries with it some realist connotations. A goal of early 
ethnographic researchers was Òto discover and represent faithfully the true nature 
of social phenomenaÓ (Hammersley, 1992, p.44), although new strands of 
ethnography have emerged shifting the focus from this Ònave realismÓ (Hammersley, 
1992, p.50) to a focus on social constructions which cannot be observed directly but 
still shape the world (Shehata, 2006, p.260). Second, no matter what the 
epistemological treatment of ethnographic data, accessing such data requires the 
researcher to spend an extended period in the Þeld,15 giving rise to practical 
considerations regarding the resources available to a doctoral student. Where such 
an approach can be adopted to great effect in a limited number of sites (e.g. 
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14 Although Gordon et al. (2009) uses an embedded ethnographic approach, and is included in the 
decentred networks issue of Public Administration, the paper makes no reference to the policy 
network literature.
15 For example, Rhodes (2011b, p.8) spent a total of 420 hours on observation and shadowing, in 
addition to interviewing. For multi-site ethnographies, the time taken gaining access to research sites 
also multiplies.
Greener, 2011), the amount of time required in each research setting makes the 
method challenging to operationalise within the time constraints of a doctoral 
study. This constraint in the number of sites in which an embedded ethnography 
could be carried out also risks insufÞcient exposure to the multiple Òwebs of 
meaningÓ which one might expect to encounter within the interpretation of a policy 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.87). This risk is increased when considering a 
network of multiple local, regional anErd national actors, which is likely to span 
multiple sites, actors and linkages.  In sum, the consequence of studying such a 
network is that data is required to be accessed on multiple sites, but to carry out 
embedded ethnographies within each network site would be beyond the scope and 
resources of a doctoral study. However, such a research design remains an intriguing 
avenue for future study. 
These practical considerations suggest a turn away from embedded ethnography as a 
method for this research, while maintaining an interpretive approach. While political 
ethnography may be the most notable contribution of interpretive political science 
to date, the focus of the approach is on the way data is analysed in terms of meaning 
rather than the manner in which data is collected (Hay, 2011, pp.173-174; Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2005, p.178). While this leaves the way clear for the use of quantitative, as 
well as qualitative, methods within a decentred network approach (e.g. Needham, 
2009), such methodological openness does not bring all Ômixed methodsÔ approaches 
under the same epistemological umbrella. Bringing together quantitative and 
qualitative methods may be done using a positivist epistemology aiming to discover 
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causal linkages (e.g. Brady and Collier, 2010). Consequently, codifying methods in 
terms of interpretive-positivist is a more appropriate shorthand than quantitative-
qualitative, emphasising the importance of how data is analysed over how it is 
accessed (Yanow and Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p.xviii).16 The methods employed here are 
qualitative, a mix of observations and interviews drawing on ethnographic inßuences 
while avoiding the drawbacks and constraints discussed above (Durose, 2009, pp.
39-40). In particular, efforts were made to make interviews as informal and 
conversational as possible (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.3). These methods are 
now explored in greater depth, along with reßections on their usage. 
4.3.2 Interviews
a) Interview structure
An interview gives the researcher an opportunity to hear a person tell their own 
story in their own words (Atkinson, 1998, p.2). This may include the reconstruction 
of experiences which the researcher was not present at, or provide a different 
perspective on events and processes which the researcher has already had access to 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.3). The interview is not a neutral process, the data 
collected is the result of a co-production between researcher and participant. Even 
during the most unstructured interviews the researcher will prompt and react to 
what they are being told, inßuencing what is subsequently said (Fontana and Frey, 
2005, p.718). Conversation and the sharing of stories may be an every-day 
occurrence, but the interview places these characteristics within a setting 
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16 While bearing in mind the developing nuances and dialogue between paradigms discussed in 
Chapter 3. See also, Guba (1990).
constructed by the researcher for the purposes of research. While appropriate 
measures should be taken to make the interview environment as comfortable as 
possible for the participant, analysis must reßect on how the data collected has been 
inßuenced by the method employed. Recognising the imperfections of interviewing, 
as with any research method, helps to build the case for the use of multiple methods 
in a research project.
The literature refers to a continuum of interview styles categorised by structure; 
ranging from a structured survey-style interview associated with quantitative 
methods to an unstructured 'life-history' style focusing on the participant's own 
story, as guided by the researcher (Atkinson, 1998, p.2). In between these lies the 
semi-structured interview, where the researcher has key topics they would like the 
participant to address within the time available, but without a rigid structure or 
wording to be replicated across all interviews within the research. The focus on 
actors' own interpretations as a source of data requires the ability for them to 
direct the information being used in research, relatively free of imposed hypotheses. 
Data collection must be primarily directed by the concerns of those participating in 
policy implementation on the ground. This will help ensure that the researcher does 
not Þnd themselves addressing a research question which has little or no signiÞcance 
to those practising public policy. This theoretical advantage had to be balanced by 
what was feasible using the resources available. While a small number of interviews 
lasted two hours or more, the limited availability of most participants, particularly 
those in senior roles, meant interviews could not be truly Ôopen-endedÕ. Interviews 
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were typically around an hour in length, half an hour for directors and civil servants. 
In the latter cases, the use of some kind of 'structure' was necessary to ensure that 
the time was used effectively. A semi-structured style can still be open enough to 
allow participants to present the elements of their story which they regard as 
signiÞcant while allowing the researcher time to probe some of the unspoken 
assumptions lying beneath the surface (Stephens, 2007, p.206). For example, 
Durose's decentred study adopts a methodology for interviewing front-line workers 
that emphasises the collection of personal stories while also listing eight common 
aspects of the stories that provide "anchoring points" for the researcher's analysis 
(2009, p.40). 
An alternative way of seeing interviewing styles is to contrast between the cultural 
and the topical interview (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, pp.9-11). This was used as a basis 
for interviewing most participants twice. The Þrst wave of interviews, which took 
place between June 2010 and March 2011, were cultural, letting the participant 
explain the generalities of behaviour, norms and values. While this was more 
'unstructured' in character, data from participant observations and follow-up 
interviews were used to uncover aspects which may be so taken for granted that 
the participant may not immediately highlight them as a feature of their culture 
(Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.10). The second wave of interviews, which took place 
between March and August 2011,17 were more topical in style, aiming to piece 
together the participant's narrative of particular issues which had already been 
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17 Second wave interviews with two participants had to be carried out earlier, in January 2011, as they 
were due to leave their posts shortly afterwards.
highlighted by themselves and others as key within policy implementation. Here, I 
employed a little more structured approach to questioning in order to construct a 
cogent account of the meanings created and acted upon (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.
11); what Roe describes as a meta-narrative derived from the different narratives of 
the individuals involved (1994, p.156). However, this had to be balanced with 
maintaining the space for participants to talk about topics of their choosing within 
second interviews. This mix of styles enabled a focusing down on particular topics 
between the Þrst and second interviews, facilitated cross-checking of meanings 
between different participants, and allowed an identiÞcation of changes in 
participantsÕ concerns over time.
b)Local participants
The process of choosing participants stemmed from the concerns identiÞed in the 
process of choosing the site: the principle focus fell on individuals working within 
local and regional government with responsibility for climate change mitigation 
policy. As discussed above (see pages 103-106), two city and two county local 
authorities were chosen to study in greater depth. In these organisations, interviews 
were conducted with:
¥ climate change managers responsible for overall climate policy;
¥ energy managers who were responsible for monitoring the local authorityÕs 
own carbon emissions and reporting NI185;
¥ the director whose department or directorate included climate change (the 
director was sometimes the direct line manager of the above positions, 
depending on staff structure); and
¥ the elected councillor whose portfolio included climate policy.
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As beÞts a network approach, additional research participants were ÔsnowballedÕ, at 
the end of each interview participants were asked for contacts and 
recommendations for which individuals who I might usefully interview next (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2006a, p.110). Such an approach carries the risk of insufÞcient exposure 
to different webs of meaning (see pages 107-112). Attempting to overcome this 
problem required some supplementary, purposive selection of participants from 
both the core local authorities and other organisations active within local climate 
policy (Yanow, 2006b, p.77). 
In one local authority (County 1), this resulted in a signiÞcant increase in the 
number of participants interviewed: eight in the Þrst wave, nine in the second wave. 
The greater number of participants reßected a larger than average core team dealing 
with climate policy and the inclusion of individuals holding signiÞcant roles in policy 
implementation but who operated outside of the core roles identiÞed above. These 
latter individuals were Þrst identiÞed during an observation of a cross-department 
meeting within the local authority, at which a policy controversy emerged, with 
differing views being aired on the introduction of a new initiative. To accommodate 
these Ònew anglesÓ discovered within County 1, a decision was made in the Þeld to 
increase the number of interviews undertaken (Yanow, 2000, p.85).  Additional 
participants who were active in climate policy were also sought from outside local 
authorities, leading to interviews with individuals from community projects, a 
business network, a social enterprise for energy, a Transition Town group and 
district-level local authorities. Being mindful of alternative views of climate policy is 
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part of the interpretive approachÕs Òethnographic sensibilityÓ (Pader, 2006, p.171), 
discovering the multivocality which is key to understanding policy implementation 
(see pages 97-100) (Yanow, 1997). This approach to snowballing followed the 
Þeldwork maxim succinctly expressed by Bevir and Rhodes: Ò[w]e took whatever 
interviews we could getÓ (2006a, p.110). While this was important in ensuring a wide 
range of participants, it did result in an unexpected abundance of data (see page 
124).
Besides the four core local authorities, referred to as ÔCounty 1Õ, ÔCounty 2Õ, ÔCity 1Õ 
and ÔCity 2Õ, interviews were carried out with climate change managers in the 
remaining Þve city and county local authorities. This served two main purposes. 
First, by widening the accessing of local knowledge, valuable context was provided 
for the core sample, providing a contribution to multivocality. Second, the inclusion 
of each local authority within the regional climate change partnership demonstrated 
to participants that their views were important in the production of knowledge 
which they subsequently wished to use to reßect upon and modify their own 
practices.  A summary of the local participants interviewed is shown in Table 4.
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Table 4. Local participants interviewed (core sample of local authorities shown in bold)
Local authorities Wave 1 Wave 2
County 1 8 9
County 2 5 2
County 3 1 1
County 4 1 1
County 5 1 1
County 6 1 1
City 1 5 4
City 2 4 5
City 3 1 1
District council 1 1 2
District council 2 1 1
Other local participants
Transition group 1 1
Social energy enterprise 2 1
Inter-local authority partnership coordinator 1 1
Local charity 1 0
Community project coordinator 1 1
Community member 0 1
Total 35 33
c) Regional participants
The starting point for determining regional-level participants was the management 
group of Climate East Midlands (CEM), the regionÕs climate change partnership. At 
the beginning of the research project, the regional organisations active in climate 
policy within CEM were:
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¥ East Midlands Development Agency (EMDA) (charged with promoting 
economic growth within the region);
¥ East Midlands Regional Assembly (EMRA) (strategic organisation bringing 
together regionÕs elected councillors);
¥ East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership (promoting sharing of 
good practice and resources between regionÕs local authorities);
¥ Environment Agency (working on renewable energy schemes and operating 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment); and
¥ Government OfÞce for East Midlands (GOEM) (representing Whitehall 
departments within the region).
A focus group was carried out including representatives from all of these 
organisations, along with the partnershipÕs co-ordinator, following a CEM meeting at 
the beginning of the Þeldwork, which helped to clarify the issues these individuals 
found most meaningful in implementing climate policy and which could be explored 
further in subsequent interviews. These interviews were carried out in the second 
half of 2010 against a backdrop of rapid change within the regional tier, as the new 
Cameron Government scrapped Regional Strategies (Pickles, 2010a), a key function 
of EMRA, and began the process of abolishing GOEM (Pickles, 2010c) and EMDA 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2012). This ongoing process of Ôde-
regionalisationÕ meant that fewer repeat interviews were conducted at this level as 
individuals left their posts and were not replaced. Interviews were carried out with 
individuals from two organisations brought into the CEM management group 
following the regional changes: Business In The Community and the National Health 
Service. Individuals from the East Midlands ofÞce of Energy Saving Trust, a national 
organisation advising local authorities and the public on energy efÞciency, were also 
interviewed. The regional ofÞce closed part way during Þeldwork, meaning one of 
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the two participants had left post by the time of the second wave of interviews. A 
summary of the regional participants interviewed is shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Regional participants interviewed
Organisation Wave 1 Wave 2
EMDA 3 2
GOEM 2 2
East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership 1 1
CEM 1 1
EMRA 1 0
Energy Saving Trust 2 1
Business in the Community 0 1
National Health Service 0 1
Environment Agency 1 0
Total 11 9
d) National participants
While being one step removed from subnational policy implementation work, 
interviews with national actors provided background to the main study and 
alternative perspectives on the relationship between the national and subnational in 
policy implementation. These individuals were only interviewed once, as they 
provided more contextual information rather than forming the main subject of the 
study. The organisations identiÞed as important (number of individuals interviewed 
in brackets) were:
¥ Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) (3) (Whitehall 
department responsible for local climate change mitigation policy);
¥ Local Government Group (1) (national organisation representing interests of 
local authorities);
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¥ Carbon Trust (2) (government funded organisation working with regional and 
local organisations on carbon management);
¥ Committee on Climate Change (2) (organisation formed under Climate 
Change Act, providing independent policy advice to government on meeting 
carbon targets); and
¥ Friends of the Earth (1) (non-governmental organisation campaigning on local 
authority climate policy).
A summary of the national participants is shown in Table 6.
Table 6. National participants interviewed
Organisation Wave 1 Wave 2
DECC 0 3
Local Government Group 0 1
Carbon Trust 0 2
Committee on Climate Change 0 2
Friends of the Earth 0 1
Total 0 9
e) Summary of interview participants
In total, 29 participants were interviewed twice and 39 were interviewed once, the 
latter number including a number of individuals who either left or came into their 
post during the Þeldwork. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Before each 
interview began, the participant was given a brief verbal recap of the purpose and 
style of the interview before being invited to read a participant information sheet 
and sign the form providing consent for the interview data to be used in the project 
(appendix 1). Interviews were usually carried out in participantsÕ own ofÞces, 
reducing the disruption to their work schedule and helping to offset some of the 
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ethical concerns about the amount of power afforded to researchers in one-to-one 
interviews by using what the participant sees as Ôhome groundÕ (Fontana and Frey, 
1998, p.64). A summary of the research participants is shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Summary of participants interviewed by spatial level
Wave 1 Wave 2
Local 35 33
Regional 11 9
National 0 9
TOTAL 46 51
 
f) Reßections on interviewing
ÒÔReßexivityÕ refers to a researcherÕs active consideration of and 
engagement with the ways in which his own sense-making and the 
particular circumstances that might have affected it, throughout all phases 
of the research process, relate to the knowledge claims he ultimately 
advances in written form.Ó (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.100)
Reßexivity is a key theme of the phenomenological literature which has become 
part of the evaluative criteria for interpretive research (Schwartz-Shea, 2006, pp.
101-102). Three aspects of reßexivity will be drawn upon here: (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012, p.101): 
¥ efÞcacy of initial research mapping for exposure to different meanings; 
¥ revising research design in the light of experiences in the Þeld; and
¥ the co-construction of researcher identity by participant and researcher, 
and the implications for the co-generation of data.
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Two notable issues from Þeldwork, developing a local outlook and researcher 
identity, will be discussed to demonstrate reßexivity and build reader conÞdence in 
the Þeldwork process. 
Developing a local outlook
I began this project working for Regeneration East Midlands, a regional-level 
organisation which contributed to the funding of the research. As part of a particular 
network, I had already come into contact with a number of individuals working in 
regional organisations, and far fewer who worked within local authorities or other 
bodies. Although I was unaware of it at the time, this was the foundation for my 
initial sense-making about the research; being based in a regional organisation led me 
to unconsciously place that spatial level at the centre of my thinking. I imagined CEM 
as the central hub for climate policy in the region, with the local authorities as 
spokes coming off into the regionÕs local areas. This cemented the notion of the 
ÔsubnationalÕ in my mind, a combination of the regional and local working to 
implement policy beneath the national level. As I began to interview local authority 
participants, it became clear that this was far from an accurate way of 
conceptualising the relationship between the spatial levels (for an example, see pages 
244-270). The hub/spoke metaphor implies that the local authorities were 
dependent upon the regional tier, when interviews revealed ofÞcers were ambivalent 
to much of the regional organisations and partnerships. 
This provides an example of reßection on themes i) and ii) from the above list.  For 
i), the initial mapping was too centred on the regional tier as a result of my own 
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positioning and personal circumstances. That this was identiÞed quickly in the light of 
ÒÞeld realitiesÓ, leading to a greater focus on local actors, provides a demonstration 
of theme ii) and further contributes to the trustworthiness of the research 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.101).
Researcher identity
As discussed above, I offered a short precis of my research to participants at the 
beginning of each interview, outlining the research topic as Òsubnational 
implementation of climate policyÓ. Most of the participants had climate policy as a 
signiÞcant part of their responsibilities, so in using this description I (unwittingly) put 
many of the participants at ease from the outset. They could be conÞdent that the 
interview would cover familiar ground. While I did not state any personal views 
about the importance of climate change as a policy priority, the role as a Ôclimate 
change researcherÕ located me within a similar interpretive community to 
themselves. Conversations were held on the basis of some implied, shared 
assumptions that climate change was a national policy priority and that the scientiÞc 
evidence that it was based upon was sound. 
Interviewing the head of a local authority section other than climate change was a 
different experience. Here, the participant belonged to a different interpretive 
community, seeing climate change as peripheral, not central, to the task of 
maintaining their service within the organisation. The interview took place in the 
context of an ongoing disagreement over policy between senior managers from the 
section and the climate change unit. Introducing myself as a Ôclimate change 
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researcherÕ may have positioned me in the mind of the participant as Ôone of themÕ 
rather than Ôone of usÕ. I was conscious of the issue during interviews, and although I 
was already aware of the struggle between the section and the climate change team, 
I strove not to ask questions which explicitly aligned me with the latterÕs position 
while still exploring the issues at the root of the disagreements. While these efforts 
went some way towards mitigating the issue, the possibility remains that my position 
as researcher may have increased the likelihood of the service head presenting an 
Ôenvironmentally friendlyÕ position. He struck a diplomatic tone in the interview and 
was, on the surface at least, much more supportive of climate policy than I had been 
led to believe both from previous interviews and from informal discussions within 
the organisation. While a positivist methodology would be concerned that the gap 
between the participantÕs self-presentation and their actual preferences shows up a 
weakness of interview data (Dowding and James, 2004, p.187), an interpretive 
approach sees such a ÔperformanceÕ as interesting data in itself (Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow, 2012, pp.110-111). The careful diplomacy employed by the participant 
contrasted with the much more open conversations that typiÞed most other 
interviews. This interview experience is not recounted as being representative of a 
greater number of interviews; the majority were conducted under much more 
relaxed conditions. However, the data accessed during the interview, both the 
language used and the performance of self-presentation, was important in providing 
a different angle on the policy controversy within County 1 (see pages 153-158). 
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This example illustrates the importance of theme iii) and how my role as Ôclimate 
change researcherÕ took on a different meaning when in conßuence with the 
participantÕs role as someone sceptical of climate changeÕs relevance to their work. 
Particular attention had to be paid to the language used to express their 
commitment to climate policy, illuminating the gap between their understanding of 
the issue and that of climate change ofÞcers (see pages 155-158). The data generated 
from the interview was of a different nature of that from an interview with a climate 
change manager, where Ôclimate changeÕ as an issue was integral to the identities of 
both researcher and participant. 
g) What would I do differently? Curb my enthusiasm.
A preoccupation with applying my theoretical approach to Þeldwork led me to 
overlook the practicalities of processing and analysing an abundance of data within a 
period of time constrained by personal18 and institutional19 contexts.  While one can 
never be sure in advance whether the data arising from an interview will be of 
importance to the Þnal research, greater reßection on this issue in the Þeld could 
have curbed my enthusiasm for data collection and made data processing and 
analysis more manageable once Þeldwork came to an end. 
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18 With the research stipend coming to an end after three years, any continuation of writing into a 
fourth year would have to have been done alongside paid work. 
19 There is increased pressure on institutions to better manage their doctoral completion rates 
(Park, 2005, p.194), exacerbated by a concentration of the Economic and Social Research CouncilÕs 
PhD student funding in fewer universities through the new system of Doctoral Training Centres 
(Corbyn, 2009)
4.3.3 Meeting observations
a) Structure
The prevalence of governance through partnership working and network 
management provided a range of meetings for observation as part of the study 
(Durose, 2007, p.24). Observation forms part of the wider suite of ethnographic 
methods which provide the opportunity to discover the acts, objects and language 
involved in policy implementation which may be less evident from interviews 
(Yanow, 2000, pp.38-9). Observation appears to enable a researcher to get closer to 
organisational activities than is possible within interviews, although what is noticed 
in the Þeld and then subsequently deemed worthy of further analysis is, of course, 
subject to the researcherÕs own interpretive frame. There is no such thing as a ÔpureÕ 
source of data but data derived from observation will be subject to a relatively 
consistent set of biases throughout the project, providing a valuable means of 
triangulating data collected by other methods (Adler and Adler, 1998, pp.89-90). 
Note taking during meeting observations had to strike a balance between collecting 
data relevant to the research questions and remaining open to the range of acts, 
interactions and use of objects which may provide useful information (Yanow, 2000, 
pp.38-39). Observations of meetings were also helpful in uncovering the meanings of 
acts beyond their literal purpose when analysed in the context of data collected 
from other methods (Yanow, 2000, pp.76-78). For examples of the value of this data, 
see section 5.4 (pages 163-179).
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b) Participants
A total of 27 meetings were observed. These can be characterised as non-participant 
observations, although I was asked to contribute to discussions on rare occasions - 
a trend which developed as I became more familiar to those attending the meetings. 
While wanting to accommodate any such requests in order to maintain goodwill, I 
kept these contributions to a minimum in an attempt not to unduly inßuence 
proceedings. Most observations were carried out at either inter-organisational 
network meetings or cross-department meetings within local authorities.  A 
summary of meetings and events observed is in Table 8.
Table 8. Meetings and events observed
Invite-only meetings Wave 1 Wave 2
National 0 1
Regional 4 4
Local/national meeting 2 0
County 1 2 1
County 2 1 0
City 1 2 1
City 2 2 1
District level network 0 1
Public events
Regional 5 0
TOTAL 18 9
Audio recordings were not made of observed meetings. Instead, extensive written 
notes were taken. I recorded my own reßections about each meeting soon after its 
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completion, often using a voice recorder while walking back from the meeting 
location to the train station.
c) Reßections
One episode which occurred while undertaking observation in the Þeld provides an 
opportunity to reßect on the effect of my presence on the actions of participants 
and the consequences for the data collected (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.
101). It was my Þrst time observing a cross-departmental meeting within a particular 
local authority. Other than the climate change manager who was my primary 
contact within the organisation, the meeting was attended by a range of more senior 
section managers involved in climate policy and was chaired by a director. My 
contact introduced me at the start of the meeting and I gave a short summary of my 
research. The director quipped that I was very welcome at the meeting Òas long as 
none of this ends up in the local paper tomorrowÓ (anonymised local authority 
meeting, Þeld notes). While the comment was delivered with a smile, it did reßect a 
sharpened political sensitivity of those in more senior positions within local 
authorities. At a different local authority meeting, a section head joked that ÒweÕre 
struggling to get them not to kill their residents at the moment, let alone do this! 
[prioritise a climate policy]Ó (anonymised local authority meeting, Þeld notes). The 
chair quickly followed this with a comment, again delivered humorously, that the 
joke should be struck from the minutes. While this comment betrayed a little 
nervousness on the part of the chair about the picture of the organisation 
presented to an outsider, that the comment was made at all suggested I was 
inconspicuous at the meeting. Similarly unguarded comments were made at most 
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other observed meetings, supporting the view that my presence did not unduly 
restrict the ability of attendees to speak freely.  In sum, even though my observations 
were largely non-participant, that did not mean I was invisible to those attending 
meetings. However, in the main meeting participants did not acknowledge my 
presence and were generally relaxed in their conduct, suggesting that I could be 
conÞdent that the effect of my presence on discussions was relatively minimal.
4.4 Choosing the data analysis
Yanow identiÞes three symbolic aspects of policy which can be analysed 
interpretively: objects, acts and language (2000, pp.41-84). Examples of each of these 
are outlined below.
4.4.1 Objects
Policy programmes communicate meaning through their deÞnition of key concepts 
and the ways in which these correspond or diverge from those of policy actors and 
the public (Yanow, 2000, p.69). As argued earlier, climate change is a socially 
constructed issue more usually associated with global, rather than local, spatial scales 
(see pages 28-30). ÔCarbon dioxideÕ has a particular meaning within the scientiÞc 
evidence upon which climate policy is based, but within the policy itself it can take 
on different meanings beyond its literal, chemical deÞnition. For climate change 
managers it could be a key performance indicator, for managers elsewhere in a local 
authority it could mean an unwelcome new policy which challenges their existing 
work practices. While carbon dioxide is a central concept within climate policy, 
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particular policy texts can also embody diverse meanings. Chapter 7 demonstrates 
the multiple meanings attached to one short document, the Memorandum of 
Understanding (DECC and LG Group, 2011), by actors within the network. Policy 
programmesÕ meanings may be dynamic, not static (Yanow, 2000, p.71). As discussed 
in Chapter 6, climate policy as an object itself has undergone ÔmorphingÕ, perhaps to 
the extent where its constituent programmes are becoming more distant from 
some of climate changeÕs original meanings.
4.4.2 Acts
One of the underlying assumptions of this research is that the targets implied by the 
Climate Change Act are highly challenging for policy-makers to implement (see 
pages 52-55). This Act (upper case) is an example of the numerous acts (lower case) 
within public policy which individuals and groups can Þnd meaning in (Yanow, 2000, 
p.74). As discussed in section 3.2.4, these meanings are created within the context of 
prior, local knowledge, leading to i) different interpretations of the acts of others and 
ii) new acts being committed (see pages 71-74). This hermeneutic process opens up 
space between local acts and written policies, which can then be compared as a way 
of understanding the Ôimplementation gapÕ (Yanow, 2000, p.76; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984, p.143). One local authority act within climate policy was that of 
adopting a target to reducing carbon dioxide emissions within their Local Area 
Agreement (see pages 47-52). The meaning and signiÞcance of these acts are 
explored in sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 (see pages 188-208). The act of holding a 
meeting within an organisation is also likely to carry meaning, for those invited (who 
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may or may not attend) and those excluded (Yanow, 2000, p.76). Interactions within 
the meetings may be of particular interest, analysed during observations. Examples of 
the meaning embedded in meetings are explored in section 5.4 (see pages 165-182). 
Such meetings are often scheduled regularly; for example, on a monthly or quarterly 
basis. The meeting will have a title such as climate policy group or climate change 
network which expresses its literal function and/or membership. However, some 
characteristics of these meetings may not make sense when considered as part of 
their stated function, but instead make more sense when the meetings are also 
understood as ritualised acts. Yanow uses the example of a meeting where the 
director regularly asked what the organisationÕs goals were, even though they were 
clearly expressed in a mission statement (2000, pp.77-78). The role of ritual in intra-
organisational and network meetings is considered in section 5.4.4a (see pages 
175-177).   
Finally, one may consider the creation and performance of myths to be another type 
of symbolic act, helping to ease the tension between irreconcilable values within 
policy (Yanow, 2000, p.80). The decentred approach sees such tensions as causing any 
given policy-maker to encounter a dilemma, which has to be Òpushed and pulledÓ to 
be reconciled with the tradition which inßuences their outlook on the world (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2003, p.37). The Climate Change Act provides the legal basis for policy 
which will ensure the UK reduces its greenhouse gas emissions to a level which 
scientiÞc evidence suggests will avert the most serious consequences of climate 
change. However, an extended analysis may locate the ActÕs targets within the 
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context of other policy decisions made within government, leading to a questioning 
of any literal reading of the Act as the basis for policy. For example, the Labour 
GovernmentÕs decision to build a third runway at Heathrow (later reversed by the 
Cameron Government) appeared to contradict the stated aim of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, and led Colin Challen MP, then chairman of the All Party 
Parliamentary Group, to describe the Act as Òwell beyond our political capacity to 
deliverÓ (Harrabin, 2009). If decisions continue to be made at a national level which 
make achieving the ActÕs emission targets less, not more, likely, then the legislation 
may be seen as the enactment of a myth that dangerous climate change can be 
averted while other government policies which increase emissions continue 
unchanged (Bellamy and Hulme, 2011, p.58; Howarth and Griggs, 2006).  With local 
authority mitigation policy being predicated on similar emission targets to national 
government, comparing and contrasting policy with action at the local level may 
highlight similar contradictions.
4.4.3 Language
Implicit in any consideration of symbolic objects or acts is language, the use of which 
within organisational texts or individualsÕ speech may be analysed in various ways. 
Yanow identiÞes two types of language use: metaphor and category (2000, p.41). An 
interpretive approach sees the notion of a Ôpolicy cycleÕ as itself a metaphor for the 
relationships between policy actors (see pages 69-70). This can be described as a 
model of action, and differentiated from a model for taking action in a certain 
situation (Yanow, 2005). While the two are interrelated, it is the latter which is of 
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primary concern during data analysis, uncovering the ways in which individuals see 
policy through language. One might expect this to be of particular interest in the 
Þeld of climate policy, where the highly complex nature of the evidence may only be 
understood by policy-makers through metaphors, rather than a grasping of the 
science itself (Hulme, 2008, p.11). Category analysis is often used to identify the 
labels used to describe groups of individuals who are affected by a policy (Yanow, 
2000, pp.48-49). Within this research, categories are used in a slightly different way, 
as a means of differentiating between policy-makers and the general public as well as 
between different groups of individuals within policy organisations. These categories 
highlight a number of characteristics about the legitimacy and implementation of 
local climate policy. Language also plays a political role in the form of rhetoric, which 
can apply pressure on actors (see pages 253-258, 309-316).
4.4.4 Reßections on data analysis
As outlined above, analysis of observations and interviews began straight away in the 
Þeld, through the taking of written and spoken notes. In particular, the use of the 
latter provided added ßexibility in note taking, not having to wait to make written 
notes before recording reßections on a piece of Þeldwork. So data analysis begins in 
the Þeld, with an ongoing interaction between Þeldwork and deskwork, with 
emerging themes helping to shape the second round of topical interviews (Yanow, 
2000, pp.84-85). More formalised analysis followed, with transcripts, Þeld notes and 
reßections from interviews and observations coded using NVivo. The software was 
preferred to a more ÔanalogueÕ pen and paper approach, in order to readily retrieve 
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the codes already used, and compare and collate themes across a large amount of 
transcripts and notes. Formulating the arguments included in this research 
necessarily implies the exclusion of much data from the abundance collected. 
Inevitably, given the anti-foundationalist, interpretive framework I am adopting, such 
Òworld-makingÓ through the authoring of texts is itself an interpretation, and not an 
attempt to provide a mirror on reality (Yanow, 2000, p.87). However, with this 
approach comes a responsibility to continuously test and check the data to ensure 
that my interpretation is robust, and has not ßowed uncritically from my initial 
preconceptions (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, pp.104-105). Where possible, 
voices dissenting from the majority view are highlighted to demonstrate the 
multivocality within policy implementation. Member checking, the sense-checking of 
the results of analysis with research participants, began in the second wave of topical 
interviews, where themes which had emerged in the Þrst round of interviews were 
revisited (or introduced when they had not previously been discussed by a 
participant). Further member checking with participants took place once the analysis 
was complete, both informally at a number of co-attended events and at a formal 
presentation to the research advisory group which met towards the end of the 
writing-up process. 
 
4.5 Ethics
Ethical approval was gained for the research from the School of Sociology and Social 
Policy in the University of Nottingham. A consent form and participant factsheet was 
given to interview participants in advance (see appendix). It was not practical to 
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circulate such forms to everyone attending meetings which I attended. However, 
attendees were made aware of the purpose of my presence both in advance, as part 
of the circulated agenda, and at the start of the meeting itself. At both stages, 
attendees were asked if they had any objections to my observing the meeting, and 
reminded that even if they did consent, this could be withdrawn at any stage (the 
same assurance was also given to interview participants). By providing clear 
information to participants before they took part in the project, the principle of 
informed consent was adhered to (Social Research Association, 2003, pp.28-29).
The greatest ethical challenge for the project has been maintaining participantsÕ 
anonymity while ensuring Þndings are reported in an intelligible manner to the 
reader (Social Research Association, 2003, pp.38-39). The four local authorities can 
be anonymised as they are not unique within their category but could still be 
potentially recognisable if reference to any distinct characteristics is necessary 
within the research. In one case, information that could have supported explanations 
has been omitted due to anonymity concerns (see page 280n45). An additional 
challenge to maintaining conÞdentiality is the Ôgossip factorÕ. It would be unwise to 
assume that the identity of local authorities included in the research will remain 
secret within a relatively small regional network. While accepting that total 
conÞdentiality may not be achievable, the researcher maintains an obligation to 
reduce the possibility of inferring identity from attributes of the participant which 
can be ascertained from the text (Social Research Association, 2003, p.39). The 
potential of participants being identiÞable, particularly by fellow network members, 
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are highlighted in the research ethics form and consent form (see Appendix) in line 
with the principle of informed consent.
4.6 Codes used to identify participants
Following this ethical approach, participants are referred to here by a code 
consisting of the type of organisation they belonged to and their role within it. City 
1, City 2, County 1 and County 2 are the four core local authorities, with other local 
authorities referred to with sequential numbers (see pages 113-116). The regional 
organisations are identiÞed as Regional 1, Regional 2, Regional 3, and so on. At the 
national level, while individuals remain anonymised, they are identiÞed as being from 
DECC or the Local Government Association as essential context for the interview 
data presented. The second part of each code consists of the role each participant 
fulÞls: Climate Change Manager represents a senior member of staff within a climate 
change or environment team, Climate Change OfÞcer is a more junior member of the 
same team. Director is at a more senior level, typically reporting to the Chief 
Executive, with a remit including, climate change alongside a range of other issues. In 
County 1, two additional roles at similar levels are identiÞed within the local 
authority which do not deal directly with climate change: Service Head, a senior 
manager with responsibility for delivering a particular local authority service, and 
Department Head, who heads a corporate section of the local authority. Councillor 
refers to an elected member who holds the portfolio for climate policy. Adviser is 
used for participants within both DECC and the Local Government Association, 
referring to middle-ranking staff with a specialty in climate policy.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has explained the choice of research sites, data collection methods and 
data analysis methods in relation to the interpretive approach. Key elements of the 
design are:
¥ located at two spatial levels:
- the regional level of the East Midlands;
- local authorities and their associated areas within the East Midlands;
¥ repeat interviews, characterised as ÔculturalÕ and Ôtopical, with participants 
from both local and regional organisations;
¥ additional contextual interviews carried out with participants from national 
organisations;
¥ meeting observations, predominantly within local authorities and the 
regional network;
¥ analysis of interview transcripts and notes from interviews and 
observations for three categories of data:
- objects
- acts
- language
¥ a commitment to continual reßection and transparency of method to build 
research trustworthiness.
This chapter has also demonstrated the translation of interpretive theory detailed in 
chapter 3 into research design. A broadly ethnographic approach to data collection 
has been balanced with the practical limitations of researching multiple actors and 
sites as a doctoral student. This brought about a use of conversational interviews 
and participant-observations across a broad range of sites, rather than embedded 
ethnography within a limited number of settings. 
Finally, this chapter and chapter 3 have demonstrated the translation of interpretive 
theory into research design in six key areas, summarised in Table 9.
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Table 9.  Theory and practice of interpretive research design
Theory of 
interpretive 
design Translating design theory into design practice
Research orientation Focus on meaning
Appreciation of individualsÕ diverse interpretations of a 
policy
Design attitude Awareness of researcher prior knowledge, located within a 
regional network
Flexibility in design through an open-ended ÔsnowballingÕ 
approach to Þnding participants
Getting going Research setting as site for open investigation, not a case of a 
pre-ordained phenomenon
In the Þeld Expanding number of research participants to ensure 
exposure to multiple webs of meaning
Focusing on locally signiÞcant issues of participants, not 
those previously assumed to be important
Analysis of evidence Communication of multiple meanings through objects, acts 
and language
Producing a robust, coherent argument for a particular 
interpretation of policy implementation
Evaluative standards Trustworthiness built through a demonstration of reßexivity 
and transparency
Adapted from Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, p.113)
The ordering of Table 9 broadly corresponds to a chronological journey through the 
research process (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.114). While all six 
characteristics have been covered in the current and previous chapters, the Þnal two 
- analysis of evidence and evaluative standards - will continue to feature in the 
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remainder of the research. Through a focus on the multiple meanings found within 
the local knowledge of individuals within the network, a cogent interpretation of 
climate policy will be developed; an argument supported by an underlying 
commitment to researcher reßection and transparency.
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5. Moving to the mainstream? 
Embedding climate policy 
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 1, the research interest in implementation of climate policy 
developed from a curiosity about the 'next steps' in UK public policy after the 
passing of the 2008 Climate Change Act. While the popularity of Ôimplementation 
studiesÕ as a sub-discipline of public policy has ßuctuated, it remains a well-
established area of research (O'Toole, 2000, pp.263-265). However, while policy acts 
may be analysed chronologically as following legislation or regulation, describing such 
acts as 'implementation' connotes local areas carrying out the bidding of central 
government (Hill, 1997, p.383). As a result, it was perhaps unsurprising that local 
ofÞcials rarely described themselves as 'implementing' policy. This chapter is about 
one of the policy acts they did describe themselves as doing or aspiring to do: 
embedding.
The concept of ÔembeddingÕ climate change considerations into other areas of local 
authority policy was mentioned, unprompted, by managers in all four local 
authorities studied in depth.  The word ÔembedÕ and its related stems were used 103 
times in interviews with local participants, compared with 76 mentions of 
ÔimplementÕ and its related stems. What makes this comparison more striking is that 
implementation was often used by myself at the beginning of each interview to 
remind the participant about the research project. Despite these cues, the word was 
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rarely repeated by the participants themselves. In contrast, embedding was a 
concept introduced by participants in interviews, talking about it of their own 
accord rather than echoing my choice of words. Embedding was a not term that was 
anticipated during research planning, as it features rarely within the public policy 
literature. Bhrs (2008, pp.62-63) does write speciÞcally of embedding climate policy 
within a wider sustainability agenda using Òpolicy synergiesÓ between carbon 
emission reduction and issues such as energy security, fuel efÞciency and reducing air 
pollution. During interviews for this research embedding took on a slightly different 
meaning, broadly referring to the consideration, and likely calculation, of carbon 
dioxide emissions within all aspects of local authority policy.  The word ÔembedÕ is 
deÞned as to Òimplant (an idea or feeling) within something else so it becomes an 
ingrained or essential characteristic of it" (Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2010).20 The 
need for climate change to become integrated with other policy issues such as social 
care, education and transport provision echoes the notion discussed in Chapter 3 of 
climate change being a Ôwicked problemÕ, spreading its tentacles into other areas of 
public policy rather than remaining within discrete boundaries.
Three aspects of embedding will be examined in this chapter: 
¥ the concept of climate change and environment being apart from, not a part 
of, mainstream policy concerns will be explained and how the presence of 
these attitudes within local authorities sparked the drive for embedding 
policy;
¥ a case study of a local authority environmental programme will show how 
attempts to introduce a new system awoke a dormant battle over policy 
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20 Although a Þgurative, rather than literal, deÞnition, it is sufÞciently well established to be included in 
the Oxford Dictionaries. For historical examples see OED Online (2012a)
implementation and the deeper understandings and values upon which it 
was based; and
¥ the practices carried out within local authority board meetings focused on 
embedding climate policy, and how the passivity of many of the participants 
suggested such meetings held meanings beyond their literal function. 
This chapter focuses on local authorities, where the issue of embedding was most 
prevalent, as they tried to reduce the emissions arising from their own activities.21 
Although only two out of the nine upper tier local authorities included the relevant 
National Indicator (NI), NI185, within their Local Area Agreements (LAAs), all nine 
were still obliged to report progress to central government, as well as having a 
Þnancial incentive for action through the reduction of their energy costs and 
Carbon Reduction Commitment burden. However, these incentives did not translate 
into effective action on emissions reduction. To explain this puzzle, this analysis 
begins with some dominant ideas within Western society and policy. 
5.2 Apart from, not a part of, the environment
5.2.1 Growth, energy and the natural world: a tradition of Western 
public policy 
HumansÕ conceptions of their relationship with the natural environment are 
multifarious and complex. The literature identiÞes a broad trend of increasing 
separation between nature and its cultural context in late modern Western 
societies, leading to a dualism rarely found in non-Western traditions (Hulme, 2009, 
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21 The regional tier is largely absent from this chapter as its relevance declined with the Cameron 
GovernmentÕs de-regionalisation strategy which coincided with the research Þeldwork period (see 
Section 4.3.2c). 
p.15). This has contributed to a ÒDominant Social ParadigmÓ where the natural 
world is seen as a separate, inert set of resources which can be controlled by 
humans in the pursuit of progress (Koger and Winter, 2009, pp.38-61).22 Linked to 
these ideas is a policy imperative for economic growth which has become inculcated 
within the Òmental infrastructuresÓ of society (Welzer, as cited in 
Sachverstndigenrat fr Umweltfragen, 2012, p.13). Taken together, these concepts 
form a broad tradition of public policy as the pursuit of growth coupled to the 
extraction of energy from fossil fuels (Connelly and Smith, 2003, pp.68-69; Jackson, 
2009, pp.48-52).
Climate change, in conjunction with Óthe end of cheap oilÓ (International Energy 
Agency, 2011, p.3), has implications for society which challenge this tradition of 
public policy (New Economics Foundation, 2010, pp.17-24; New et al., 2011; 
Tverberg, 2012; Evans-Pritchard, 2012).23 As energy costs have increased and 
evidence of the effects of carbon emissions has emerged, some policy-makers have 
begun to re-examine their assumptions, leading to the national and local policy 
developments traced in Chapter 2. Despite these developments, climate change has 
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22 Such a broad deÞnition captures a key aspect of the human/nature relationship but also elides 
some important nuances which cannot be captured by the Ôpart ofÕ/Ôapart fromÕ dualism (Schroeder, 
2007, p.307). For example, humans may identify themselves as being part of nature while 
simultaneously seeing natural environments as those free of human interference (Vining et al., 2008, p.
10). Such a dissonance reßects that ÔnatureÕ represents multiple, often contradictory, social 
constructions (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998, p.8).
23 While it is unclear whether global oil production has reached its peak, the experience to date in 
the twenty-Þrst century suggests such a point is imminent or has already passed (Hirsch, 2008; 
Tsoskounglou et al., 2008). More certain is that global population growth and economic development 
is driving signiÞcant increases in the demand for energy (International Energy Agency, 2011, pp.1-2) 
and that any new fossil fuel sources are likely to come at greater cost than in the past (Murphy and 
Hall, 2011 pp.64-68).
continued to face a battle for the attention of local policy-makers more used to 
dealing with long-established issues such as adult social care, transport and schools.  
When trying to reduce emissions within their own local authority, ofÞcers have 
often struggled to get the issue treated as a priority by other parts of the 
organisation. A fundamental part of this problem, as seen by many climate change 
ofÞcers, is a reßection of the dominant social paradigm; a perception by many within 
local authorities that climate change and the environment are apart from, not a part 
of, their organisationsÕ day-to-day business.24 Two aspects of this are explored here: 
Þrst, climate change and the environment as peripheral to mainstream public policy; 
and second, climate change as being an extra-local issue.
5.2.2 The peripheral environment 
These dominant attitudes towards nature within Western societies provided 
context for a continuing belief amongst some policy-makers that climate change was 
a fringe concern. One climate change ofÞcer summed up how the problem affected 
their efforts to reduce the local authorityÕs own carbon emissions:
ÒItÕs generally seen as someone elseÕs problem, people donÕt relate it to 
their own activities; people donÕt see how they can address it in their own 
work lives, in their own work environments.Ó (County 1 Climate Change 
Manager 1, interview 2)
As discussed below, this observation manifested itself in the divergent meanings 
placed on policies to reduce carbon emissions by climate change teams and 
organisational colleagues working in other departments or service delivery areas. An 
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24 This is not a normative comment that climate change should be seen as an environmental issue, 
rather that it has emerged as an issue within, not transcending, environmental policy (Roberts, 2010).
extreme example of antipathy towards climate policy from policy practitioners came 
from a regional organisation, where one ofÞcer was given the nickname ÔSwampyÕ by 
colleagues:25
ÒThatÕs taking it to the real nth degree, but it's that attitude of ÔthatÕs 
something separate and I don't quite understand how it Þts with me. ItÕs 
not part of the mainstreamÕ.Ó (Regional 1 Climate Change OfÞcer, 
interview 1)
The ofÞcer was offering advice to local businesses on cutting carbon emissions 
through improving energy efÞciency. While such advice would appear relatively 
benign to climate change ofÞcers, for some colleagues from outside the Þeld it 
meant an association with a fringe movement, apart from the mainstream. While not 
usually expressed in such stark terms, the use of the nickname provides a vivid 
example of the barriers many ofÞcers described between climate change and more 
mainstream policy areas. Other barriers that were identiÞed included the unfamiliar 
lexicon of climate change, the challenge of relating climate policy to established 
organisational priorities and the long-term nature of the policy goals, expressed 
respectively in the following interview extracts:
ÒPeople donÕt like the term Ôclimate changeÕ, ÔcarbonÕ, things like that. They 
just go ÔerrrmmÕ! It can be a big turn-off for people. Generally people still 
havenÕt got their head around carbon dioxide. ÔWhat is that, so many 
balloons?!Õ [...] You can paint some pictures of polar bears and that 
doesnÕt mean that much to me.Ó (County 2 Climate Change Manager 1 
interview 1)
 
ÒIÕve just been asked Ôwhat have we got to sell from a climate change 
perspective? How could I demonstrate that I have any value to add to 
anything? [...] Do they [the board] value it? I donÕt know if they do or not 
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25 Named after the environmental campaigner who became famous in the UK for living in tunnels as 
part of a campaign of direct action against the construction of a new road in Newbury (CauÞeld, 
1997).
really, climate change is not high enough proÞle.Ó (Regional 2 Climate 
Change Manager, interview 1)
ÒHow embedded is it really? It's very hard... I think the times we're going 
through now, even getting staff to focus on 2020 as [you think] will we all 
be here [the organisation] or what will we be doing?! But when you start 
talking about 2050, 2080, I struggle with thatÕ.Ó (District 1 Climate Change 
Manager 1, interview 1)
Faced with such attitudes, one local authority ofÞcer explicitly saw running 
community events which sought to make environmental and climate change issues 
more meaningful locally as a part of their role. By working with existing 
communities, such as religious groups, sports clubs and arts festivals, the local 
authority can communicate more successfully than speaking as an outsider:
ÒThatÕs what we want, to make environmentalism mainstream and not 
something that sits alongside. I think part of the problem is that itÕs seen 
as a kind of green, weird people that sit over here somewhere. ThatÕs 
partly our fault because we have given that kind of image. You wanna get 
away from that and go Ôno, itÕs not weird stuff that happens behind closed 
doors, itÕs something that is affecting how we do our job and how we 
liveÕ.Ó (City 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 1)
A director from the same local authority who had responsibility for climate change 
echoed similar sentiments, describing the period prior to their arrival, in which 
environmental specialists dominated the agenda, was described in disparaging terms:
Ò[There were} a lot of like-minded people talking to each other, the 
outcome from which I donÕt think was immediately obvious. Friends of 
the Earth group, Health and Environment partnership group É I couldnÕt 
see what changed other than media activity. City planning, city 
infrastructure wasnÕt taking place, in my mind.Ó (City 1 Director, interview 
1)
On delivering these comments, the director adopted a mocking tone of voice and a 
facial expression suggesting that these groups could not be taken seriously, 
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expressing them as apart from the mainstream council activities of planning and 
infrastructure (City 1 Director, interview 1, Þeld notes). Once in post, the director 
took steps to move the agenda away from these specialist groups and become more 
in step with mainstream council activities; the focus shifted from public awareness-
raising and communication towards infrastructure programmes. 
In both of the above quotes from City 1, the environment was depicted as 
something apart from the everyday business of local public policy, with those 
focusing on environmental and climate policy seen as being unserious or even 
strange. As a result, policy-makers have been forced to Þnd new routes to some of 
the outcomes bound up in climate policy. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, progress 
has been made by talking about issues other than the environment, rather than a 
change in traditional attitudes. 
5.2.3 Climate change as extra-local
Peripheralisation of the climate change issue does not only arise from doubts about 
environmental experts and campaigners. The intangibility of climate change's causes 
and effects also plays a key role. As discussed in Chapter 2, the emergence of climate 
change as an issue has been dominated by a scientiÞc framing which makes it difÞcult 
to grasp. Greenhouse gas emissions are invisible to the human eye so their local 
consequences do not impact immediately on the local environment in the same way 
as previous issues; for example, the London smog which prompted the Clean Air Act 
of 1956 (Brimblecombe, 2006). Environmental concerns have become increasingly 
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globalised (Fenger, 2009), with climate change emerging as an issue only due to 
advanced scientiÞc inquiry and complex computer modelling, setting it apart from 
everyday lived experience (Demeritt, 2001, p.309).
 
Environmental problems typically do not respect the boundaries between the 
different jurisdictions of humans, but climate change is particular in that it is the 
global tally of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide, which affects 
change. The location of GHG emission production does not relate to the locations 
in which effects are most keenly felt. As a result, collective action has been seen as 
the only effective means of arresting the growth in emissions.  A local area acting 
alone could only make a very small impression on the global stock of GHGs.
While the causes of climate change are global, the consequences are likely to be felt 
locally, with particular areas, such as low-lying ground, suffering special 
vulnerabilities. This weakens the appeal of climate change mitigation to local policy-
makers. If the causes are global, why act locally? A local action has its place within 
the world, but the vast majority of the emissions causing climate change are from 
sources external to the local area. As a global problem, climate change becomes 
external to the local sphere, externalised from local action.
  
From this perspective, the directorÕs criticisms of environmental policy in the 
previous section become clearer. Other than Ôraising awarenessÕ, there are few policy 
responses that the local area can practically do about something perceived to be a 
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global problem. The director can be both concerned about climate change but also 
reluctant to commit resources to solve a problem conceived as requiring large 
scale, collective action. Of course, action to reduce carbon emissions can have other 
beneÞts and, as we shall see later in Chapter 6, these have contributed to the 
evolution of the climate change agenda in some local authorities (Prins et al., 2010).
Local authority ofÞcers were often happy to accept this framing of climate change as 
being an extra-local policy issue, emphasising that councils had limited scope to 
affect emissions within their local area:
ÒWhen you look at the impact a local authority can have in terms of area-
wide carbon emissions, itÕs minimal. The biggest impact anyone can have is 
national government in terms of policy and Þscal measures. Our role is 
not as a do-er, itÕs to facilitate this to try and get others on boardÉ. 
WeÕre doing well because of the national inßuences that are driving down 
our carbon emissions within this period, and the trajectory looks very 
promising that we will exceed our targets É nothing to do with local 
intervention, itÕs to do withÉwell we donÕt really know what itÕs to do 
withÉ. We were joking the other day and saying we should make more of 
this and pretend itÕs all to do with everything weÕre doing!Ó (City 2 
Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
National, rather than global, policy is highlighted by this climate change ofÞcer as the 
main driver for reducing GHG emissions, but this still represents an emphasis on a 
scale of action which cannot be replicated by a local area. Within this view local 
authoritiesÕ ÒminimalÓ impact when acting alone leads them to look for a facilitating 
role, establishing a partnership of private and public sector organisations from the 
local area with the aim of encouraging and embedding climate change as a priority in 
the plans of local actors. Once this is established, collaborative action on a scale 
making a signiÞcant difference to a local areaÕs emissions is intended to follow. 
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5.3 New system, different meanings
5.3.1 Context
The peripheralisation of the environment and the prioritisation of growth set the 
broad policy contexts within which climate change ofÞcers operated. They often 
talked of climate change and the environment being peripheral issues which they 
wanted to move to the mainstream of local authority policy. From this came a desire 
to ÔembedÕ climate policy across their organisations. 
The climate change team in one local authority (County 1) took steps to introduce 
an environmental management system as a way of formally embedding climate policy 
within organisational processes. The remainder of section 5.3 charts how this move 
reawakened battles over the implementation of existing policy, and shows how 
diverse interpretations of policy led to an impasse in the acceptance of council-wide 
climate change action.
5.3.2 Introducing a new policy framework
One local authority made a decision to introduce an environmental management 
system, to provide evidence that the organisation was in control of its 
environmental impact. Integral to the systemÕs introduction was the assembling of a 
register of environment risks within the council. The compiling, distribution and 
subsequent negotiation of the register illustrated the competing values of council 
staff which led them to different ways of seeing climate policy.
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The climate change manager compiling the register identiÞed the risks of the local 
authority not meeting its environmental objectives, grading carbon dioxide emissions 
as a high risk activity on a par with legal compliance issues. Risk registers were 
compiled for different services within the council to inform them about the level of 
environmental risks they were subject to. All sections of the council were assigned a 
high risk rating that emissions would not be reduced as a result of excessive energy 
use, requiring mitigating action to be taken. The climate change manager aimed to 
ensure that when writing the system manual, the amount of new procedures 
required of staff was kept to a minimum, estimating that 90 per cent of it was 
already present within existing local authority processes. In a further attempt to 
smooth the systemÕs introduction, the environmental risk register was compiled 
using existing corporate risk methodology:
ÒAny operation that manages signiÞcant amount of operational waste, 
polluting, uses a lot of natural resources, they were deemed as high risk. 
Things like transport, property, facilities management, I went round to 
each of them, talked about what they did and how they did it, and 
produced a register of how their activities risk damaging the 
environment, including breaching legislation. I assessed those risks against 
the councilÕs environment strategy objectives.Ó (County 1 Climate Change 
Manager 2, interview 1)
It is important to note here that the ofÞcer was doing little in addition to what the 
council already had in place in its own strategy. Council activities were being 
assessed for their risk of breaking existing council policy which service heads were 
expected to be following already. 
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5.3.3 Uncovering the policy/practice gap
The process of risk assessment highlighted that this expectation was not realised in 
practice; something being written in a strategy did not mean that it was necessarily 
carried out within council services. While climate change ofÞcers were not naive 
enough to expect Ôby the bookÕ implementation of council policy on the ground, the 
scale of transgressions discovered within one particular service (hereafter referred 
to as ÔService 1Õ) was unexpected. When asked about any new information 
uncovered by the writing of the risk register, the climate change ofÞcer had to tread 
carefully:
ÒUmm, there were a lot of surprises about environmental legislation I 
think. Umm, I donÕt know how conÞdential to be here! Particularly, the 
management of contractors was - is - very wanting... . [Long pause]. I was 
surprised.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 2, interview 1)
Others were more forthcoming about the problems faced in getting the head of 
Service 1 to take environmental issues seriously:
ÒThe head has, on a number of occasions, said that the risk of getting 
caught and the consequences of getting caught are far outweighed by the 
risks of putting things right! You start off with that approach and itÕs 
almost like saying, if a shoplifter goes in and doesnÕt get caught, then 
shoplifting hasnÕt taken place. Our climate change ofÞcer would argue that 
being happy to carry that risk of prosecution, because the impact will be 
less than changing everything else, is professionally irresponsible. The head 
would say Ôwell itÕs just part of how we manage our business, we always 
carry risks.Õ Yeah, but we donÕt knowingly break the law!Ó (County 1 
Department Head 1, interview 2)
ÒWe ask them about where they are at risk of breaching legislation. Even 
thatÕs a battle. In that service [Service 1] they will have this little 
contractor, what does he do with his waste? We have a duty of care 
under that legislation to ensure that waste is disposed of properly. Has 
this guy got a waste carriers licence for sticking it in his van? [Service 1 
tell us] ÔnoÕ. Well weÕre going ÔthatÕs completely outrageous, itÕs not 
meeting our duty of care!Õ And they go Ôwell even if we get caught with a 
151
£500 Þne we can live with itÕ because in the grand scheme of things, the 
costs of imposing a structure that makes it happen means a small 
contractor may not be able to do the business, meaning weÕve got to go 
to somebody else with a bigger overhead that costs more 
money.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 1) 
The service head referred to in these quotes (County 1 Service Head 1) is depicted 
as seeing environmental concerns as peripheral to the practicalities of running 
Service 1. The slim risks of being caught breaking environmental law, (primarily 
focused on waste disposal) means that it was not worth allocating time and 
resources to address the underlying problems. With such a ßexible approach being 
taken to complying with environmental law, it was unsurprising that the service head 
was even more sceptical of local authority policy to reduce carbon emissions which 
wasnÕt backed by government legislation. While staff are expected to comply with 
such policy, monitoring can be weak without strong leadership:
ÒIf itÕs there in black and white as a strategy, you have to comply with 
that, youÕre going to be assessed against whether youÕre complying with 
the strategy É if the whole system works through then it would be quite 
difÞcult for people to ignore it. But itÕs not worked through of course, 
because I donÕt think thereÕs an awful lot of commitment from anyone at 
the top in that service, so nobody actually evaluates them on whether 
theyÕre meeting their requirements.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 
2, interview 1)
The risk register was largely a repackaging of existing environmental policy which 
was afforded different meanings by the climate change ofÞcers, for whom it was 
central to their work, and Service 1, for whom it was a peripheral concern. This 
variation helps explain the standoff which followed the writing of the register.
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5.3.4 ÒYouÕre way too aspirational, letÕs get realÓ
Department Head 1 became a mediator between the climate change team and 
Service Head 1, and explained the reaction to the risk register and the impasse that 
followed:
ÒEach of these risk assessments ran to a dozen pages and there were 
dozens of recommendations. Faced with that fog of material and having to 
take reluctant managers and say ÔOK, you have to move your position 
from there to thereÕ IÕm Þnding a real challengeÉIÕve gone back to the 
climate change ofÞcers and told them that managers are saying ÔyouÕve got 
your heads in the clouds, youÕre way too aspirational, letÕs get 
realÕ.Ó (County 1 Department Head 1, interview 1)
Service heads perceived that a large number of recommendations had essentially 
been dropped out of nowhere, and bristled at the idea of implementing such a large 
programme of measures in pursuit of outcomes they saw as marginal to their own 
concerns. From the climate change teamÕs viewpoint, the risk register was 
uncontroversial; a prioritisation of the environmental risks arising from processes 
which the council should already be doing. Crucially, this meaning given to the risk 
register by the climate change team was a long way from the meaning given by the 
service heads. Whether or not the measures should already have been taking place, a 
full implementation of the actions required by the risk assessments would have 
meant the service heads moving too far, too fast without the additional resources 
they required to act. 
The presentation described above by County 1 Department Head 1 of a Òfog of 
materialÓ deepened the problem, particularly as the climate change managers only 
had the power to recommend, not insist, what action service heads took. Service 
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heads were unclear how the recommendations related to their own values, 
reinforcing the notion of environmental policy being apart from their core 
concerns. Service Head 1 saw the proposals espoused by the climate change team as 
impractical to absorb into their business, and was polite, but Þrm, in the need to 
moderate the drive for increased environmental action:
ÒThereÕs a balance to be had here between taking on board every 
environmental opportunity youÕve got, compared with looking at whatÕs 
practical in terms of actually delivering a service. ThereÕs always the 
ultimate, and we do have disagreements with our environmental 
colleagues about thingsÉweÕve got to look at the practicalities of 
delivering the service and how that might be done, whereas some of our 
environmental colleagues might take a very theoretical view of trying to 
maximise what can happen.Ó (emphasis added) (County 1 Service Head 1, 
interview 1)
The service headÕs talk externalised the environment as a ÒtheoreticalÓ concern, an 
abstract idea which does not take into account the practicalities of Òdelivering a 
serviceÓ. Reducing carbon emissions was a key priority for the local authority, so the 
head could not be totally dismissive of the environmental agenda. Indeed, the head 
goes further than the bare minimum in emphasising how environmental action is no 
longer a fringe activity:
ÒI mean, IÕve not come across anybody who says ÔI donÕt want to do whatÕs 
right for the environmentÕ, but itÕs trying to get that balance isnÕt 
it?Ó (County 1 Service Head 1, interview 1)
There is, at least in the section headÕs talk, an acceptance of the case Òto do whatÕs 
rightÓ, but this doesnÕt square with the frustration shown by the climate change 
manager:
ÒWe try and help as much as we can, but we havenÕt got all the time in 
the world. So we had a couple of head-banging sessions and I tried to 
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follow up: Ôwhat are you doing, you have the risk register now, do you have 
any ideas about which ones youÕre going to prioritise this year in your 
business plan?Õ Hitting my head against a brick wall. So IÕm now working 
with another service who are a lot more receptive [laughing], IÕm leaving 
them alone.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 2, interview 1)
The next section will explore some of the potential factors driving the divergence in 
perspectives.
5.3.5 Explaining resistance
As already outlined, the initial positions of both sides were much further apart than 
they realised; without a shared understanding of the importance of action on climate 
change, there was a tendency for the two sides to Ôtalk pastÕ each other.  In this 
analysis, the declaration of support for the environment by the service head was a 
politically correct gesture unsupported by signiÞcant action. While a senior manager 
might indeed be expected to demonstrate support for council priorities, deeper 
explanation of the service headÕs behaviour can be found through a reading of social 
representation theory (Whitmarsh et al., 2011, pp.57-58).
This suggests another possibility: that the service head does indeed accept the broad 
case for increased environmental action but that this will not necessarily result in 
any new policy implementation. Breakwell (1993, p.213) argues that awareness and 
understanding of an issue does not necessarily lead to a change in behaviour. An 
individual will assimilate the social representation of an issue and accommodate it 
within their existing identity and perspective (Breakwell, 1993, pp.204-207). This 
echoes the decentred network concepts of traditions and dilemmas. An individual 
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has Ôsituated agencyÕ, possessing the freedom to act when confronted with a policy 
dilemma, but is greatly inßuenced by their own particular web of beliefs, expressed 
as a tradition of action (Bevir and Richards, 2009a, pp.9-10). The importance of 
identity and tradition for Service 1 was discussed by the manager-turned-mediator:
ÒThese people have been doing it the way theyÕve been doing it for years 
and years and years. They donÕt want to change and their managers arenÕt 
going to changeÉI think thatÕs a huge cultural issue for us in that 
service.Ó (County 1 Department Head 1, interview 1)
The Ôbusiness-as-usualÕ availability of cheap, plentiful energy is part of this tradition of 
practice within Service 1. Climate change challenges this, provoking a dilemma for 
those within Service 1 who are faced with a threat both to their tradition of service 
delivery and their identities as individuals within that service (Bevir and Richards, 
2009a, p.5).
As well as discovering the wider problems of environmental law compliance 
discussed earlier in the chapter, the climate change manager found that the local 
authority already had a policy in place obliging Service 1 to use Ôwhole life costingsÕ 
to take account of long-term energy costs when on large capital projects. This 
means of expressing environmental impact, often referred to in the literature as life-
cycle assessments, seeks to calculate the total environmental impact of a particular 
good or service (Wiedmann and Minx, 2008). For energy usage, this requires 
expanding the deÞnition of a buildingÕs costs beyond those incurred through 
construction to also include the ongoing energy supply costs throughout the 
buildingÕs life cycle (Whole Life Cycle Costing Forum, n.d.). The climate change 
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manager elaborated on the technologies involved, and how the approach was not 
implemented despite the local authorityÕs policy:
ÒWhole life costings are actually required in the strategy. But the idea of 
us suggesting that they do them [laughs]É. TheyÕd often come up with 
quite energy efÞcient things - solar water heating, grey water recycling, 
things like that - but when they costed them up, they wouldnÕt meet the 
budget, so theyÕd start value engineering them and cut out all those 
things, and theyÕd cut down to the bone of building regulations É. 
[Where] whole life costings would come in, if you use renewables itÕs 
going to cost x thousand pounds more to build, but much less a year to 
run. The whole life cycle cost comes out as much less, bit more capital 
upfrontÉ. At the moment, the client gets presented with É [Service 1Õs] 
É recommendation, whereas they should get presented with: you could 
do this, this or this, and this is how they work out over the 
lifetimeÓ (County 1 Climate Change Manager 2, interview 1)
This highlights the way in which Service 1 understood climate change. Acceptance of 
the issue relied on an anchoring within their own prior knowledge (Whitmarsh et 
al., 2011, p.63), in this case the association of climate change with technologies of 
energy efÞciency and renewable energy. By including these features in initial project 
designs, Service 1 saw itself as understanding climate change. However, this 
understanding remained situated within a prevailing tradition of cheap energy which 
treated the ongoing costs of running a building as negligible, so not judged over the 
long term. The criteria for judging new renewable energy technologies were 
assimilated within existing modes of short term cost-beneÞt analysis, under which 
they became more likely to be removed from a project than if the alternative system 
of whole life costings were to be adopted. 
This assimilation of renewable energy technologies within the social representation 
of climate change also acts as a defence of continuity within Service 1, and of 
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individual self-esteem in the face of signiÞcant policy changes proposed by an 
external source (Breakwell, 1993, p.205). While Service 1 held considerable power 
within the local authority as instrumental in providing a service to local residents, 
the political priority placed on climate change meant they could not reject the issue 
outright. They instead accommodated the technological aspects of the social 
representation of climate change with which they were familiar, but not those 
underlying principles likely to upend their tradition.
5.3.6 Experts, amateurs and mediators
The previous section has shown some of the difÞculties in policy implementation 
when different parts of the same local authority holds divergent meanings about a 
policy, in particular when a policy is perceived to be incompatible with existing 
working practices and therefore seen as beneÞcial to neglect (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1984, pp.99-100). This has implications for the way in which we think 
about a local authority. Rather than being a monolithic organisation with a single 
view it is a site for multivocality; a competition between often conßicting individuals 
and interests (see pages 100-102, 113-116). In the example above, two sections of 
the local authority, each with different core priorities, found themselves in conßict 
over an already established policy agenda. This turned out to be not a dispute over 
the implementation of new policy but the lack of action on existing policy. This 
inaction emphasises the interactive nature of policy implementation, a recursive 
process of action and reaction (policy formulation and reformulation) rather than a 
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transfer of ideas from core to periphery (Barrett and Fudge, 1981a, pp.25-26; Barrett 
and Fudge, 1981b, p.251).
There were very different expectations of what should happen to policy once it had 
been ÔmadeÕ and written into corporate strategies. The climate change managers 
wrote the new risk register on the assumption that Service 1 had made reasonable 
efforts to implement existing policy. The service head felt that policy - at least on 
climate change and other environmental issues - should be applied according to its 
Þt with the requirements for service delivery. If this resulted in a policy not being 
implemented or legislation not being complied with, then these were risks that 
could be borne by Service 1, and ultimately by the local authority, as both external 
and internal monitoring was seen as ineffective.
Department Head 1 felt obliged to act as a mediator between the two sides as part 
of their wider role as departmental lead on environmental and climate change 
issues, particularly as they already had a good relationship with both parties:
ÒI know the climate change team had really struggled to get good 
engagement from Service Head 1Õs deputy and, as I know that person 
well, I felt I could get the issue moved along. It often comes down to 
personalities you see!Ó (County 1 Department Head 1, personal 
communication)
 These duties were in addition to the core responsibilities of Department Head 1Õs 
role, meaning they were unable to commit much time to the task of mediation. 
However, their actions did help to foster a continuing dialogue following the 
publication of the risk register, helping to move the two sides closer together as 
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someone free from association with the traditions and perceived excesses of either 
side of the argument. A more challenging aspect of this distance from either side was 
that the mediator was entering into dialogue in the Þeld with no previous 
experience of environmental issues:
ÒI think part of the problem is with me being a complete bloody amateur 
on this so IÕve had to learn. I remember having a couple of meetings with 
the climate change ofÞcer where I just got to the end of the meeting and 
said ÔIÕm sorry, I still donÕt get it, weÕre going to have to meet againÕ and 
getting quite cross and frustrated really.Ó (County 1 Department Head 1, 
interview 2)
In the interview, I put the argument that it was useful to be seen as an amateur in a 
situation where environmental ÔexpertsÕ were being viewed with some suspicion:
ÒWell yes, possibly, possibly, but I think the downside of that was more 
evident than the upside, because I think we were seen as having a foot in 
the idealistic camp anyway, but we werenÕt expert enough to get stuck in. 
It felt a bit like being in a swimming pool and saying ÔOK, teach these kids 
to swimÕ and not being able to swim yourself É Over here, youÕve got a 
bunch of amateurs driving it with reluctance and over there, youÕve got 
stroppy stakeholders.Ó (County 1 Department Head 1 interview 2)
While the mediator found this inability to easily grasp some of the issues as a 
hinderance to participation in the policy dialogue, this ÔamateurishnessÕ was also a 
strength, establishing their credentials as a non-expert and as a more palatable 
bearer of the message to increase environmental policy activity. Learning about the 
issues Ôon the jobÕ, in conjunction with a shortage of time to contribute to breaking 
the impasse, did contribute to the dialogue became drawn out.  While the mediator 
did succeed in edging Service 1 towards greater engagement with the risk register, 
the small amount of time that Department Head 1 was able to contribute to the 
task meant that progress was slow. While more common ground between the sides 
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had been established over the course of a yearÕs mediation, little substantive 
progress had been made on implementation.
5.3.7 Doing policy ÔtoÕ people
Reßecting on the situation, Department Head 1 saw the risk register conßict as 
rooted in a top-down approach to policy, both within the local authority and from 
central government down to local level. The local authority was obliged to take 
account of the NIs established by central government, adapting policy accordingly 
and setting targets for reducing carbon dioxide emissions within the LAA (see pages 
45-52, 188-208). Department Head 1 saw this policy work as having been too 
insular, being kept apart from the service areas who would have to implement it, 
with a few people in the middle such as himself trying to communicate the changes 
with limited knowledge and time.
Both Department Head 1 and Climate Change Manager 1 offered an alternative 
model where policy was less something ÔdoneÕ to people from the top down. 
Instead, environmental experts would be seconded to service areas of the council:
ÒTheyÕre not outside the gates, lobbing the instructions over, theyÕre 
actually part of the department [and] do some learning around the 
departmental challenges and risks.Ó (County 1 Department Head 1, 
interview 2)
ÒIf we had two more people, weÕd go out and have more conversations 
with people and embed it and really make it real for people É we 
wouldnÕt do anything differently, weÕd just do it quicker. WeÕd embed the 
system, weÕd go out and do more trainingÉ. WeÕd go out and handhold 
more, run programmes in departments which were much better 
supported so weÕd say Ôright, weÕre going to work inside this department, 
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go through a programme throughout the department and make it 
realÕ.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 2)
Here a more nuanced view emerges than the environmental experts and service 
being intrinsically opposed to each other. In this analysis, the lack of understanding 
stems from the different parts of the council focusing on policy and ensuring that 
written strategies Þt together correctly. While this area of work was later described 
by Department Head 1 as being Òin good shapeÓ, it had involved those writing the 
policy spending too much time behind the ÒgatesÓ of their own department 
(interview 2).
This corresponds to a classical top-down view of the policy process with policy 
initially drawn up by experts in response to the new issue deÞnition of climate 
change established in central government through the NIs. There was a shared 
assumption of local authority ofÞcers and managers that this was the natural order 
of things; strategy must come Þrst. For a cross-cutting issue such as climate change, 
this presents a problem less obvious than where policy initiatives fall within the 
boundaries of traditional service delivery silos:
ÒI think the safe approach to take, and thatÕs not meant in any critical way, 
is to say ÔOK letÕs É decide what as an organisation we need to do É 
that will be a combination of the relevance to the organisation, what the 
political steer is locally and whether or not it slots neatly within existing 
departmental structures of the organisation. If it does, theoretically youÕve 
got your sponsor straight away in the chief ofÞcer. If not, thereÕs a whole 
set of issues around whoÕs going to own this, how itÕs going to be 
managed and governed within the organisation, so those early discussions 
almost set the route map for you because youÕre thinking of those sorts 
of issues. YouÕre not thinking about the manager down at the bottom 
whoÕs been working for 30 years doing things the way he does, and this is 
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all going to be a huge challenge when it eventually gets to him.Ó (County 1 
Department Head 1, interview 2)
An issue such as climate change absorbs more of senior managersÕ time as they try 
to work out how it will be accommodated within the established services of the 
local authority. This effort absorbed resources to such an extent that it left little 
opportunity for engagement with service delivery ofÞcers who had to deal with the 
consequences of the policy. The gap in understanding between both sides in the risk 
register debate highlights the consequences of discussion coming only after a policy 
has been written.
This lack of engagement did not mean that the policy was sprung on Service 1 
without warning; rather, that the advance information was of a kind that exacerbated 
misunderstanding. The initiatives were accompanied by press releases and a steady 
drip-feed of unofÞcial information on the organisational ÔgrapevineÕ. When this 
simpliÞed, indirect communication was the only source of information regarding a 
policy, ofÞcers typically missed out on an explanation how the policy was relevant to 
them:
ÒTheyÕre thinking two things. [First], what a load of idealistic twaddle! 
Come on, get real! [Second], these people are thinking ÉÒoh God this is 
coming isnÕt it, this is going to be bad newsÓ. So when it does arrive they 
think thereÕs a bunch of idealists paddling in a different direction to 
themÉ. Maybe the trick is not to change the way in which you do things, 
because you have to get your leadership and political governance right, 
but make sure that the gap between that coming into place and the 
crunchy stuff happening is as tight as possible. So the middle bit is not 
Þlled with gossip, rumour and É ÔyouÕre on that side, IÕm on that sideÕ and 
so forth.Ó (County 1 Department Head 1, interview 2)
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So while policy-making on a cross-cutting issue such as climate change has shown 
weaknesses in the top-down approach, neither can a bottom-up approach alone 
provide the answer. A policy initiative will not gain the necessary traction within the 
organisation relying on low-level ofÞcers alone; the political leadership must Ôbuy inÕ 
to the policy and demonstrate to the wider organisation that it is a priority.  But as 
has been demonstrated by the risk register story, that is not enough on its own to 
get results. While a written strategy, often signed off by a councilÕs Cabinet, served a 
democratic function in presenting policy to members of the public and partner 
organisations, such documents were not consulted on a day-to-day basis by ofÞcers 
and management making decisions. Policy and strategy set the broad context, but 
were only a Þrst step towards action, as a climate change ofÞcer from a different 
local authority explained:
ÒPolicy is the thing that underpins, but itÕs not the be-all and end-allÉ. 
There are a lot of people out there who want to get involved in climate 
change and sustainability who care about the issue but donÕt know what 
to do as itÕs not part of their main job. So we come along [and say] Ôcan 
we somehow embed what we do within your work, we think weÕve got 
some ideasÕ. ThatÕs the interesting bit.Ó (City 1 Climate Change Manager 
1, interview 1)
Effective policy implementation did not automatically ßow from the careful crafting 
of a policy within a small coterie of experts. Without wider engagement in policy 
formation at an earlier stage, the perception grew amongst those outside the 
coterie that policy was an externally imposed irrelevance. Those individuals who 
were expected to implement it as a non-core issue within service delivery areas, 
were unable to relate it to their own traditions and identity as service-providers. 
The next section explores local authority board meetings which, similar to the 
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environmental management system, sought to embed climate change across the 
organisations.
5.4 Board meetings: passivity and ritual as a 
means of embedding?
5.4.1 Context
Two of the four local authorities studied in depth set up inter-departmental board 
meetings as a means of embedding climate change as a priority. Board meetings 
typically took place every two to three months and were chaired by a director. The 
boards in both local authorities were associated with strategies focused on their 
own corporate emissions: County 1Õs board was charged with delivery of the 
environment strategy; City 1 more loosely associated with the councilÕs carbon 
management plan. I observed two meetings at each authority. This section will 
examine the rationale for these meetings and explore the idea of passivity which 
was common to both authorities.
5.4.2 Rationale
The meetings were seen by climate change ofÞcers as a way of getting service heads 
together from across the council in an attempt to get shared ownership of the 
issue. There was a consensus in both local authorities that the right people were 
being invited to the meetings; typically, service heads or senior managers who were 
the environmental leads for those services. Whether those people actually attended 
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the meetings proved to be an issue in both local authorities, as heads increasingly 
delegated their serviceÕs representation at a meeting down to less senior staff. 
The model of gathering together peers to discuss a Ôcross-cuttingÕ issue such as 
climate change was well established and seen as valuable. One service head 
discussed how its perceived success had led to something of a ÒbandwagonÓ effect, 
with a proliferation of such meetings placing an ever-increasing strain on peopleÕs 
time (County 1 Service Head 1, interview 1). This led to senior managers having to 
pick and choose the meetings they attended. When thinking about priorities, the 
environment often remained as a second order issue:
ÒWhen youÕre dealing with vulnerable children or adults - you know, 
major political issues - then you can see why someone might not come to 
that meeting, because itÕs seen as the next layer down.Ó (County 1 Service 
Head 1, interview 1)
ÒThey [service heads] are just engaged with so many other things. Service 
Head 2, who IÕve got a lot of time for, has said to me Ôwell IÕd love to but if 
you can Þnd me another 20 million pounds more savings, IÕll be at your 
meeting. IÕve been asked to Þnd another 20 million pounds this week. So 
running their department is their primary concern. This idea that they are 
responsible for resource consumption still doesnÕt seem to me to be 
where they are.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 2)
Here, social care is explicitly described as ÒpoliticalÓ, reßecting both the statutory 
duties of local authorities and the ongoing public and media interest in the issue. 
There was a widespread acknowledgement amongst participants that climate change 
would always be secondary to some key issues for local authorities, in particular 
social care. This prioritisation was in part based on the lack of statutory 
requirements to act on climate change, as well as the emerging issue of public 
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spending cuts. While these issues were high proÞle and ÔpoliticalÕ, climate change also 
reßects a lack of public pressure on local politicians, particularly on an internal, 
technical issue such as corporate carbon emissions. As one councillor succinctly put 
it:
ÒYou go out door-knocking, the Carbon Reduction Commitment is not 
the thing they raise with you...Ó (City 1 Councillor, interview 2)
The comparatively low public pressure for climate change action suppressed its 
political importance, and therefore its prioritisation within local authority practice. 
The problem that the board meetings were intended to address - a relatively low 
priority being given to climate change - remained evident through the limited 
engagement from service heads.
5.4.3 Passivity
Managers from different parts of both local authorities raised, without prompting, 
the problem of passivity in the meetings. When service representatives did attend, it 
was often a challenge to elicit contribution from them:
ÒMy feeling is that itÕs very passive. Finding things for the board to 
genuinely make a decision about is difÞcultÉ. They tend to be focused on 
how it impacts on their staff, which is not unreasonable at all, I 
understand that. However, I donÕt feel they bring much to the party in 
terms of strategy and challenge É my overwhelming sense is that they 
tend to be passive recipients.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, 
interview 2)
ÒAt the moment, theyÕre all going along and basically [just] listening to 
what the climate change team is having to say... . My feeling is after the 
meeting they all walk out the room and forget about it for a few 
months.Ó (City 1 Climate Change Manager 2, interview 2)
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This section will outline three aspects of passivity. Two of these aspects - language 
and a lack of issue ownership - were identiÞed by local authority staff during 
interviews. The third aspect, the partnership ethos, uses the work of Davies (2009) 
to uncover an inherent problem of the inter-departmental meeting format.
a) Language
County 1 Service Head 1 reported the tendency for such meetings to be dominated 
by environmental experts (interview 1), and this was supported by meeting 
observations. County 1 meetings consisted largely of reports and presentations 
from climate change ofÞcers, often of a detailed and/or technical nature. In one 
observed meeting, a climate change ofÞcer delivered a verbal report about future 
options for reporting carbon dioxide emissions following the demise of NI185 
(Meeting 4, Þeld notes). The report was of a technical nature that was hard for the 
policy ÔamateursÕ in the meeting to engage with. The options presented at the end of 
the report were too similar to spark debate and, other than a brief comment by the 
chair, the ofÞcerÕs recommendation was accepted without further discussion 
(Meeting 4, Þeld notes). 
The climate change team and the remaining non-climate change managers attending 
the meeting created different meanings for the report. For the climate change team, 
the report was meaningful to the evaluation of future climate policy, and the team 
were observed informally discussing the report in an informed manner prior to the 
meeting (Meeting 4, Þeld notes). For the wider board meeting, the reportÕs technical 
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language was not meaningful for attendees focused on running their own 
departments and services. Using such language in the presentation of the report 
contributed to the passive acceptance of the climate change teamÕs 
recommendation, feeding into the broader peripheralisation of climate policy and a 
lack of shared ground between ÔexpertsÕ and ÔamateursÕ.
b) Lack of ownership
Issues with data and performance management were common to both local 
authorities. For County 1, the meeting was tasked with delivering the environment 
strategy, but producing the data with which this could be measured was proving 
difÞcult for the climate change managers. While data on emissions from stationary 
sources was improving through the widespread installation of gas and electricity 
meters which could be remotely monitored in Ôreal timeÕ, there was still distrust of 
the overall quality of the data. An 8 per cent reduction in emissions from stationary 
sources was reported to the board by County 1, Climate Change Manager 1 as 
being a somewhat suspicious statistic (Meeting 6, Þeld notes).
Like most local authorities, County 1 paid attention to performance management. 
Uncertainties around carbon dioxide data dampened the potential for services to 
take action to reduce emissions, although it did stimulate work to improve data for 
benchmarks against which future activity could be measured. For City 1, the board 
was formed as a number of strategies were being refreshed and rewritten, and was 
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consequently left without a clear focus on policy delivery. The director who chaired 
the board was equivocal about its effectiveness:
Interviewer: 
ÒItÕs good to have a lot of people in the room [for the board meeting] 
because youÕre getting representation, but the more people you get round 
the table it can be harder to get input from all the people if you like. It's a 
hard one to balance out.Ó
City 1 Director: 
ÒI wouldnÕt disband it, but itÕs coming to the point where it needs a Ôwhat 
are we trying to achieveÕ discussion. My team have to lead that in terms 
of an action plan or you just have another conversation [laughing]. You 
need the plan, then the performance regimes behind it.Ó (City 1 Director 
interview 1)
This assessment was very similar to that delivered within County 1, even though 
that board meeting was more formally tied to the delivery of an existing strategy 
document:
Interviewer:
ÒI just want to get a view on how the board is working.... If the right 
people are sat around the table, if itÕs the right level of responsibility 
within the departments, what the attendance is like, that kind of thing.Ó
County 1 Department Head 1:
ÒI wouldnÕt go so far as to say itÕs dysfunctional but itÕs not an effective 
board, in the sense that itÕs 90 per cent discussion between this lot [the 
climate change team] and then bits of intervention between the rest of 
us.... If you want more engagement from these people ... give them a task, 
come back and tell us what youÕve done about this, this and this.Ó (County 
1 Department Head 1, interview 2)
Both analyses begin with references to failure, either in terms of the disbandment or 
dysfunction of the board meetings, followed by a highlighting of the lack of clear 
goals for attendees from services and departments outside of the climate change 
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team.  According to these assessments by senior management, County 1Õs longer 
established strategy did not lead to greater clarity on the goals of the board than in 
City 1. This was supported by the meeting observations undertaken, where service 
heads typically contributed little to the discussion, only being called on to volunteer 
updates to colleagues on matters of interest, rather than reporting on progress on 
speciÞc goals.  A more structured meeting might see service representatives tasked 
with relevant strategic goals, and then pressed to explain their progress at 
subsequent board meetings. Without such a process of making abstract emission 
targets meaningful to service areas, the latter suffered an ongoing lack of ownership 
of the carbon reduction policy, which continued to be viewed as the responsibility of 
the climate change team. 
OfÞcers in both authorities saw this as stemming from an absence of measurements 
of carbon emissions which service areas could affect through policy. This contributed 
to an air of vagueness becoming readily apparent at many of the observed meetings. 
Climate change managers were seeking to introduce new metrics for service areas, 
allowing the latter to adopt better deÞned targets on which they could be 
monitored and more easily challenged where poor performance was an issue.  In 
both County 1 and City 1, plans to rectify this centred around passing on the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) liability to different service areas based on 
their own energy usage. In both local authorities, there was resistance from service 
areas to the idea, as calculating energy usage had to be based on proxy measures of 
desk space used within shared corporate headquarters. As well as raising further 
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questions about data quality, services were also sceptical about the inßuence they 
could exert on energy usage within such buildings. Even if these concerns could be 
overcome, there remains the problem of it being treated as a Ôbelow-the-lineÕ cost 
which is absorbed into service delivery budgets and does not stimulate activity to 
reduce energy usage (see pages 218-231 for a further discussion of the CRC and 
energy costs as an incentive for action).
c) The partnership ethos
Both language barriers and a lack of issue ownership are factors affecting the 
implementation of policy, but could be addressed within the recognised framework 
of the board meeting through a move away from technical reports and an 
improvement in data quality. However, the board meeting also had a more intrinsic 
ßaw. DaviesÕs (2009, p.90) research into local partnerships within the British cities of 
Hull and Dundee found that the prevailing ethos of working together displaced 
political conßict and the discussion of fundamental values. Although internally 
focused, rather than an area-wide partnership, there was evidence to support a 
similar phenomenon occurring in the board meetings of both County 1 and City 1.
On the way to a board meeting, County 1 Climate Change Manager described how 
there had to be a lot of advance discussion of the agenda with service heads to 
ensure that Òno-one got crossÓ in the meeting (Meeting 4, Þeld notes). This 
statement appears to contradict the plea from the same manager for service heads 
to provide a greater challenge to strategy (see page 172). Such inconsistency can be 
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interpreted in the light of the different meanings attached to climate policy by 
individuals within County 1. The wish for greater challenge and debate stems from 
an aspiration for shared meaning; that service heads saw the reduction of carbon 
emissions as intrinsically desirable; the Ôright thing to doÕ. However, the ManagerÕs 
pre-meeting negotiations signalled that this was not a plausible portrayal of policy 
within County 1. The board meeting was a practice prompted by the organisational 
imperative to reduce carbon emissions, as expressed through policy documents. 
However, this did not equate to individuals within the organisation changing their 
worldviews. Rather, there was a thin consensus amongst those attending the board 
meeting that the meaning of carbon emission reduction was a new addition to the 
list of performance management targets, rather than something that would 
fundamentally change the nature of the local authorityÕs business. Dislodging the 
dominant social paradigm guiding local authority practice was not on the agenda 
(Rutland and Ayett, 2008, p.644), discussions instead being restricted to mundane 
subjects in order to avoid political conßict (Davies, 2009, p.93). 
As discussed above, both local authoritiesÕ boards suffered from key service heads 
not attending meetings. After those attending a City 1 meeting gave feedback on 
their current emission reduction programmes, the director chairing the board 
summed up the problem:
ÒItÕs quite therapeutic to hear what everyone round the table is 
contributing [but] those here are self-selecting. Those not around the 
table need to be there [reducing carbon] as well.Ó (City 1 Director, 
Meeting 5, Þeld notes)
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The feature of note here is not the non-attendance, although that was problematic 
enough, but the lack of any signiÞcant redress from the board chairs. City 1 Director 
later noted (interview 1) that there was Òno pressure to complyÓ on those services 
who did not have the issue in their ÒDNAÓ. Financial accountability tied to carbon 
emissions was seen as the solution, along with a move to the board being chaired by 
the councillor holding the portfolio for climate change, which, it was felt, would 
provide more kudos and make service heads more likely to attend. In both City 1 
and County 1, a range of meeting participants noted that levels of attendance 
ßuctuated signiÞcantly in the absence of any compunction to attend.
As discussed in the previous section, ofÞcers in both City 1 and County 1 saw 
greater performance management through disaggregated emissions data, enforced 
through Þnancial penalties as a solution to ßuctuating attendance and engagement by 
service heads. Such measures may be of some help, but attitudes to data and 
Þnancial incentives are complex. If carbon emissions are seen as being outside of a 
serviceÕs control, introducing more performance management data will not 
necessarily change that perception, particularly when data quality continues to be 
questioned. Stronger performance management would be more likely to promote 
the implementation of carbon reduction programmes if introduced in conjunction 
with a more open debate about values which underpin the diverse attitudes to 
environmental issues within the local authorities. These are political questions which 
may not Þt easily within board meetings of the type discussed here. However, the 
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discussion of such questions is fundamental to bringing about more understanding 
between individuals operating within different traditions of practice. 
5.4.4 The meanings of meetings
a) Meetings as policy rituals
The analysis here suggests that board meetings were a response to the perceived 
peripheralisation of climate change in comparison to local authoritiesÕ core priority 
of service delivery. Bringing together service heads to discuss the reduction of 
carbon emissions was an extension of the partnership ethos which had emerged 
under New Labour (Davies, 2009). Board meetings, in support of a written strategy, 
could ÔembedÕ the priority of climate change within all areas of local authority 
business. However, three questions emerge from this analysis: 
1. Why did senior participants in both local authorities characterise 
the meetings as requiring a refocusing on goals, when the 
ostensible raison dÕtre of the meetings was the implementation of 
existing policy strategies? 
2. Why was there so little input from service heads into the board 
meetings?
3. Why was there no questioning of the need to continue board 
meetings, when they were viewed as ineffective by many of its 
participants? 
In both local authorities, the meetings were established as a means of implementing 
organisational strategies, yet there was a desire to refocus on goals. The meetings 
were speciÞcally designed to include representatives from across the local authority, 
yet their role was largely passive. Despite reßection on these ßaws by a range of 
participants from both local authorities, no-one voiced the possibility of scrapping 
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the meetings. From a top-down perspective on implementation one may see such 
events, particularly the passivity of service heads, as indicative of an implementation 
ÒgapÓ or ÒfailureÓ, an outcome deÞcient to that expected (Hill and Hupe, 2009, pp.
9-10). However, such an approach does not fully make sense of participantsÕ 
willingness to persist with board meetings when they were seen as ineffective.   This 
inclination towards regularised meetings suggests they served an alternative purpose 
than as an instrument of policy implementation. The meetings were acts which can 
instead be analysed as policy rituals (see pages 129-131):
ÒRitual action ... follows highly structured standardized [sic] sequences and 
is often enacted at certain places and times .... Ritual action is repetitive 
and, therefore, often redundant, but these very factors serve as important 
means of channeling emotion, guiding cognition, and organizing [sic] social 
groups.Ó (Kertzer, 1988, p.9)
Utilising the concept of policy rituals enables an explanation of the board meetings 
beyond a normative judgement of implementation failure or a presumption of 
irrationality on the part of those who wished to continue the meetings. The 
meetings served each of the three functions of the rituals proposed by Kertzer in 
the above quote - channeling emotion, guiding cognition and organising social 
groups:
¥ channeling emotion: County 1Õs board meetings were organised to try 
and minimise conßict, in line with the partnership ethos prevalent within 
local authorities (see pages 175-177);
¥ guiding cognition: climate change teamsÕ cognitive processes were guided 
by the passivity recognised within the meetings, indicating the agendaÕs 
peripheral status to the local authoritiesÕ core work of service 
provision; and
¥ organising social groups: the meetings served as a means of organising 
and classifying groups of individuals within both local authorities who 
had responsibility for climate policy. 
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These qualities point to the meetings being examples of ritualised behaviour, 
particularly when considered alongside their regularised scheduling throughout the 
year. However, for a policy act to be deÞned as a ritual, it must also contain Òan 
expressive, symbolic quality, which is not found in technical thought or activity ... 
[requiring] ...  the comprehension of the meanings which the participantÕs ideas and 
acts have, or may have, as symbolic statementsÓ (Beattie, 1970, p.240).26 Policy rituals 
can be symbolic expressions of policy myths (see pages 129-131). It is argued here 
that the board meetings were symbolic of a myth which arose out of the need to 
maintain climate policy despite the latter encompassing incommensurable elements. 
Yanow made the link between policy ritual and myth in her study of an Israeli 
government agency, identifying the practice of restating goals at annual meetings as a 
ritual expressing Òa Ômyth of rationalityÕ which resolved, at least temporarily, the 
tension between two incommensurables; the agencyÕs inability ... to implement its 
explicit mandate, and its ability to make this failure explicit, because that would have 
required making tacit goals explicit and would have undermined its continued 
existenceÓ (1993, p.52).  The board meeting rituals in County 1 and City 1 were 
similarly expressive of a myth. The next section outlines the emergence of the policy 
myth within these local authorities.
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26 Without such symbolism, the act could only be said to be a habit or custom, rather than a ritual 
(Kertzer, 1988, p.9).
b) Meetings as expressions of policy myth
The mythÕs development can be understood as an attempt to reconcile two facets of 
human action brought into conßict by the emerging dangers for society of its 
inherent fossil fuel usage: 
i) economic growth based upon an abundance of fossil fuels; and
ii) societal progress through rational-scientiÞc decision-making based upon the 
available evidence.
Basing policy on evidence from climate science directly challenged the sustainability 
of fossil fuel-based growth, providing policy-makers with a dilemma of how to 
reconcile the two in a way which made sense for future policy (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2006a, pp.9-10). Rather than being able to push and pull the two in order to 
reconcile them (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p.37), they were (and remain) so deeply 
embedded within society that neither could be reshaped or reinterpreted by local 
policy-makers. A reliance on fossil fuels as the basis for economic growth forms part 
of the Western worldÕs dominant social paradigm, establishing a potent path 
dependency as the context for new policy developments (Eastin et al., 2011, p.17) 
(see pages 143-146). 
The role of rationality in society is also highly signiÞcant, dominating the rhetoric of 
organisations and the accounts provided for decision-making (Manning, 1992, p.47). 
Under such conditions, demonstrating organisational rationality to others is key to 
maintaining the status of a policy area (Sapolsky, 1972, p.247; Yanow, 1996, pp.
208-209). Although the notion of Ôrational policy-makingÔ has been subject to various 
178
critiques (e.g. Lindblom, 1959; Kingdon, 1984, pp.82-83; Majone, 1989; Vickers, 1995; 
Simon, 1997, pp.72-91), the model on which policy-making was based under New 
Labour (Cabinet OfÞce, 1999) persisted with rational idealism:
ÒFrom the outset the model is predicated on a centralised top-down view 
of what policy-making is about.... Policy-making ... is narrowly 
conceptualised as translating ÔvisionÕ into delivery. Perfect implementation 
is a function of perfect policy design. In large part this neglect of politics 
derives from the way in which the approach which it adopts to strategic 
policy-making is so utterly grounded in a deeply rationalistic, positivistic 
and mechanistic approach to strategic management.Ó (Parsons, 2001, p.
108)
 
The emergence of local climate policy under New Labour traced in Chapter 2 
suggests a rational-scientiÞc mode of policy-making; the identiÞcation of a problem 
(climate change) followed by the introduction of a policy (i.e. reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions) (Parsons, 1995, p.87). This process reßected the widely accepted 
science-policy model of Ôspeaking truth to powerÕ, where ÔneutralÕ, ÔapoliticalÕ 
scientiÞc evidence forms the basis for informed public policy (Parsons, 1995, p.273; 
Hulme, 2009, p.103), a process embraced by a New Labour administration who saw 
policy as best created in the ÒlaboratoryÓ (Hallsworth et al., 2011, p.88). By 
introducing policies to address the problem of climate change, politicians and policy-
makers expressed their own authority within this rational paradigm (Colebatch, 
2002, p.58), particularly when presented with a serious problem whose potential 
consequences became described in increasingly extreme terms after the terrorist 
attacks of 2001 within the US (Hulme, 2009, pp.66-68). Those in power could not be 
seen to be doing nothing in response to such signiÞcant claims from scientists, 
pressure groups, media and the public. However, the introduction of targets for 
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reducing carbon emissions - the central element of climate policy - overlooked 
societyÕs ability to achieve the Òtruly gargantuan taskÓ of rapidly eradicating fossil 
fuels from energy supplies which such targets implied (Smil, 2012). While the claims 
for new policy to be introduced proved irresistible, the decarbonisation targets 
therein appeared beyond policy actorsÕ capacity to achieve. Rather than radical 
proposals for decarbonising the local authority, or an overt decision to reject the 
salience of scientiÞc evidence for policy, a myth arose that local authorities could 
achieve signiÞcant cuts in their carbon emissions through a rational-scientiÞc 
process of establishing targets that would prompt shared values and policy 
priorities, and that this could be done in lieu of a Òreorientation of public values 
away from consumption at all costsÓ (Eastin et al., 2011, p.25). The next chapter will 
show how this myth was embodied in the use of performance management and NIs 
(see pages 188-199).
Local authority board meetings were expressive of this myth. On recognising the 
pervasiveness of carbon emissions within their organisations, climate policy-makers 
sought to embed policies for reducing emissions across their local authorities. The 
board meetings which were designed to be instrumental within this process actually 
contributed little to emissions reduction, instead acting as a ritual for the production 
and reproduction of the policy myth. That the meetings simultaneously had their 
effectiveness questioned and their future secured indicated that their actual function 
was enabling the coexistence of incommensurable values and priorities.
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In evoking the concept of policy myths, it is easy to see how this analysis could be 
construed as reßecting negatively on the participants involved; as well as the 
meaning of ÔmythÕ intended here as Òa traditional storyÓ, the word can also mean Òa 
misrepresentation of the truthÓ (OED Online, 2012b). It is important to emphasise 
that policy myths are social constructions arising from the Òneeds of the momentÓ, 
rather than being speciÞcally created by policy-makers (Yanow, 1996, p.191). There 
was no evidence that senior managers were motivated to perpetuate board 
meetings by a desire to present a faade of activity on climate change. There was no 
reason to doubt the good intentions of policy-makers in their desire to cut 
emissions. Rather, that they found themselves on the horns of a dilemma between a 
fossil-fuel based economy and evidence-based policy which they could not easily 
resolve, particularly with the dwindling resources and powers available to local 
government. Scrapping board meetings would have symbolised an admission that 
policy-makers have weak authority within climate policy, as well as a rejection of the 
joined-up, partnership approach to wicked problems which had become ingrained in 
local government.
The emergence of the climate policy myth also served an important purpose for 
local authorities. While the barriers to achieving national targets may prove 
insurmountable, the existence of targets had an important meaning beyond their 
literal capacity as a rational policy goal. The targets created the space for local 
policy-makers to engage with the issue of climate change, even it was not possible to 
attain international policyÕs ultimate goal, keeping the rise in the EarthÕs temperature 
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to below 2¼ Celsius (New et al., 2011, pp.8-10). Maintaining board meetings marked 
a continued commitment to climate change on the agenda and legitimised further 
policy developments, even if the meetings themselves did little to contribute to the 
process. Performance management indicators for climate policy similarly created 
opportunities for action beyond their literal meaning, a case discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter began by explaining how the concept of policy embedding came to 
prominence through research participantsÔ own talk, in contrast to my initial focus 
on policy implementation. The Þgurative deÞnition of ÔembeddingÕ was taken as a 
starting point, but in conclusion it is relevant to cite its literal deÞnition: Òto Þx Þrmly 
in a surrounding massÓ (Oxford Dictionaries Online, 2010). This implies a need to apply 
force in order to overcome resistance suggesting that climate change managers, in 
using this term rather than the more common ÔmainstreamingÕ, showed prescience 
in understanding how challenging their task would be. 27 Policy embedding has been 
explained in the context of a broad tradition within Western society of seeing 
human activity as apart from, rather than a part of the natural world. The existence 
of a similar separateness between mainstream public policy issues and climate 
change provides a way of understanding the importance of ÔembeddingÕ; it represents 
the (re)placing of the natural environment into Òthe substance of what government 
doesÓ (Dearlove, 1973, p.2).
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27 The term is occasionally used in climate policy (e.g. Kok and de Coninck, 2007) but is particularly 
prevalent in gender equality policy, which similarly requires introduction across the breadth of 
organisations (e.g. Verloo, 2005; Benschop and Verloo, 2006; Krizsn and Zentai, 2006, McGauran, 
2009).
The difÞculty of embedding was Þrst illustrated by the case of County 1Õs 
environmental management system. Here, conditions for the systemÕs introduction 
appeared favourable; climate change was an established priority area for the whole 
local authority and the new system was largely a collation of existing policy rather 
than an introduction of new processes. Yet implementation still prompted a drawn 
out battle between the climate change team and service heads which remained 
largely unresolved. For the former the new system was predominantly the 
repackaging of existing policy, for the latter it represented the attempted imposition 
of an extensive new programme. This diversity stemmed from a different perspective 
on the function of policy; the climate change team assumed that existing policies 
were being followed within the local authority while Service 1 saw policy as 
secondary to the pragmatic concerns of service delivery. Service 1 was not overtly 
hostile to the climate change agenda, but their understanding of it was anchored 
within their own tradition of practices so as not to challenge their own professional 
identities. The role of these identities echoes the importance of prior knowledge in 
the interpretive approach (see pages 71-77), and how this knowledge can be applied 
tacitly rather than explicitly.
The concept of professional identity also helps to explain the apparent contradiction 
in Service 1Õs resistance to the environmental management system: if they had felt 
able to be selective in the policies they implemented in the past, why not simply 
acquiesce in the new system before following a similarly piecemeal approach to 
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future implementation? When seen as a threat to their identity and working 
practices, it makes sense for those within in Service 1 to resist the new system. As 
well as the symbolic power of such policy action/reaction, even if Service 1 could 
continue to adopt a piecemeal approach in the future (not a certainty), this still 
implies having to implement some of the new policies. 
While the organisational characteristics and individuals involved remain unique to 
County 1, the case provides a demonstration of the divergent meanings attached to 
those carrying out climate policy and those having it applied to them. Within the 
Þeldwork period, shared policy did not equate to shared meaning. One may also 
surmise that County 1Õs experiences form a Òcritical caseÓ; that is, if the baby steps 
towards embedding constituted by the environmental management system were so 
faltering, implementation of the more radical measures implied by long-term carbon 
targets becomes less plausible (Flyvbjerg, 2006b, p.230). 
Board meetings showed a different aspect of the divergent meanings applied to 
climate policy, with passivity at the forefront rather than resistance. The meetings 
invoked the partnership ethos within local government, recognising the cross-cutting 
nature of implementing climate policy. However, while such meetings were intended 
to foster policy embedding, their default towards harmony over dispute meant the 
displacement of discussion of the deeper values and assumptions at stake. Interviews 
with participants highlighted a different barrier to embedding - a paucity of internal 
data which hindered the ability of service areas and departments to ÔownÕ the policy. 
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As will be examined in Chapter 6, having the means to measure and evaluate 
performance was an important ingredient in embedding climate policy. However, as 
that analysis will show, the instrumental power of quantiÞcation cannot be taken as 
read. Depicting an increase in data as the primary means of increasing policy 
ÔownershipÔ, and thus successful implementation, can be read as Òa fantasmatic 
narrative ... that promises a fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is 
overcome ...Ó (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.147).
The board meetings were also sites for the practice of passivity by the policy 
ÔamateursÕ in the face of the expertise of the climate change ÔexpertsÕ - a signiÞcant 
divergence from their founding rationale for further policy embedding. This practice 
was acknowledged by participants occupying a range of positions in both local 
authorities. However, this only prompted them to reßect on the level of 
participation within the meetings, not the status of the meetings themselves. The 
disinclination to challenge the latter pointed to a meaning beyond the literal; that the 
meetings were rituals which reproduced a policy myth in which a common priority 
of cutting carbon emissions could be achieved through a discussion carried out 
within a framework of shared values and beliefs. This myth was a construction that 
enabled the resolution of an irreconcilable dilemma between the need to maintain 
an appearance of rational-scientiÞc policy-making and the ingrained usage of fossil 
fuels in society. This goes beyond the notion of a dilemma causing conßicting 
elements to be Òpushed and pulledÓ in order to be reconciled (Bevir and Rhodes, 
2003, p.37). The case of the board meetings has illustrated how, when such elements 
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are both ingrained in society and incommensurable with each other, a policy myth 
emerges, enabling policy work to continue. Crucially, the myth allowed the meeting 
participants to remain connected in the face of implausible long term goals. As 
discussed above, the placidity of the board meetings displaced debate about the 
fundamentals of policy. If, by keeping the network together, the myth facilitates such 
debate in the future, then one can see how the continuation of passive team 
meetings may provide the foundations for a deeper analysis of how local authoritiesÕ 
activities Þt within the new context of climate policy. However, this scenario is 
questionable when considering the partnership ethos within the local authorities 
which, if it remains dominant, will continue to suppress the questions about fossil 
fuel usage and service provision which lie behind the setting of rational-scientiÞc 
goals for carbon reduction. 
 
This chapter has argued that rational-scientiÞc goal setting as an apolitical practice 
has not been able to escape the diverse meanings placed on climate policy, and the 
deeper political arguments which underpin them. That is not to say that rational-
scientiÞc goal setting has not played an important role in the implementation of local 
climate policy, only that its role has been one other than its literal function of 
establishing objectives. The next chapter explores this symbolic function of goal 
setting through an analysis of the performance management of climate policy, and 
the consequences of this symbolism for implementation.
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6. Flawed indicators and kindred 
policies
6.1 Introduction
The last chapter argued that while scientiÞc evidence thrust climate change onto the 
public policy agenda, local policies designed to address the problem of carbon 
emissions were subject to both passivity and resistance from those outside of local 
authoritiesÕ specialist climate change teams. A myth of rational-scientiÞc goal setting 
emerged to resolve the irreconcilable dilemma between the scientiÞc evidence and 
the ingrained usage of fossil fuels in society. This chapter explores the preeminent 
example of such goal setting within local climate policy, the adoption of National 
Indicator (NI) 186, which measured the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions 
across a local area. The indicatorÕs ßaws are analysed, highlighting that local authority 
managers were largely aware of the problems before taking the decision to include 
it within their Local Area Agreements (LAAs). This course of action is explained in 
the context of the burgeoning Òaudit cultureÓ within local government (Geyer, 2012, 
p.20). NI186 is then discussed as a piece of evidence within policy implementation, 
showing how data alone was insufÞcient evidence to justify local climate policy in 
the absence of consensus on the social and political aspects of reducing carbon 
emissions. Drawing on the work of Weiss (1991), it will be shown that political 
argument, rather than quantitative data, provided a more robust form of evidence 
for the continued implementation of climate policies within local authorities. 
187
However, this process led to a shift in focus away from a central goal of area-wide 
emissions reduction towards what will be termed here Ôkindred policiesÕ of reducing 
fuel poverty and improving local authoritiesÕ own energy management. Kindred 
policies are deÞned as those which are related, sharing some features while 
remaining distinct from each other.28The relationship of these two policies to 
climate change are then assessed, arguing that, although responsibility for them often 
lies with the same local authority managers, they are not equivalent to the broader 
aim of reducing carbon emissions. 
6.2 The three ßaws of NI186 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the National Indicator (NI) framework of performance 
management was introduced in 2008 to measure progress on a range of policies, 
determined locally but drawn from a single list of 198 indicators representing 
national priorities (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008, p.6) 
(DCLG). NI186 measured carbon dioxide emissions from across a local authority 
area, encompassing business and commercial, road transport, and domestic 
emissions, but excluding large point source emissions included within the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, diesel railways, motorway trafÞc and emissions 
resulting from changes in land use and forestry (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2011a, pp.1-4) (DECC). Three ßaws in the indicator are analysed below: 
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28The term Ôkindred policiesÕ has previously been utilised, but not deÞned, in the literature 
(Teichmueller, 1895, p.375; Bain, 1943, p.54; Penna, 2003). 
delays in data publication, the use of a single central methodology, and the lack of 
local authority control over the emissions measured.
6.2.1 Delayed data
A key ßaw in NI186 was the 21 month lag between the end of a monitoring period 
and the publication of data for local carbon dioxide emissions (Audit Commission, 
2011). This resulted from limitations in data collection and the greater priority 
placed on international climate obligations as compared to local policy. Over the 
course of a three-year LAA, Þgures for the Þrst year, 2009, only became available in 
September 2011, making it almost impossible for practitioners to make timely policy 
responses to changes in the indicator (at least, with a view to reaching their Þnal 
LAA target) (Audit Commission, 2009, p.18). The delay in publication is a product of 
the means of data production; priority is given to the UK Inventory of Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, which the government is obliged to report to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. This takes just over a year to compile, 
after which a further nine months is taken to disaggregate local area emissions from 
the national inventory (DECC, 2011a, pp.1-2). Here, the pre-eminent global framing 
of climate policy interfered with the efÞcacy of local policy; the focus required on 
completing the national Þgures delayed the local dataset to such a degree that it 
became of little use for policy evaluation. That is not to downplay the importance of 
accuracy in the data collection, and if attempts were to be made to aggregate 
emissions data from the bottom up it would still be advisable to compare them to 
the national inventory. However, a balance needs to be made between data accuracy 
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and usefulness, and local authority managers believed that data had to be made 
available more quickly for it to meet their needs.
This ßaw was familiar to local authorities as they entered the LAA negotiation 
process, as a preliminary version of the data had already been issued with a similar 
time delay (Goodwin et al., 2005; King et al., 2006). In interviews, it was clear that 
climate change managers were aware of the problem at the outset:
ÒThe data at that stage was two years behind, so how does that help you 
do something in a three year LAAÉ? ThereÕs so many uncertainties about 
the data, and itÕs such a time lag. It wasnÕt a particularly helpful 
indicator.Ó (County 3 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
ÒIÕve just seen the [new] Þgures from DECC É I think the statistics are 
dubious as hell, if IÕm honest. TheyÕre historic 2008 Þgures. What can we 
do with that?!Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
ÒI think the problem with 186 is the data isnÕt reliable in my view. ItÕs two 
years out of dateÉ.Ó (City 2 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
ÒTheyÕve said they are still going to produce the 186 Þgure É even 
though itÕs two years out of date itÕs not worth anything anyway, but we 
will still have a Þgure.Ó (City 1 Climate Change Manager, interview 2)
The terminology used to disparage the data is notable: there is Ôsuch a time lagÕ on 
the data, which is so ÔhistoricÕ as to be practically irrelevant to climate policy work 
taking place within the local authorities. This view is hard to challenge within the 
context of a three-year LAA containing annual targets which imply a cycle of action, 
evaluation and feedback into policy based upon the evidence of local carbon dioxide 
emission Þgures. While the time lag does not preclude such a cycle over the longer 
term, it provides little scope for evidence-based policy adjustment within the LAA 
timeframe. While this was seen by managers as a weakness in the NI186 data, the 
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suitability of a three-year policy cycle for addressing carbon dioxide emissions 
should also be questioned. The relationship between human action and atmospheric 
reaction is temporally stretched. There is a Òclimate change commitmentÓ of 
unavoidable temperature rises well into the twenty-Þrst century as a result of 
greenhouse gases already emitted (Wigley, 2005). As a result, any beneÞt from 
reduced emissions today would likely take several decades to be felt in terms of 
curtailing atmospheric warming (Armour and Roe, 2011). Attempting to evaluate 
climate policy over such a time scale would be a signiÞcant challenge for local 
authorities who operate under four-year electoral cycles.
6.2.2 Centralised data
ManagersÕ observations about the time lag in emissions reporting were linked to 
wider concerns about data accuracy.  As outlined above, the NI186 data was issued 
by central government, allocating carbon emissions to Ôend usersÕ at the local level 
(King et al., 2008, p.3). In interview, a central government ofÞcial (CS1) stated that 56 
per cent of the data came from local sources, principally gas and electricity meter 
readings, while 44 per cent was derived from models used to disaggregate national 
datasets. In the published methodology for NI186, it was estimated that the Þgures 
for most local authorities were subject to a potential error of less than 2.5 per cent 
(King et al., 2008, pp.35-36).29 Along with this transparency regarding data accuracy, 
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29 Three authorities within the East Midlands had uncertainties of over three per cent.
the overall local emissions dataset30 was ÔkitemarkedÕ as complying with the national 
Code of Practice issued to improve conÞdence in statistics (UK Statistical Authority, 
2009, p.3). Viewed within established criteria for data accuracy, the statistics were 
trustworthy. However, these were not necessarily the criteria used by local authority 
managers, many of whom were distrustful of the NI186 data. One manager held a 
general scepticism about the accuracy of area-wide emission measures:  
ÒThe robustness of that data is very questionable anyway. YouÕre carbon 
footprinting the ... [whole area]. ThereÕs so many inaccuracies with this 
whole exercise when youÕre trying to carbon footprint your own 
authority, let alone an area. You factor that up, itÕs just quite 
mindboggling.Ó (City 2 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
Another manager focused on the similarities between the emissions trends of 
different local areas, casting doubt on the 44 per cent of data derived from 
disaggregated modelling:
ÒIf you look at the data, nearly everywhere follows the same sort of 
trajectory, which makes you wonder. Obviously itÕs a difÞcult thing to put 
statistics together on, but itÕs just a bit odd that all the trajectories are 
exactly the same. And thereÕs so much top-down disaggregated stuff isnÕt 
there, rather than aggregating actual impact from the community 
areas.Ó (County 3 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
While such misgivings about the data were common amongst managers, they did not 
invoke any statistical analysis of their own to counter the NI186 methodology. 
Instead they used their own local experiences and observations as the basis for 
scepticism, reßecting criteria established in the literature for lay judgement of expert 
opinion (Wynne, 1992, p.298). While local authority ofÞcers could be termed 
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30 NI186 emissions data was not a national statistic in itself, but was a subset of the overall emissions 
data for local authority areas. The subset was derived by the removal of those emission sources over 
which local authorities were deemed to have least control (Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, 2008b, p.10).
ÔexpertÕ on policy, this expertise did not extend to data collection. When asked 
about the details of a project to collect local carbon data, one ofÞcer replied ÒI donÕt 
know how you go about doing it, thatÕs why I get experts to do itÓ (City 1 Climate 
Change Manager 1, interview 1). In one local authority adopting NI186, the manager 
attempted to address negativity over the data by commissioning their own study of 
local area emissions based on a methodology taking greater account of local 
knowledge in the sources of energy production and patterns of energy usage, rather 
than conforming to the centrally determined NI186 methodology. The data which 
resulted from the study, carried out by a local university, was largely consistent with 
the NI186 data. Despite this apparent conÞrmation of data quality from a local 
source, the authorityÕs climate change manager continued to take a dim view of the 
reliability of the centrally produced statistics:
ÒWe had a lot of very good local carbon data which actually cross-
referenced against the data produced for 186, and it was pretty similarÉ. 
[But] to be basing the whole of our targets on 186 data is not 
reliable.Ó (City 1 Climate Change Manager, interview 1) 
The persisting scepticism about data reliability, even after the corroborating Ôsecond 
opinionÕ from a local expert source, suggests managers held an inherent distrust of 
centralised data production, regardless of the statistical validity of the data itself. The 
introduction of NI186 was intended to move power and responsibility from central 
to local government, but the means of monitoring progress remained controlled by 
central government departments. The NI framework made a virtue of the small 
number of new datasets on which local authorities were required to report in the 
new performance management framework, described by Whitehall as Òreducing data 
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burdensÓ on local government (DCLG, 2008, pp.22-3). This may have eased a strain 
on local government resources, but also contributed to a disengagement with NI186 
as managers saw the indicatorÕs methodology as being outside of their capacity to 
inßuence. One manager expressed a feeling of passivity in the process when 
referring to the NI186 data as being Òpumped out to us every yearÓ (City 2 Climate 
Change Manager 1, interview 1). Local authorities were also denied the opportunity 
to check the NI186 data before publication to comply with pre-release secrecy rules 
for ofÞcial National Statistics (DECC, 2011a p.5). 
Another local challenge to the accuracy of NI186 data was based on the changes 
made to the ÔbaselineÕ emissions Þgures upon which targets were based. In an 
attempt to reduce the level of uncertainty in the data, changes were made to the 
methodology from year to year. Such changes were applied retrospectively so that 
data for all years remained comparable using a consistent methodology (DECC, 
2011a, p.3). These actions were intended to help improve the accuracy of NI186, but 
were instead interpreted locally as afÞrming the indicatorÕs questionability:
ÒI think the ongoing problem is every time they tweak the reporting, it 
means the baseline needs to be tweaked. So you have a constantly 
evolving baseline which isnÕt healthy and is something councillors or 
public canÕt understand: Ôwhy all of a sudden have you changed the 
baseline again?!ÕÓ (City 2 Climate Change Manager, interview 2)
Overall, the centralisation of data production fostered suspicion and a lack of 
understanding and in NI186 from the very people who it was intended to help, local 
climate change managers. The methodological complexity of the indicator lay outside 
of the expertise of climate change managers, who were experts in policy, not 
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statistical techniques. This gap in understanding left the production of NI186 
appearing as a Ôblack boxÕ to local managers, a process which remain closed to the 
contribution of local knowledge. While central government may have taken this 
route with the good intentions of producing a consistent dataset and reducing data 
burdens on local authorities, their actions occasioned a negative local perception of 
NI186, which in turn provided the context for weak implementation of climate 
change mitigation policy.
6.2.3 Lack of control
Suspicion of centrally produced data was a manifestation of a wider worry for local 
managers: a lack of control over policy.  There was a widely held view that local 
authoritiesÕ scope for inßuencing emissions was tiny in comparison to the potential 
for central government action: 
ÒI donÕt think what weÕre doing in that plan is going to have much effect 
on it, itÕs only ever going to have a 1 per cent impact. The government 
must recognise it has a lot more power to affect carbon dioxide 
emissions.Ó (County 2 Climate Change Manager, interview 2)
ÒThe impact a local authority can have in terms of area-wide emissions is 
minimal. The biggest impact anyone can have is national government in 
terms of policy and Þscal measures.Ó (City 2 Climate Change Manager, 
interview 1)
These views were supported by central government reports showing that local 
policy measures would have no inßuence over the majority of an areaÕs emissions 
(see Table 10).
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Table 10. National policy exerts the greatest inßuence over local emissions measured by 
NI186
Policy measures inßuencing local carbon dioxide emissions Percentage
1. Purely national measures but still inßuencing community emissions 71.2
2. National measures for which local authority inßuence can improve 
performance
25.9
3. Purely local measures implemented by local authorities or other 
organisations 
2.8
While there was considerable uncertainty about the degree of inßuence local 
authorities could exert over Category 2 (Table 2), the overall picture was one of 
local performance under NI186 being largely determined by national policies. One 
central government estimate was that Categories 2 and 3 in Table 2 would produce 
a total reduction of just 5.1 per cent between 2005 and 2010 (DECC, 2009, p.56). 
This compared with East Midlands local authoritiesÕ aggregated target of a 10 per 
cent reduction over the same period (East Midlands Climate Change Partnership, 
2009, p.15), suggesting that local authorities had inßuence over only half of the 
emissions they had committed themselves to reduce.
 
This contradicts one of the fundamentals of the performance management approach 
to public management, that an indicator should have controllability, only measuring 
what is the responsibility of the manager (Jackson, 1988, p.12). Instead, over 70 per 
cent of NI186 measured emissions over which the local manager had no control, 
with less than three per cent of emissions being purely inßuenced by local measures 
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Sources: AEA Technology (2008, p,36); Eadson (2008, p.146)
(although these were the responsibility of the local partnership, rather than the local 
authority manager in isolation). As with the issue of time lag in publication, the 
apparent lack of control over a local areaÕs emissions was known during the LAA 
negotiation process. In sum, the problem of control within NI186 was dual-layered: 
1. Centrally controlled data production overlooked the potential role of 
local knowledge and context in the process, leading to misunderstanding 
of methodology and doubts over data quality; and
2. The resulting indicator provided untimely data on emissions 
predominantly outside of local control.
6.3 Choosing NI186 despite the ßaws
This prompts the question: if NI186 was recognised as a poor indicator, why did 
seven out of the nine local authorities in the East Midlands include it in their LAAs? 
While research in the West Midlands suggests central government pressure during 
LAA negotiations as a potential factor (Pearce and Cooper, 2011, p.209), this was 
not signiÞcant within the East Midlands. Several local authority managers referred to 
some pressure from central government, by way of Government OfÞce, for local 
authorities to select NI186 as their climate change mitigation indicator. However, in 
most cases this was analogous to pushing at an open door.  A willingness to tackle 
carbon dioxide emissions had already been demonstrated as the East Midlands 
became the Þrst region to have all of its local authorities sign up to the Nottingham 
Declaration, a voluntary commitment to addressing climate change locally (East 
Midlands Regional Climate Change Partnership, 2009, p.3). While signatory 
authorities were far from certain to follow up this action with a coherent climate 
change strategy (Carty and Hislop, 2007, p.8), it underscored the increased public 
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awareness of the issue prompting local councillors to respond with a statement of 
intent (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2008a, pp.20-21). This 
response was reinforced by Òwilful individualsÓ working within local authority 
environment units, who developed expertise and enthusiasm working on Local 
Agenda 21 throughout the 1990s and seized on climate change as a new 
manifestation of the sustainability agenda (Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2005, p.
20-22) (see pages 33-39). Local authoritiesÕ engagement with the agenda implied a 
willingness to adopt an indicator measuring area-wide emission reduction, but this 
jarred with the ßaws in NI186 outlined above. The resulting dilemma was 
summarised by one local authority manager familiar with the LAA negotiation 
process: 
ÒOur view was when 186 came out, well we're not going to say no 
because we've been asking for this for a very long time, but a) we have no 
resources, and b) we have no control.Ó (County 5 Climate Change 
Manager, interview 1)
While two local authorities felt strongly enough about NI186Õs weaknesses to reject 
it in favour of NI185, most did not want to be seen as backing away from the more 
ambitious NI186 indicator. However, demonstrating credibility to central 
government and the public was not the only salient issue in indicator choice. In 
selecting NI186, local authorities prioritised its symbolic importance over the ßaws 
in its design to demonstrate that carbon dioxide reduction was a local priority 
within an institutional context. To do this, carbon emissions reduction had to be 
established within the performance management regime which has become 
increasingly important within local government since the 1980s (Andrews et al., 
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2005, p.640; Hood, 2006; Wilson and Game, 2006, pp.361-364). By including NI186 
within their LAAs, climate change mitigation became a mainstream policy area 
towards which resources could more justiÞably be directed:
ÒNI186Õs power is to raise the proÞle of climate change within a formal 
performance management structure. The fact we have NI186 É within 
our LAA is a good indication of our commitment to the climate change 
agenda.Ó (City 1 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
Climate change managers seized the opportunity of raising the issueÕs priority within 
their local authorities. By introducing a carbon dioxide emissions metric into council 
performance management frameworks, climate change would no longer be seen as 
an issue of fringe concern. For central government and senior management in local 
authorities, the meaning of NI186 was the transformation of climate change into an 
area of policy that could be measured and managed in the same way as others 
within the existing performance management regime: 
ÒItÕs meaningless really but the politicians and performance management 
people for the LAA use it [NI186] as Ôhave we passed or not?ÕÓ (City 2 
Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
For climate change managers, NI186Õs ßaws rendered the data itself ÔmeaninglessÕ for 
policy evaluation and implementation. Instead, it was the very acts of measurement 
and monitoring that were important, as they gave climate change new meaning as a 
mainstream policy concern and created the space within which they could introduce 
new programmes. This meaning emerged as a result of the acts themselves, rather 
than the data they produced.
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6.4 NI186 as evidence
6.4.1 The 'wrong' evidence
Since 1988, climate change mitigation rapidly moved up the public policy agenda 
(Jaspal and Nerlich, 2012), becoming an issue of cross-party consensus in the second 
half of the 2000s. This set the context for the local commitment to climate change 
action through the Nottingham Declaration and the adoption of LAA climate change 
targets (see pages 45-52). Under such conditions of agreement about the direction 
of policy, one might expect NI186 data to be an important form of evidence in 
policy evaluation:
ÒResearch as data is more likely to be inßuential in situations of 
consensus on values and goals. Research can pinpoint the problem and 
clarify its parameters, and it can serve as the basis for good estimates of 
the efÞcacy of correctives.Ó (Weiss, 1991, p.41)
However, the consensus was not as Þrm as it appeared (Jordan and Rayner, 2010). 
Since the passing of the Climate Change Act in 2008, events have threatened the 
increasing priority afforded to climate change since it was declared, in 2004, to be 
the most important long term issue faced by the world by the then Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair (2004). Following the Climatic Research Unit email controversy of 2009 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2010),31 there was a signiÞcant decline in the number of people 
believing climate change to be a man-made occurrence, although the sustained 
period of cold weather in Britain at the time may have been more of a contributing 
factor (Climate Sock, 2010a). 2009 also saw governments at the Copenhagen climate 
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31 Commonly, but pejoratively, referred to as ÔClimategateÕ. A number of emails between climate 
scientists entered the public domain, some of which contained inadvisably worded comments which 
critics used to question the scientistsÕ integrity.
change conference failing to reach the legally binding deal to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions that was expected (Rogelj et al., 2010). While the precise effects of these 
events on public opinion are hard to disentangle, they coincided with a decline in 
interest in climate change in the UK, although this was also true of a range of other 
public policy issues in the wake of the Þnancial crisis (Climate Sock, 2010b). In 
addition, many of those people who agreed climate change was an important issue 
demonstrated only a ÔthinÕ commitment to action, being happy to take ÔeasyÕ 
measures such as recycling but unwilling to take ÔdifÞcultÕ steps such as energy 
conservation or reducing car use (Whitmarsh, 2009, p.21).
Interviews with managers and councillors also suggested that public support for 
climate policy may not have been as strong as previously thought. None of the 
elected councillors interviewed who held responsibility for climate change issues 
described the issue as one which voters remarked upon Ôon the doorstepÕ: while 
managers were used to thinking about such strategic issues, they did not have the 
same resonance for members of the public and, by extension, local authority 
members. There was a view that this disjoint between the perspectives of managers 
and the public was an issue when it came to securing support for action:
ÒI'm not necessarily 100 per cent popular with my ofÞcers for this view, 
but if you walk out and say to somebody on the street out there, ÔweÕre 
going to save the planet by cutting down CO2, right?Õ I don't think you're 
going to get an amazing amount of people leaping up and down about 
that.Ó (County 1 Councillor, interview 1)
As well as noting public apathy on climate change, this quote also underlines the 
disjoint between expert and lay opinion. While climate change had been prioritised 
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as an overarching theme or agenda by many local authority councillors and 
managers, its peripheral status within public concerns left it short of political 
support within an environment of increased public and media scrutiny of local 
authority expenditure. Managers who were personally convinced of the need for 
strong local climate policies also came to recognise this gap: 
ÒI think thatÕs one of our problems with the general public, we talk glibly 
about climate change. Why do they need to bother about climate change? 
They just need to know about practical things they can do which can help 
them improve their quality of life, and that can be energy efÞciency, saving 
a bit of money on your fuel bills. I just think we put ourselves on a 
pedestal with this and donÕt really understand whatÕs happening around us 
and how our customers view this agenda.Ó (City 2 Climate Change 
Manager 1, interview 1)
This gap can be explained by the divergence between global framing and local 
understanding. ÔClimate changeÕ quickly established itself as a policy issue in the 
2000s, a commonly used label that entered into the public lexicon very quickly 
(Nerlich et al., 2010, pp.97-99). While this had beneÞts in getting the issue onto the 
local agenda, its power at that spatial level soon dissipated. In its rapid rise to 
prominence, climate change had already become established as a global, long term 
problem, both in the discussion of its causes and its political solutions (Demeritt, 
2001). As a result, climate change did not hold signiÞcant meaning for individuals 
thinking about their local environment or, crucially, their day-to-day lives. By 
continuing to be described as Ôclimate change policyÕ, the agenda became understood 
as aspirational and hence left vulnerable to the arrival of austerity and localism.
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NIs and LAAs were an early casualty of the new localism agenda, abolished in 2010 
as part of a drive to empower local authorities to pursue policies more closely 
suited to local circumstances (Pickles, 2010b). This reduction in local authoritiesÕ 
reporting obligations was implemented alongside the Cameron GovernmentÕs 
austerity programme which brought cuts in local government grants of 10.2 per 
cent in 2011-12, the beginning of a package of 27 per cent cuts up to 2014-15 which 
signalled the disproportionately high percentage of the governmentÕs cuts being 
absorbed by local government (Hayman, 2010; Jones et al., 2011, pp.9-10; Lowndes 
and Pratchett, 2011, p.23). This prompted a refocusing of budgets onto those policy 
areas encompassing signiÞcant statutory duties such as adult social care and 
safeguarding children.32 In comparison, climate change work was largely non-
statutory, becoming discretionary and more vulnerable to cuts by local authorities as 
NIs were abolished by central government (Green Alliance, 2011, pp.14-15).
The cuts in local climate change work which followed the break-up of the LAAs 
revealed that performance management indicators alone provided a fragile 
justiÞcation for policy. In particular, NI186 was rooted in the long-standing 
construction of climate change as a scientiÞc problem caused by the heat-trapping 
properties of greenhouse gases (Demeritt, 2001, pp.328-329). The narrow framing of 
greenhouse gas emissions as the ÔproblemÕ to be addressed led to a focus on the 
reduction of these emissions as climate policyÕs raison dÕtre, expressed locally 
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32 A central government review found a total of 1338 statutory duties for local authorities, of which 
only three pertained directly to climate change and greenhouse gas emissions: compliance with 
Carbon Reduction Commitment, improving domestic energy under the Home Energy Conservation 
Act and reporting large emissions sources under the European Union Emissions Trading System 
(DCLG, 2011b, 2011c). The last of these did not apply to any East Midlands local authorities.
through NI186. While this established the conditions for consensus, it was the 
ÔwrongÕ consensus for legitimising public policy:
 ÒBy excluding any obviously, social or political matters, the scientiÞc 
reductionism of CC [climate change] makes consensus possible, but the 
result is, in some sense, irrelevant. The things that can be known with 
scientiÞc certainty are not necessarily the most important to know. So, 
for example, the science of CC can agree about the physical sources of 
carbon emissions, but only by refusing to consider the far more important 
and deeply political question of why they are increasing and how (or if) 
they should be curtailed.Ó (Cohen et al., 1998, pp.360-361)
While an initial, consensual decision was made to cut greenhouse gases based on the 
scientiÞc evidence, Ò[i]n order to bring along the organizations [sic] and individuals 
who will carry out decisions, there is a continuing need for legitimationÓ (Weiss, 
1991, p.42).  This legitimation was overlooked within local climate policy as social 
and political aspects were neglected in favour of a focus on the quantiÞcation of the 
problem (through carbon dioxide emissions) and monitoring of the solution 
(through performance management). Following policy decisions, such as the one 
taken to tackle climate change, Weiss identiÞes the need for evidence to take the 
form of arguments, rather than data, to maintain the support of the actors needed 
to assist implementation (1991, pp.41-42).  Within a local context, the ongoing 
renewal of legitimation through argument was even more vital to counter the 
dominant framing of climate change as a global, not local, issue.
Policy-makersÕ misunderstanding of the consensus left a dearth of usable evidence 
on which actions to address NI186 could be based. While NI186 legitimised new 
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projects and partnerships with local organisations, local managers found themselves 
faced with a vexing question: Ôwhere do we start?Õ
ÒNI186 has been hard to get our heads aroundÉnobody seems to know 
how to tackle it and nobody seems to have the conÞdence of 
understanding it É . I think NI186 was too big and it has taken almost 
three years for local authorities to do some stuff on it.Ó (Regional 2 
Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
Besides the three ßaws discussed previously (see pages 188-199), the struggle to Þnd 
policy responses to NI186 stemmed in part from the problematisation of carbon 
dioxide emissions as one of many indicators to be inßuenced, rather than as a 
Òpersistent conditionÓ of the everyday functioning of a local area (Prins et al., 2010, 
p.16). This echoes the earlier analysis of local authority board meetings in which 
discussion of how public policy norms would be altered by decarbonising society 
was absent. It was hard for managers to identify a way of affecting NI186 because it 
was an apolitical performance indicator eliding difÞcult political arguments. Managers 
intended NI186 to legitimise new programmes and policies. Instead, the indicatorÕs 
inherent failings stißed their ability to conceive ways to proceed. In terms of 
evidence for policy, NI186 represented a premature move to data, before a deeper 
consensus on what decarbonisation meant for policy had been reached through 
argument (Weiss, 1991, pp.41-42). In contrast, there were much stronger arguments 
for local authorities to concentrate on their own corporate emissions rather than 
those across their local area. The next section analyses how this trend developed.
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6.4.2 The 'right' evidence
The previous discussion highlighted how vulnerable climate change programmes 
were to budget cuts without local authorities continuing to argue for their local 
relevance. That this was often not the case was reßected in a national survey which 
found that many local authorities were narrowing their ambition in the area, and 
only 35 per cent were maintaining the same commitment to climate change work 
following the demise of LAAs (Green Alliance, 2011, pp.14-15). One councillor 
provided a straightforward view of how resources were to be allocated to climate 
change work in this new context:
ÒSo I said to the team, if we need x per cent effort into É regulations - 
things we have to do whether we like it or not, and if we donÕt there will 
be a consequence - then I wanted a signiÞcant amount of resourcesÉ
pushed into those areas. Then we worked out what was left.Ó (City 2 
Councillor, interview 2)
In practice, this meant resources were prioritised for the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment (see pages 218-231) while posts and projects aimed at addressing 
area-wide emissions disappeared (City 2 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 2). 
While the austerity programme required budgets to be cut across much of the local 
authorityÕs service areas, the percentage reductions made to climate change 
programmes were considerably larger than the average across the organisation as a 
whole.
This contrasted with City 1 local authority, where the climate change budget 
continued largely unchanged despite suffering a similar overall funding cut and being 
subject to the same regulations as City 2. While City 1 had been one of the earlier 
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local authorities to take steps on climate policy, councillors were not naturally 
sympathetic to the agenda. Indeed, this early work was seen by a director as being of 
limited relevance:
ÒWe see climate change locally É as a little bit of a damaged brand 
almost. We're not trying to change the climate particularly, we're trying 
more short term objectives around energy - people understand the fact 
energy bills are increasing É. Certainly locally, when we stopped talking 
about carbon emissions and [started talking about] real life stuff that 
resonates on the doorstep, that resonates much more with our local 
councillors.Ó (City 1 Director, interview 1)
This quote encapsulates the difÞculty of talking about climate change locally. The 
roots of climate policy are inescapably global: macro-scale strategic policy with the 
aim of minimising global temperature rises (Demeritt, 2001, p.307). However, the 
rapid rise of the issue onto the policy agenda brought it to the attention of local 
authority ofÞcers who had built a strong tradition of environmental action since the 
early 1990s (Tuxworth, 1996; Church and Young, 2001; Hulme and Turnpenny, 2004, 
pp.107-111). While this early work by local ofÞcers helped establish the agenda 
locally, climate change as a topic in itself could not be invoked politically as an 
effective driver for policy. However, elements of the agenda did resonate locally and 
were supported by the local authorityÕs political leadership. 
Councillors within City 1 were more heavily involved in policy discussions with their 
managers than was usual within the rest of the regionÕs local authorities, where 
managers often saw councillors as distant. Despite none of the relevant councillors 
within City 1 having backgrounds in environmental issues, their greater engagement 
with managers enabled them to identify those elements of the climate change 
207
agenda which could gain political support locally; for example, installing insulation 
and renewable energy technology as a means of tackling fuel poverty and improving 
public transport. This brought greater political legitimacy to programmes associated 
with climate policy, enhancing the arguments for policy beyond that of Ôreducing 
carbon emissionsÕ. That such a close interest in the agenda was the exception, rather 
than the norm, within local authorities was reßected in successive regional-level 
programmes which aimed to engage more with local councillors on climate change 
issues (East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership, 2009, p.36; Climate 
East Midlands, 2011, p.2). This indicated a general ambivalence towards climate 
change in local authoritiesÕ political leaderships, despite the commitments made to 
the Nottingham Declaration and LAAs in the late 2000s. Within this context, the use 
of data as evidence had little purchase within local policy-making, as the legitimacy of 
climate change as a policy issue had come from a different spatial level. 
This section has shown how attempting to use quantitative data such as NI186 as 
evidence for policy-making was misconceived in the absence of discussion over the 
meaning of decarbonising for policy. Where there was a greater degree of political 
involvement in local authority policy, as in City 1, there was a keener awareness of 
the need to justify and argue for climate policies. Within City 1, this manifested itself 
through policies to address fuel poverty.
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6.5 Kindred policy 1: fuel poverty
6.5.1 Arguments for fuel poverty policy
The number of households in fuel poverty, deÞned as those needing to spend over 
10 per cent of their income to maintain a satisfactory level of warmth, has increased 
in recent years, largely as a result of changes in energy prices (DECC, 2011b, p.3, 
Ekins and Lockwood, 2011, p.7). Reducing fuel poverty and carbon emissions has 
been seen as possessing a natural Þt, with the installation of energy efÞciency 
measures (typically, cavity wall and loft insulation) as a policy response common to 
both issues (Boardman, 2010, p.119). Historically, housing has been a key function of 
unitary and district local authorities. While its importance has been eroded by 
central government policy since the 1980s, housing still accounted for 16 per cent of 
local governmentÕs total net current expenditure in 2010-11 (Wilson and Game, 
2006, pp.135-8; DCLG, 2011a, p.69). Since the late 1990s, improving domestic energy 
efÞciency has become an increasing priority, with some measures aimed particularly 
at low-income households (Ekins and Lockwood, 2011, p.8). The Home Energy 
Conservation Act 1995 (HECA) obliged all unitary, district and metropolitan 
authorities to report to the Secretary of State a plan to improve energy efÞciency in 
domestic properties by 30 per cent over 10-15 years (Association for the 
Conservation of Energy, 2005). However, in recent years the effectiveness of the Act 
has reduced as it was scheduled for repeal.
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Efforts to reduce fuel poverty have been incorporated into the largest energy 
efÞciency scheme, the Carbon Reduction Energy Target (CERT), with just over half 
of the 2008-11 budget used for households in receipt of certain beneÞts or where 
an occupant was over 70 years old (Ekins and Lockwood, 2011, p.8). This was 
complemented by the Community Energy Saving Programme (CESP) which was 
aimed speciÞcally at households in the lowest income decile (Gough and Marden, 
2011, p.13). Local energy efÞciency schemes utilising CERT or CESP funding 
emphasised the potential both for reducing householdersÕ bills and their carbon 
footprint (e.g. Leicester City Council, n.d.; Nottingham Warm Zone, n.d.; Daventry 
District Council Home Energy Conservation Scheme, 2011). Analysis to support 
CERTÕs forerunner, the Energy EfÞciency Commitment, reinforced this link by 
assuming that efÞciency savings would be converted entirely into a reduction in 
energy usage, and consequently lower carbon dioxide emissions. Subsequent policy 
evaluation showed this to be an unrealistic picture, with many householders 
choosing Ôcomfort takingÕ, using increased efÞciency to improve thermal comfort and 
well-being rather than minimising energy bills (Oreszczyn et al., 2006, p.252; OfÞce 
of the Gas and Electricity Markets, 2008, p.9). Revised analysis showed priority 
groups in receipt of beneÞts as taking Ôcomfort factorsÕ of up to 40 per cent of the 
efÞciency beneÞts from insulation measures and up to 25 per cent of those from 
heating measures (DECC, 2010b, pp.17-18). Increased comfort was a higher priority 
than reducing energy bills, despite the low household incomes of those in fuel 
poverty (Heyman et al., 2011, p.131). This led to a signiÞcant downgrade in the 
estimated emissions cuts from schemes. While Þgures were not available for any East 
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Midlands local authorities, one national leader in insulation installation, Kirklees 
District Council, had to cut the estimated emissions reductions arising from 
insulation by 50 per cent once comfort taking and heat leakages from poor Þtting 
were included in modelling (Butterworth et al., 2011, p.17). Reductions in carbon 
emissions can still be expected from increased energy efÞciency, but the Kirklees 
experience suggests a far more uncertain relationship than previously assumed.33
6.5.2 Fuel poverty and climate change
This development highlights further problems regarding the performance 
management data for climate policy. With the widespread disquiet among ofÞcers 
about NI186 data, some participants raised the possibility of using proxy data 
measures more closely aligned to areas which local authorities could inßuence. One 
such area would be the installation of domestic energy efÞciency measures, which as 
well as being a policy area traditionally associated with local authorities, provides the 
potential for more locally tangible policy outcomes than reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions. However, one manager highlighted the potential pitfalls of this approach:
ÒThe problem with these proxy measures is what do they really tell 
youÉ? It doesnÕt become a measure of carbon reduction at all É 
potentially it is how well youÕre addressing fuel poverty, and you donÕt 
know whose houses they are and the nature of those people is É IÕm not 
suggesting É these things are worthless. YouÕve just got to be very 
cautious about what they mean. The absolute measure is carbon 
emissions, the other things are measuring activity, not outcome. YouÕve got 
to ask É ÔWhy are we insulating lofts?Õ If the purpose is to reduce carbon 
emissions, thatÕs what you measure. The reason might be multifaceted, one 
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33 Carbon savings from energy efÞciency measures may be further reduced by the Ôrebound effectÕ, in 
which householders use a percentage of the avoided energy costs on other goods and services 
responsible for further emissions (Druckman et al., 2011, p.3578). 
reason is carbon, the other is to reduce people living in fuel poverty. So 
then you measure the number of people in fuel povertyÉ. The problem 
of measuring is youÕre asked for multifaceted things, theyÕre all 
interrelated, and single actions have an impact on more than one 
outcome.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 2)
With carbon reduction and fuel poverty having weaker synonymity than previously 
thought, this quote illustrates a dilemma about how to evaluate the policy of energy 
efÞciency installation. Such installations in fuel poverty households may reduce 
emissions, but will not be as effective in achieving that aim as once assumed. In 
addition, the fuel poor are likely to already be living Òlow-carbon lifestylesÓ (albeit 
likely not out of choice), implying that it is not the most effective means of reducing 
total emissions within a local area (Jenkins et al., 2011, p.25). Instead, targeting 
energy efÞciency measures at low income groups implies a priority being placed on 
fuel poverty, with carbon reduction as a Òco-beneÞtÓ, not the primary aim (Prins et 
al., 2010, p.13).  While this may appear a semantic difference, establishing priorities 
has implications for policy design. While the element of CERT aimed at households 
in fuel poverty has increased, its focus has remained on carbon reduction (as its 
name implied) and has not succeeded in reaching the very poorest in society (Ekins 
and Lockwood, 2011, p.8). This is intended to change under the Energy Company 
Obligation, which will succeed CERT in 2012 and is intended to be more strongly 
focused on low income households while still maintaining a carbon reduction target 
(DECC, 2011d, p.3; DECC, 2012a, pp.84-85).
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Notwithstanding the funding details, the political steer in some local authorities was 
clearly towards a focus on fuel poverty rather than a general reduction in carbon 
emissions. One councillor discussed their misgivings about the Green Deal, a 
scheme due to begin in 2012 under which households will be able to borrow the 
money required for energy efÞciency measures and pay back out of energy bill 
savings: 
ÒThe danger with the Green Deal is it will go to all the people who donÕt 
really need it, who could have paid for it [energy efÞciency measures] 
anyway, whoÕve got the £7,000É. ItÕs about getting it to those people 
where it makes the most difference - in fuel poverty.Ó (City 1 Councillor, 
interview 2)
For those households who Ôcould have paid for it anywayÕ there are other barriers 
to using their own funds to improve their homeÕs energy efÞciency, such as 
availability of information and the length of time families remain in the house 
subsequent to measures being Þtted (the latter typically being less than the amount 
of time taken to recoup installation costs through energy savings). Respectively, the 
Green Deal is intended to address these through home energy assessments and the 
loan being tied to the energy bills of the property, rather than householders 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2012a, p.34) Addressing barriers to those with the 
Ò£7,000Ó identiÞed by City 1 Councillor makes sense if the policy priority is 
reducing carbon emissions. Spending on domestic energy increases with income 
levels, suggesting that higher income households have a greater potential to, in the 
councillorÕs words, Ômake the most differenceÕ in reducing overall carbon emissions 
in an area (Palmer and Cooper, 2011, p.23). However, the councillorÕs use of the 
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phrase demonstrates a re-interpretation of policy to focus on fuel poverty over 
carbon emissions.
Such a shift was not the case in all local authorities. In particular, fuel poverty was far 
less prioritised in City 2 than in City 1. This cannot be explained in terms of the 
relative scale of the problem. Both had similar Þgures for fuel poverty with all East 
Midlands cities having between 21 and 23 per cent of households classed as Òfuel 
poorÓ in 2009 (DECC, 2011c). There was also little difference between the cities in 
the proportion of their carbon emissions coming from the domestic sector, varying 
between 30 and 33 per cent for 2009 (AEA, 2011). One manager within City 2 gave 
an account of how fuel poverty had fallen off the local authorityÕs agenda:
ÒIts got lost a bit in the conversation around climate changeÉ. At the 
moment the dialogue is about carbon emissions. It doesnÕt talk about fuel 
poverty, itÕs hidden in there as part of reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
É We havenÕt got much of a [political] steer at the moment É IÕve 
always seen my job as half and half about carbon dioxide reduction and 
making sure people can heat their homes É [now] IÕm not sure. There 
are no speciÞc fuel poverty projects at the moment. We are looking to do 
a bit of work with health and Primary Care Trusts to do some 
promotion.Ó (City 2 Climate Change Manager 2, interview 2)
Here is a further example of how climate change has crowded out other kindred 
issues from policy discussions (see also page 46 on national governmentÕs Public 
Service Agreements). While there are clear links between policies for climate change 
and fuel poverty, seeing the latter as subservient to the former continues a long 
term peripheralisation of fuel poverty which has left it poorly served within UK 
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public policy (Boardman, 2010, pp.119-121). The predominance of climate change 
over fuel poverty in policy priorities was further illustrated by the dwindling of 
central government interest and funding related to HECA.34 The national 
commitment to fuel poverty targets through HECA was effectively diluted under the 
NI framework, with local authorities able to choose whether or not they established 
such targets (Association for the Conservation of Energy, 2007, p.5).35 However, the 
intention to repeal HECA has since been scrapped, prompting a renewal of the 
obligation for local authorities to report their plans to central government (DECC, 
2012b). 
This renewed obligation on local authorities to act on fuel poverty accompanied a 
rapid rise in domestic fuel bills, which more than doubled between 2004 and 2011 
(OfÞce of the Gas and Electricity Markets, 2011, p.4), prompting increased public 
concern (Barrow and Reynolds, 2012), public protest (Davies, 2012) and a new 
prominence on the political agenda (Wintour, 2012). The experience of City 1 
demonstrates how rising energy costs can provide a more inßuential argument for 
local action than addressing climate change. However, merely reframing or relabelling 
existing policy as addressing fuel poverty rather than climate change muddles the 
meaning of policy, which history suggests makes the attainment of fuel poverty aims 
far less likely (Boardman, 2010, p.119). Moving the aim of policy from 
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34 Symbolising this shift, the national network of local authority energy efÞciency ofÞcers changed its 
name from ÔUK HECAÕ to ÔCarbon Action NetworkÕ (Carbon Action Network, 2008).
35 Only three out of the regionÕs nine local authorities adopted a NI target for fuel poverty reduction 
within LAAs.
decarbonisation to reducing fuel poverty may be more meaningful in the local 
context. As the above discussion has shown, these aims may be related but they are 
not as synonymous as sometimes claimed. 
Another kindred policy to climate change is that of energy management; local 
authorities increasing energy efÞciency and reducing associated emissions within 
their own organisation. Like fuel poverty, this policy may not be as closely related to 
climate change as often thought, as the next section demonstrates.
6.6 Kindred policy 2: energy management
6.6.1 NI185: a dearth of data
Local authorities were obliged to report on the entire suite of NIs to central 
government, regardless of those they had prioritised within their LAAs; the regionÕs 
seven authorities who had adopted NI186 still had to report on their own 
corporate emissions through NI185 (DCLG, 2008, p.17). As work began to establish 
the latterÕs baseline data, it became clear that most local authorities needed to 
direct signiÞcant resources into the process of accurately identifying energy usage 
within their organisations. A regional ofÞcer provided an overview of the 
fundamental problems that had to be addressed:
ÒFrankly, before local authorities looked at this, it was quite startling how 
little information they had on what their energy usage and emissions 
wereÉit is very problematic. There are serious issues around billing from 
suppliers, where they get estimated bills rather than ones from meters. 
When they do have meters they often donÕt know where the meters are, 
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large county authorities can have several thousand meters to try and 
Þnd. Not all the authorities knew how many buildings they owned. 
Streetlights tend to be on an unmetered supply. These are the kind of 
issues to get to the bottom of.Ó (Regional 3 Climate Change Manager, 
interview 1)
Such issues required action far beyond collating existing data on energy and fuel 
usage into a spreadsheet. By revealing the paucity of accurate information available 
to climate change ofÞcers, the NI185 reporting process highlighted the extent to 
which energy use had become unconscious within local authorities. Besides the 
resources required to complete the spreadsheet, the scale of the challenge outlined 
by Regional 3 Climate Change Manager required climate change ofÞcers to establish 
contacts with other local authority departments. While the process did not suffer 
from the same degree of resistance as policy of a more overtly environmental 
nature, mobilising activity across a local authority was time consuming for climate 
change teams, with it typically taking around 18 months to improve corporate 
emissions data. While this constituted what Regional 3 Climate Change Manager 
described as Òa pretty major headache for local authority ofÞcersÓ (interview 1), 
there was a general view among local and regional ofÞcials that it was important to 
improve the standard of data from what had been a very low base. 
A performance management regime requires baseline data to evaluate future 
implementation. The lengthy process of establishing a NI185 baseline contrasted 
with the centrally provided data of NI186. This disparity in the amount of work 
required to fulÞl these two reporting requirements was the same for all councils, 
unaffected by which of the indicators they had chosen to prioritise. As a result, there 
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was a much greater focus on NI185 than was initially expected within those local 
authorities adopting NI186. While these councilsÕ performance management 
frameworks emphasised area-wide emissions, their implementation of policy became 
focused on their own corporate emissions. The time spent on data collection 
provides part of the story for the focus on corporate emissions. That local 
authorities continued to focus on them over reducing area-wide emissions rested 
on the more persuasive evidence for addressing the former. Three facets of this 
evidence are highlighted here: cost cutting, inßuence and leadership.
6.6.2 Arguments for energy management 
a) Cost cutting
With renewed pressure on local authoritiesÕ budgets from the Cameron 
GovernmentÕs austerity programme, the potential for cost savings resulting from 
reduced energy usage provided the clearest incentive for reducing corporate 
emissions. The work to produce NI185 benchmark data intensiÞed the focus on 
energy usage, changing the perception of utility costs from being Þxed to variable 
and illuminating the potential for cost savings from energy efÞciency measures. Many 
of these measures could recoup the initial Þnancial investment within Þve years, 
qualifying them for government funding through Salix Finance, a body providing loans 
for investment in energy efÞciency which are then paid back out of the resulting 
savings in energy bills. Typical schemes included improved lighting for buildings and 
voltage optimisation for large ofÞces.
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The Salix scheme proved to be a powerful means of funding energy efÞciency 
measures which provided a Þnancial return in less than Þve years. However, these 
Ôlow-hanging fruitsÕ only went some way to meeting energy reduction targets, and 
took place against a background of energy rises elsewhere within local authorities, 
both through incremental changes in technology and new infrastructure such as 
schools and leisure centres. As schemes compliant with the Salix funding criteria 
become harder to Þnd in some local authorities, then it becomes harder to invoke 
cost as an incentive for implementing carbon reduction policies as Þnancial return 
timescales become longer and more uncertain. However, even if these timescales for 
return were persuasive for Þnance managers, the importance placed by local 
authority service managers on maintaining working practices, rather than pursuing 
possible cost reductions, should not be underestimated (see also pages 227-230). 
Improved monitoring of buildings also sparked an interest in estate rationalisation as 
a way of reducing energy costs, particularly as the data collection process has 
brought to light some buildings that local authorities did not realise they had 
responsibility for. While closing a building would seem a more straightforward and 
effective way of reducing emissions than energy efÞciency, it had potential side 
effects. Where buildings were associated with particular council services, such as 
libraries or community centres, the added incentive of a Ôquick winÕ on energy costs 
potentially increased the likelihood of services being closed rather than local 
authorities trying to provide the same services using less energy. Also, attempts to 
rationalise estates proved problematic to implement. One local authority had 
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attempted to switch from a diffuse range of buildings to one large, central ofÞce. The 
local authority found it difÞcult to sell the old properties during the recession, 
leaving it with a number of buildings whose utilities had to be maintained to avoid 
them falling into disrepair. While these buildingsÕ costs were still reduced, the local 
authority found itself with a net increase in its energy costs once the move to the 
new ofÞce was complete. This story also illustrates the shortcomings of a 
rationalisation strategy within an area-wide approach to climate change. Any 
buildings jettisoned by a local authority are still a source of energy and carbon 
dioxide emissions, no matter who they are owned by, unless they are demolished 
and the sites returned to nature.
b) Inßuence
Besides the Þnancial incentives to cut carbon in their own estates, local authorities 
had another motive for prioritising NI185 over NI186. Simply, they were able to 
more easily exert inßuence over their own operations than over the behaviour of 
residents and businesses in the area. It made sense to focus on their own 
organisationÕs behaviour, both in terms of the tools available to them to inßuence 
others, and their resources:
ÒThe view of the team is that 186 is nice and ßuffy. ItÕs a really nice idea 
but weÕre a little council spending relatively little money in the face of a 
huge [issue]ÉWhat practical inßuence can we have out there in any 
signiÞcant way?ÉCarbon emissions are much more inßuenced by national 
energy policy, our mix of production systems, the decisions of business 
people, theyÕve much bigger inßuence than we have as a local 
authority.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 1)
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Here there is a shrinking of the view of the ÔlocalÕ over which the local authority has 
inßuence. Rather than having inßuence over their local area, the council is only able 
to exert authority over its own internal organisation. As illustrated by the case of 
County 1Õs environmental management system, even implementing policy within the 
local authority was not straightforward (see pages 150-167). Once these problems 
became apparent, it would reinforce ofÞcersÕ view that they had to concentrate 
their efforts on reducing corporate emissions, particularly if they wanted to 
demonstrate any leadership in the community. 
c) Leadership
Besides the greater inßuence ofÞcers could have over their own organisation, there 
was a more fundamental desire for local authorities to Ôpractice what they preachÕ 
on carbon emissions before attempting to inßuence others. Two aspects to this were 
discussed by local authority ofÞcers. First, by concentrating on reducing its own 
carbon emissions, a local authority could demonstrate what it is possible for an 
organisation to achieve:
ÒWe donÕt have any signiÞcant inßuence on people directly. I think our 
biggest inßuence is to model good behaviour, to demonstrate what we 
can do at the moment, and when weÕve done something successful shout 
about it.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 1)
Here, the ofÞcer sees action on local authority corporate emissions, and then telling 
the story of their success, as a more effective means of inßuencing others than more 
general communications intended to raise public awareness on climate change. In 
this view, policy to reduce corporate emissions is intrinsic to reducing area-wide 
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emissions. Any attempt at the latter without the former will founder on the local 
authorityÕs lack of resources and inßuence in the community.  
Second, there is the risk to local authoritiesÕ reputation from being seen not to 
reduce their own emissions. Nominally, this relates to the entirety of NI185 data but 
was more often expressed in terms of discrete, tangible aspects of energy 
consumption:
ÒItÕs a very visible ofÞce. Everyone knows itÕs a council building so if the 
lights are on post-eight oÕclock itÕs a bit of a visible example of us saying 
wonderful things about reducing our carbon footprint. Everyone else 
doing their bit, but if weÕre not doing oursÉ. Being seen to be [doing 
something] is almost as important as the unsexy bit which is reducing 
your carbon footprint and your costs which people donÕt see. The heating 
temperatures in that building make no difference to the people outside, 
they make a lot of difference to the people inside. The visible part is what 
the lighting doesÓ (City 1 Climate Change Manager 3, interview 1)
While reducing energy costs as a whole is important to the organisation, the 
manager was clear that being seen to act was more meaningful than published 
statistics in terms of external engagement. The emphasis was on avoiding bad 
practice, with the risk to reputation that holds for the local authority, rather than 
Ôshouting aboutÕ good practice. Turning off ofÞce lights promptly could still be used 
as a good practice story, but the prevailing risk is that the most tangible aspect of 
the organisationÕs energy use could weaken its credibility in advocating action. While 
this was not checked through interviewing members of the public, public sector 
organisations have been criticised in the media for apparent hypocrisy in advocating 
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private individuals reduce their carbon emissions while not addressing emissions 
accruing from their own operations (e.g. Newton Dunn, 2010).36 
Overall, the ability to demonstrate leadership within a local area was depicted by 
ofÞcers as a strong driver for local authorities to prioritise reducing their own 
emissions. Illuminating a path towards emissions reduction for other organisations 
was part of this and holds potential for sharing aspects of good practice both within 
a local area and between local authorities. However, ofÞcers were very cautious on 
the potential to be seen as hypocritical if local authorities were to take a leadership 
role before taking action on energy usage. As discussed previously, local authoritiesÕ 
own information on energy usage, and in many cases their wider asset management 
processes, required signiÞcant improvement before baseline data could be compiled 
(see pages 216-218). While this ongoing process contributed to ofÞcersÕ concerns, it 
was the most tangible energy uses, irrespective of their overall contribution to 
emissions, which were seen as the greatest threat to the local authorityÕs legitimacy 
as an actor in climate policy.
d) Summary of arguments for energy management
The Þnancial beneÞts of cutting corporate carbon emissions and the importance of 
demonstrating community leadership on the issue were clearly articulated by 
ofÞcers as drivers for action to reduce NI185, whether or not NI185 was their core 
indicator.  Following this, the idea of Ôtackling climate changeÕ changed in meaning for 
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36 In a consideration of the links between the recommendations and actions of researchers, this is 
termed Òholistic credibilityÓ (Nordhagen et al., 2012, p.13).
many local authorities during the period up to the revoking of NIs and LAAs by the 
Cameron Government. Many local authority managers thought that, in contrast with 
reducing their own emissions, they lacked the necessary resources and policy tools 
to cut area-wide emissions. This view contributed to the rapid fading of NI186 as a 
priority in local policy implementation, contrary to its continuing prioritisation 
within most LAAs. This inward turn was intensiÞed by the volume of work required 
to meet the obligation to provide NI185 data, forcing local authorities to look in 
depth at deÞciencies in their own record-keeping. This Ôbottom-upÕ production of 
data contrasted with the Ôtop-downÕ production of NI186 data, ofÞcers 
characterising the latter as of dubious quality and lacking in local context. Whether 
or not these were valid criticisms, it is notable that they were not made of the 
locally produced NI185 data. The experience of NI185 shows that while local data 
collection may be a burden on local authority resources, it can also enhance policy 
implementation when compared with policy areas which while free of such burdens 
are also regarded as out of a local areaÕs control.
During the implementation of LAAs, local authorities moved to tackle the aspects of 
climate change they felt they could best inßuence, which in many cases 
corresponded to a move away from their written policy. The policy agenda for local 
authorities was beginning to change, but still within the context of addressing 
climate change. However, this latter idea was itself beginning to morph into 
something different. The next section looks at how this was driven by a political 
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context of austere localism and the disconnect between climate change and local 
priorities.
6.6.3 Regulatory pressure for energy management: Carbon 
Reduction Commitment
As discussed earlier, local authorities put much of their efforts into reducing their 
own corporate emissions. The three drivers for this - leadership, inßuence and cost-
cutting - were unaffected by the demise of NIs. At the same time the introduction of 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) provided a signiÞcant enhancement to 
the Þnancial incentives for reducing emissions, subjecting large local authorities to 
Þnancial levies based on their carbon emissions. Although the CRC covered much of 
the same emissions as NI185 had done previously, it was regarded by ofÞcers as a 
more signiÞcant driver for cutting emissions. The process of compiling NI185 data 
had prompted action on some of the most serious shortcomings in local authoritiesÕ 
energy use data, but had been limited as a driver in emissions reduction. Energy 
usage was still regarded as a Þxed cost, albeit one that was now being more 
accurately measured. The increased priority given to corporate emissions as a result 
of CRC was described by one local authority manager:
ÒWe talk about carbon footprints - and people like that - but CRC has 
added another cost and raised it to the top of most corporate agendas. 
ThatÕs a good thing. If you can relate carbon to cost because you can at 
least get peopleÕs attention to focus on it. What always amazes me is that 
most people donÕt take into account that the emissions they already 
generate come at a huge cost.... I spend £9m a year on utilities for this 
council. IÕm only going to spend a small proportion of that, albeit a 
considerable amount of money, on the CRC. Now why are the corporate 
board bothered about the small sum of CRC money, why are they not 
bothered about the £9m IÕve spent on utilities?Ó (City 1 Climate Change 
Manager 3, interview 1)
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Carbon footprints may have been something that Ôpeople likeÕ to discuss, but their 
priority is much enhanced when linked to Þnancial cost. CRC augmented this link, 
but raised the issueÕs priority disproportionately to any rise in energy costs which 
local authorities may have incurred in the schemeÕs initial incarnation. In City 1 
Climate Change Manager 3Õs view, it was not the percentage rise which was 
important. Energy bills had simply been paid as a matter of course over a long 
period of time, reßecting the ingrained nature of fossil fuel usage (see pages 
141-143), and the incremental cost increases attributable to CRC were not of a 
scale to drive activity in their own right. Rather, it was the novelty of the CRC, not 
the direct Þnancial penalty, which attracted the interest of senior management and 
sparked discussions over the possible disaggregation of energy costs to council 
departments. Besides the Þnancial aspect was the ÔreputationalÕ impact on a local 
authority of being placed low down on the CRC league table. This was a key issue 
for senior management, who were generally keen to extend their own performance 
management culture to a comparison against other local authorities. CRCÕs tighter 
rules for data collection than NI185 aimed to provide greater comparability 
between organisations, and expanded the scope beyond local authorities to include 
other public sector organisations as well as the private sector. The wider pool of 
participants increased the schemeÕs visibility and prestige, providing a further 
stimulus for action.
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This changed following the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review, when the 
Cameron Government signiÞcantly altered the fundamentals of the scheme (HM 
Treasury, 2010, p.62). The scheme was much simpliÞed by the removal of the ability 
to trade allowances meaning the money spent on allowances to emit carbon dioxide 
was now to be kept by the Treasury, and not recycled to participants as previously 
planned (Environment Agency, 2010, pp.52-53). But there was also a ten-fold increase 
in the cost per tonne of emissions, making the CRC roughly equivalent to a 10 per 
cent levy on energy costs (DECC adviser 3, personal communication). The changes 
were unexpected, having not being consulted on in advance, further jolting senior 
management to act on the issue just as the scale of their overall budget cuts was 
starting to become apparent (Murray, 2010). 
It is worth noting that all of this activity was occurring in the very early stages of the 
CRC, before the Þrst Þgures were published in 2011 (an introductory year before 
Þnancial liabilities began in 2012). The policy maintained its novelty as management 
and ofÞcers worked out what meaning it had for them. But this meaning was subject 
to the policyÕs novelty, and began to fade even before the Þrst set of Þgures was 
released, with one energy manager describing how interest had already Ògone off the 
boil againÓ and that the cost of the CRC had quickly gone from being a priority to 
becoming another Ôbelow the lineÕ cost that was paid automatically (City 1 Climate 
Change Manager 3, interview 2). The only scope for this changing would be to 
increase the cost of the CRC to a point at which it really hurt local authorities. 
Managers did not perceive this to be the case at the current costs of buying carbon 
allowances, although one did voice an expectation that CRC would increase in a 
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similar fashion to landÞll tax since the latter was introduced in 1996 (HM 
Government, 2011, p.96).37
The CRC signiÞcantly raised awareness within senior management and Þnance 
departments of the need to cut corporate emissions, increasing the visibility of 
energy usage after a long period of it being treated as a Þxed cost. This bore 
similarity to the Climate Change Agreements negotiation process between energy-
intensive industries and central government in 2001. This obliged managers to pay 
greater heed to opportunities for increased energy efÞciency, an Òawareness effectÓ 
which brought greater energy savings than would have been expected from similar 
charges being administered through a non-negotiable ßat tax (Ekins and Etheridge, 
2006, p.2080). However, the absence of the negotiation element that was central to 
Climate Change Agreements brings into question whether CRC will have a longer 
term effect on councilsÕ energy usage. There is a danger that, as the novelty of CRC 
wears off, it will be overtaken by new policy priorities and the Þnancial penalties will 
become seen as part of the Þxed costs of energy usage, which local authorities see 
themselves as being able to do little to affect.
6.6.4 Cost cutting: a weak incentive?
Cutting energy costs was an attractive proposal for local authorities in a time of 
severe budgetary pressure, but while it became an increasingly common strategy 
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37 In 1996 landÞll tax was £7 per tonne, rising to £56 per tonne in 2011 and is planned to increase to 
£80 per tonne in 2014/15.
pursued by climate change ofÞcers, questions were raised over how it might work in 
practice. While energy managers attempted to reduce energy usage, competing 
priorities and agendas saw the implementation of policies which increased demand 
for energy usage. New schools were built with a high level of IT equipment to help 
improve skills. New kitchens were installed in old schools to provide hot school 
dinners. New leisure centres were built to improve the health of local residents. All 
examples of local authority policies which increased energy demand, but were 
outside the remit of energy managers. While savings can be made at the margins 
through efÞciency improvements, it is questionable whether they can offset the 
ongoing increases prompted by infrastructure improvements and technological 
change. 
As well as these large scale projects, there were smaller scale, incremental increases 
in energy usage which managers also found out of their control:
ÒThe proliferation of people with two monitors on their desks is quite 
phenomenal. You think Ôhow has that been allowed to happen, whoÕs 
making that decision in the light of our carbon target?Õ If I wanted a 
second screen, I stick a request into ICT and I get one. Seems to be the 
rule. No attempt to evaluate what the impact of that is on all policyÉItÕs 
not factored in to some of this decision making, itÕs about service delivery 
and Þnancial efÞciency. A single screen costs us about £100 a year. ItÕs just 
not seen as a relevant number in the grand Þnancial scheme of the local 
authority.Ó (County1 Climate Change Manager 1 interview 2)
Local views within the organisation about what constitutes better work practices 
and service delivery often involve technological change which increases 
consumption. Local authorities were able to make inroads in some areas, for 
example, in reducing idle time on ofÞce IT equipment, but new ways of using energy 
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appeared as quickly as existing ones were reduced. Metaphorically, ofÞcers were 
trying to walk up a down escalator, having to move fast to offset these incremental 
increases in energy use in the hope of achieving any net reduction in corporate 
emissions. 
Interpreting climate policy as energy management represented a route of least 
resistance for local authorities. Chießy, by taking cost as an incentive for reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions, it appeals to one of the central principles of classical 
economics. Rising energy costs should provide a strong incentive for local 
authorities to act. This section has shown that this may not be the case, with energy 
usage potentially remaining inelastic to changes in price and delivering little in the 
way of emissions reduction. Prospect theory supports the notion that Þnancial 
incentives to action are Òneither necessary nor sufÞcient to ensure É 
cooperativeness, thoughtfulness or truthfulnessÓ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p.
316). The way in which individuals frame a particular problem of choice yields 
Òsystematically different preferencesÓ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992, p.298). In the 
case of reducing energy usage, it is plausible to imagine that those climate change 
ÔamateursÕ (see pages 158-165) working in local authority service delivery frame the 
problem in a way which places a greater value on avoiding the loss of existing working 
practices than pursuing the gain of cost savings (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).38 
Existing work practices rely on the use of fossil fuels, itself a practice so deeply 
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38 In formulating theories of problem choice, Tversky and Kahneman acknowledge that Òtheories of 
problem choice are at best approximate and incomplete.... [C]hoice is a constructive and contingent 
processÓ (1992, p.317).
ingrained in society that contemplating its loss far outstrips the potential for 
marginal Þnancial gain to the organisation (see pages 141-143). Following this 
argument, one can see how incremental increases in utility bills are unlikely to lead 
to signiÞcant changes in policy. However, legislative changes such as the introduction 
of CRC jolted ofÞcers and management into action to a degree out of proportion 
to the amount it added to local authoritiesÕ total energy costs. 
The main potential impact was that some local authorities were attempting to pass 
on the cost of CRC to their departments, in an attempt to encourage behaviour 
change at a lower level and get service heads to take greater responsibility for their 
own energy use. By bringing energy costs closer to managers, the aim was to show 
how such energy saving could free up resources for service delivery. This was an 
approach favoured by many ofÞcers, but the above discussion about the weakness of 
Þnancial incentives compared to the loss of working practices raises questions about 
its potential effectiveness. While it may make energy usage and its (Þnancial) 
consequences more tangible, departments may have less capacity than a corporate 
budget holder to carry out efÞciency measures due to their smaller scale. Estate 
rationalisation has also increased the likelihood of departments sharing ofÞce space, 
making the assigning of responsibility for energy use more difÞcult. One climate 
change ofÞcer discussed how the passing on of CRC was their ultimate goal, but was 
politically sensitive and being kept within their team for the time being, 
demonstrating the organisational difÞculties of implementing such a move even if it 
was to lead to reduced costs.
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6.7 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the morphing of local climate policy in terms of a search for 
persuasive evidence for action. NI186 was analysed as a key piece of evidence with 
which policy-makers might have judged implementation, determining the extent to 
which their programmes were affecting the level of carbon dioxide emissions across 
their local areas. However, three key ßaws in NI186 were identiÞed which led 
managers to distance themselves from the indicator in interviews, stating that the 
data was too slow to be published, that they distrusted the methodology and that it 
measured emission sources largely out of their control. This gave rise to a puzzle: 
why did seven out of nine local authorities adopt NI186 rather than NI185 despite 
the formerÕs ßaws being evident during the LAA negotiation process? The puzzle was 
answered in terms of local governmentÕs audit culture: that by placing climate policy 
within the world of performance management metrics and targets, climate change 
was deemed to have moved from the periphery into the mainstream of local public 
policy. While such a move established the agendaÕs legitimacy, the focus on data did 
not constitute sufÞcient evidence for programmes to be implemented, leading to 
uncertainty about how to tackle area-wide carbon emissions. This became 
particularly apparent as climate change programmes became vulnerable following 
the Cameron GovernmentÕs cuts in local government funding. Chapter 5 showed 
how setting goals for carbon reduction targets helped to perpetuate the notion of 
rational-scientiÞc policy-making in the face of societyÕs ingrained use of fossil fuels. 
The above analysis of NI186 shows the roles that one such target has played in 
implementation, acting as a passport for climate change into mainstream public 
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policy but also as an elision of arguments over the social and political implications of 
attaining such targets. NI186 sustained the myth of rational-scientiÞc goal setting as 
a solution to rising carbon emissions, keeping the issue on the agenda. However, the 
weakness of such apolitical goals was ultimately demonstrated by managersÕ 
disowning of the indicator and a re-focusing on other kindred policy areas.
Two such areas of policy were discussed: fuel poverty and energy management. Both 
issues have risen up the public policy agenda, were locally meaningful and more likely 
to be evidenced through political argument than a broader climate policy. For fuel 
poverty, improved insulation of domestic properties was a key measure. For energy 
management, local authorities looked to reduce their own energy usage through a 
range of efÞciency measures and changes in working practices. While there was a 
range of sound reasons for undertaking these policies, the discussion has shown that 
these policies are related to, not the same as, climate policy. Fuel poverty carries 
increasing public salience as domestic energy bills continue to rise and the economic 
recession continues. Some reduction in carbon emissions is possible as a result of 
improved insulation, but even though such a reduction would be accompanied by 
falling fuel bills, householders in fuel poverty prioritise thermal comfort and 
wellbeing over such Þnancial incentives. 
The link between cutting carbon and cutting costs is also a key argument for 
improved energy management, particularly in the context of cuts in local 
government funding. If a local authority is aiming to reduce emissions across its local 
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area, that effort clearly must include its own operations, out of both quantitative 
necessity and a desire to demonstrate leadership (or, alternatively, to avoid being 
labelled as hypocritical). However, focusing on cost cutting did not prove as powerful 
an incentive for improved energy management as might have been expected. Cost 
remains important when making policy choices, but may not be a sufÞcient incentive 
to reverse the carbon-dependent working practices built up during a local 
authorityÕs development. The controversial implications of a high level of 
decarbonisation such as reduced provision of social services, massive renewable 
energy installations and restrictions on car usage in cities need to be confronted on 
a political level if climate policy is to move forward. Reducing these questions to a 
performance management indicator cannot bypass discussion of these challenges to 
public policy norms. It may well be that kindred policies such as energy management 
and fuel poverty co-exist more easily with the Òpolitical realityÓ of public policy than 
the scientiÞcally framed issue of climate change (Dryzek, 1993, p.216). Such kindred 
policies may deliver some reductions in carbon emissions, particularly in the short 
term (Prins et al., 2010, p.36). However they cannot be a substitute for confronting 
the fundamental questions raised by established decarbonisation targets, which 
presume that Òthe focus of UK climate policy is on the production of 
emissionsÓ (HM Government, 2011, p.118). If the focus shifts to kindred policies, 
there may be a greater level of political acceptance, but it also becomes more 
questionable whether decarbonisation targets can be achieved. 
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Finally, this chapter has addressed the notion raised in the conclusion of Chapter 5 
that greater data availability within local authorities would lead to greater 
ÔownershipÕ of climate policy by service heads and other non-climate change 
managers (see page 185). That such a notion is fantasmatic is supported by the 
experience of NI186, a dataset which local authority managers distanced themselves 
from, even though they had requested and subsequently adopted it. The ability to 
measure progress on a policy could not lead to improvements in implementation 
when isolated from the local meaning of decarbonisation. Indeed, the process of 
quantiÞcation was a symbol of rational-scientiÞc policy-making which acted as a 
placeholder for discussion of such meaning. This is not to say that quantitative data is 
unnecessary within climate policy. However, an issue which challenges the use of 
energy across society requires more than performance management measures if it is 
to be addressed in a meaningful way.
This chapter has highlighted the importance of local political argument in justifying 
and remoulding climate policy which has been predicated on scientiÞc evidence. The 
next chapter shows how climate policy was also subjected to national political 
pressures. In particular, the struggle for meaning within climate policy following the 
introduction of austere localism. 
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7. Politics, power and the 
struggle for meaning
7.1 Introduction
This chapter adopts a different lens with which to examine climate policy, shifting 
focus from indicators and policies towards sets of actors at a range of spatial levels: 
central government, the Local Government Association (LGA), regional 
organisations, local authority managers and councillors. The analysis focuses on their 
struggles over climate policy meaning following the abolition of National Indicators 
(NIs) and the introduction of budget cuts. These struggles are shown to be founded 
upon political concerns over actorsÕ positions within this new landscape. After a 
brief background of the regional climate change partnership, this chapter focuses on 
two analyses. First, the interpretations of a key climate policy document, the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), are assessed. The MoU was an agreement 
between the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Local 
Government (LG) Group which set out a new approach to local climate policy. The 
meanings placed on the document by different actors are discussed before drawing 
out themes of vagueness and dislocation between local and national actors. Second, 
local councillorsÕ perceptions of the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) are 
evaluated, contrasting one councillorÕs focus on criticising CRC with the 
comparative silence on the issue by councillors within other local authorities. The 
inconsistency between the councillorÕs criticism and their support for climate policy 
is used to uncover hidden meanings of policy preferences. 
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Throughout both of these sections, the concept of power will be discussed, 
responding to the observation that Òpower appears wherever people interpret and 
respond to one anotherÓ (Bevir and Richards, 2009b, p.140). Power will be shown to 
be a mitigating factor upon policy preferences - the latter being contingent upon the 
need to maintain position and inßuence within the policy network. The chapter 
concludes by identifying a signiÞcant ßow of power out of the established network 
to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) as a 
consequence of the latterÕs localism agenda. In addition, the MoU is identiÞed as the 
onset of a new myth, enabling continuity against a background of local government 
funding cuts. 
7.2 Background of the policy network
The regionalisation of climate policy was reviewed in section 2.5 (see pages 39-44), 
showing how a climate change network developed in the East Midlands. The 
network became increasingly institutionalised, moving from an informal Climate 
Change Steering Group which was Òa largely self-selected community of interestÓ to 
a slimmed-down, more formalised partnership, latterly named Climate East Midlands 
(CEM) and dominated by the larger regional organisations (Chadwick, 2012).39 One 
manager with experience of this transition placed the move in the context of 
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39 East Midlands Development Agency, East Midlands Regional Assembly, Government OfÞce for the 
East Midlands, East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership and the Environment Agency.
developments in other regions and at the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA):
ÒThere was a national network running which had been facilitated by the 
UK Climate Impacts Programme, which was basically a self-help group for 
climate change coordinators. It became clearer and clearer to me ... [that 
we could move] ... to a more formalised arrangement which mimicked 
what was going on in other parts of the countryÉ. [B]ecause they were 
becoming better organised and doing more interesting work, they were 
successful in lobbying DEFRA to provide some funding.Ó (Regional 4 
Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
Improved organisation was emphasised as a driver towards the establishment of 
similar networks within each region, which in turn came together to form a national 
network. Regional 4 Climate Change Manager also recognised the increased 
potential for national funding in shifting from the loose membership structure of the 
Steering Group to a more formal partnership arrangement between the main 
regional-level agencies. While the extra resources were helpful for initiating 
programmes, the funding had a meaning beyond its monetary value. For a regional 
partnership in its infancy, it opened up a line of communication to those in positions 
of power:
ÒDirect engagement with a government department is enormously helpful 
even if they donÕt provide you with huge amounts of money. The funding 
from DEFRA is modest, only £45,000 a year, but itÕs the fact that you 
know you have some recognition within central government, that what 
youÕre doing is important to them. That in itself provides a listening ear 
within Whitehall, potential connection to ministers and so on. ItÕs not to 
be underestimated.Ó (Regional 4 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
The manager put more meaning in the act of funding than the level of funding itself. 
Despite the annual sum from DEFRA being ÔmodestÕ, it was a symbol of ofÞcial 
approval from central government of regional adaptation work. Although an explicit 
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demand for partnerships was not made by DEFRA in this case, the prevailing trend 
inßuenced Regional 4 Climate Change Manager in the decision to move to a more 
formal partnership model. The attainment of government recognition through 
partnership working contrasted with the situation on mitigation policy, where 
regional activity within England was more patchy and the responsible Whitehall 
department (Þrst DEFRA, latterly DECC) did not fund regional partnership work.40
A desire for simpliÞcation helped to explain why partnerships in environmental 
management became institutionalised through funding decisions (Blanco et al., 2011, 
p.302-303). This trend was not restricted to the national level. A regional ofÞcial also 
described the impracticality of dealing with a plethora of local authorities:
ÒWeÕre a kind of pinch point, we actually have very few people you need 
to talk to at a regional level to manage the networksÉ. When you get 
down to local authorities youÕve got 46 in our region all ßying off in 
different directions, a bit like herding cats. Whereas with the climate 
change partnership, youÕve got ten or twelve people in a room and youÕve 
got access to a lot of big networks through those people.Ó (Regional 5 
Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
While it was appealing to regional organisations to try to streamline the policy goals 
of a disparate collection of local authorities through a partnership, no regional 
organisation had any authority to represent councils on the partnership. Despite this, 
some regional actors perceived the partnership as representing local authorities, 
with one regional sustainability head describing it as their main source of interaction 
with local authorities:
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40 Some central government funding ßowed into regional working from the Department for Trade 
and Industry, but this was focused on energy matters rather than climate change per se (Chadwick, 
2012).
ÒWe principally work through Climate East Midlands because itÕs much 
more sensible to work through a single strategic entity that is 
representative of local authorities than have 27 [sic] different discussions. I 
would say thatÕs principally our relationship.Ó (Regional 1 Climate Change 
Manager 1, interview 1)
Both Regional 1 Climate Change Manager 1 and Regional 5 Climate Change 
Manager highlighted the difÞculty of dealing with the diverse views and priorities of a 
range of local authorities. Distilling these views down to a manageable scale was 
seen as a key function of the partnership. 
This brief background to the development of connections between organisations 
operating at different spatial tiers illustrates some of the different meanings put on 
such linkages by the actors involved. Regional organisations saw a more 
institutionalised partnership as a means of obtaining funding and opening up lines of 
communication with central government. The regional partnership was also seen as 
a means of simplifying the local authoritiesÕ sometimes diverse perspectives into a 
format which regional organisations and central government found more 
manageable, even though local authorities were not directly involved in the 
partnership. Under the Cameron Government, regional organisations within the 
partnership were wound down, NIs were abolished and funding to local authorities 
cut. Taken together, these developments constituted very different conditions for 
network relationships than those which developed in the 2000s. The changes are 
summarised in Figures 4 and 5 below. 
241
Figure 4. East Midlands climate change network, 2010
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Figure 5. East Midlands climate change network, 2011
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The next section continues the theme of the diverse meanings which actors put on 
these relationships through an analysis of the MoU, which attempted to reformulate 
the links between national and local climate policy.
7.3 Memorandum of Understanding: birth of a 
new partnership?
7.3.1 Background and content of the MoU
The history of weak linkages between central and local government on climate 
change mitigation policy continued with the initial development of the Green Deal 
under the new Cameron Government in 2010. The programme was conceived 
without a well-deÞned role for local authorities, prompting the LG Group to lobby 
DECC for greater engagement on the issue within the context of councilsÕ history 
of action on mitigation and the new governmentÕs localism agenda. These discussions 
led to a wider dialogue between LG Group and DECC on local climate policy, 
culminating in their joint publication of the MoU in March 2011. The document 
stated their arrangements for working in partnership and the milestones against 
which progress on LG GroupÕs original offer could be measured (DECC and LG 
Group, 2011, p.3). Covering Þve pages of text, the MoU did not go into detail on 
policy. It instead highlighted the national mitigation targets providing context for 
local action and set out Þve criteria for evaluating the MoUÕs success:
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Table 11. Criteria for evaluating success of Memorandum of Understanding
1 Progress in meeting MoU milestones
2 Proportion of councils signing up to New Nottingham Declaration
3 Council progress against their commitments set out in New Nottingham 
Declaration
4 The extent to which the MoU is successfully helping the UK to meet its national 
obligations
5 The extent to which councils are playing an active role in delivering climate 
change mitigation and related policies, such as Green Deal
Adapted from DECC and LG Group (2011, p.5).
The document marked a fresh turn in the relationship between local and central 
government in climate change mitigation policy, situated within a context of the new 
localism agenda. Fieldwork undertaken in the weeks following the documentÕs 
publication highlighted actorsÕ diverse interpretations of the MoUÕs role and 
signiÞcance within policy-making. Interpretations of the MoU by four sets of actors 
(the LGA, DECC, local authorities and regional organisations) will be analysed, 
providing a window on their attempts to produce and reproduce power within the 
network. 
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7.3.2 Local Government Association
A key section of the LG Group was the LGA,41 which aimed to be Òthe national 
voice of local governmentÓ (2012a, p.20) under the direction of local authority 
elected members serving on the organisationÕs boards, including an Environment and 
Housing Board (LGA, 2012b). An LGA ofÞcer emphasised that it was local 
governmentÕs initial exclusion from the Green Deal that had sparked a wider effort 
to increase local government involvement in climate policy. DECC responded to this 
pressure with a request to the LGA:
ÒGovernment said ÔOK, we recognise youÕre pivotal but we need a bit of 
help to work out your role. Can you submit a document?Õ So we 
submitted the local government offer on climate changeÉ. We saw it as 
more of a deal, I suppose, than a one-way offerÉ. Number one É you 
recognise the key role that councils play in achieving climate change 
objectives. Number two, by recognising that you [also] recognise the need 
to be resourced to be able to deliver it.Ó (LGA Adviser 1, interview 1)
The ofÞcer was clear in describing their proposal to DECC as a ÒdealÓ rather than 
the ÒofferÓ which had been initially proposed by the Secretary of State (Huhne, 
2010), although the subsequent documentÕs ofÞcial title was Local GovernmentÕs Offer 
on Climate Change, a document containing 15 proposals for local authority action on 
climate policy (LG Group, 2010).  While many of these proposals were not 
subsequently agreed on by the LGA and DECC, the document provided the 
groundwork for the eventual publication of the MoU. The LGA sought recognition 
from DECC for the work local authorities were already undertaking on climate 
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41 The other sections were Local Government Leadership, Local Government Improvement and 
Development, Local Government Employers and Local Partnerships (LG Group and DECC, 2011, 
back cover). Local authority managers referred to the LGA, rather than the broader LG Group, in 
interviews, but the latter was named as the author of the relevant documents.
change mitigation, against a background of continuing divides and misunderstandings 
between central and local government (Wilson, 2003, p.338). The LGAÕs rationale for 
the introduction of the MoU reßected such divides, providing an account of ad hoc 
interactions and misunderstandings between themselves and DECC:
ÒThe LG Group has often been asked to come in to meet civil servants, 
who are required to make policy decisions for local government, with no 
knowledge or experience of local government. This has led to to LG 
Group staff time being spent in informally getting civil servants Ôup-to-
speedÕ on local governmentÉ. The LG Group has often experienced 
approaches where civil servants suddenly want É help in promoting a 
piece of work É where there has been no previous involvement.Ó (LG 
Group, 2010, p.91)
The document goes on to recommend tackling this issue through training for DECC 
civil servants to improve their knowledge of the local government sector (LG 
Group, 2010, p.83). While this did not end up being explicitly included in the MoU, 
DECC did take responsibility for working with LG Group to ensure the impact of 
policy on local authorities was to be considered at an early stage, although no detail 
was included on how this would be implemented (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.7). 
Echoing the previously discussed institutionalisation of the regional network (see 
pages 238-244), LGA Adviser 1 (interview 1) expressed a hope that a greater 
recognition of local governmentÕs role in climate policy would be the precursor to 
central government funding.
In addition to gaining Whitehall recognition for local activity, LGA Adviser 1 
emphasised the importance of local authorities determining their own goals for 
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climate policy through the planned update to the Nottingham Declaration (see pages 
45-46):
ÒWhat central government got out of É [the MoU was] a commitment 
from LG Group to get councils to sign up to a new Nottingham 
Declaration É [which] will give councils an opportunity to express their 
ambition on carbon dioxide emission reductions from their own estate, 
from their area, and the role they are going to play in the Green DealÉ. 
Instead of having top-down targets, something we averted, weÕre saying 
that if local government is left to its own devices itÕs often a lot more 
ambitiousÉ. DonÕt give them a top-down indicator because thatÕs all they 
will do.Ó (LGA Adviser 1, interview 1)
Although this reßected the dominant view expressed by East Midlands climate 
change managers that the NIs were important in establishing the issue on the 
agenda, LGA Adviser 1 was averse to any return to top-down targets. While it was 
the case that some local authoritiesÕ targets for corporate emissions reduction were 
more ambitious than suggested by DECC, as claimed by LGA Adviser 1, there were 
also many examples nationally of local authorities scaling back their climate change 
work (Green Alliance, 2011, pp.14-17). In addition, as shown in Chapter 6, the 
presence of such targets had not previously compelled local authorities to 
implement programmes speciÞcally aimed at cutting area-wide carbon emissions. 
As an alternative to centrally imposed targets, LG Group proposed a new version of 
the Nottingham Declaration allowing local authorities to Òsign up to locally 
appropriate targets and goalsÓ and detail the relevant programmes they would 
implement (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.6). Whether this initiative would reverse 
the national trend for local authorities reducing their climate change work was 
openly questioned by some working within the sector (Johnston, 2011; Scott, 2011). 
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The previous incarnation of the Nottingham Declaration was successful in 
encouraging political leaders to engage with climate change as it emerged on the 
policy agenda, committing local authorities to develop action plans, participate in 
local and regional partnerships and monitor their results (Nottingham Declaration on 
Climate Change, 2005). The new version would be introduced under conditions of 
budget constraints and fading interest in climate change, following the difÞculties 
with local implementation identiÞed in Chapters 5 and 6.
7.3.3 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
For DECC, the MoU marked a new turn in their relationship with local government 
action on mitigation, moving from a detached contentment with any activity being 
driven by NIs to a recognition that the latterÕs demise required a signal from central 
government that such activity remained legitimate. Along with this change in the 
policy framework, the localism agenda presented additional difÞculty for DECC; with 
the abolition of the Government OfÞces in the regions, the main conduit for 
communication between Whitehall and local authorities was lost. It was in this 
context that the MoU speciÞed a role for LG Group in gauging the opinion of their 
members: 
ÒThe LG Group will actively seek their council membersÕ views on the 
MoU, LG Offer on Climate Change, subsequent action plans and DECC 
policy. These views will form part of the Annual Report on the MoU. This 
does not exclude individual councils from expressing their views on 
DECC policy directly to DECC.Ó (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.8)
DECC acknowledged the work already undertaken by the LG Group (e.g. LGA, 
2007), which lent it some legitimacy as a potential representative of local 
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authorities, but one policy adviser from the department expressed caution when 
questioned directly over how effective they could be in that role:
ÒIt is [a bridge]É. WeÕve always had a concern that they talk to the top 
10 or 20 per cent of the councils who want to engage with energy and 
climate change, but not the laggards at the other end. I think thatÕs a work 
in progress at the moment. ItÕs in the MoU and one of the good things 
about going to events É [out of London] É is to Þnd out whether 
theyÕre being successful in talking to local authorities and getting our 
messages as well as their messages acrossÉ. I suspect theyÕll get better at 
it, but every time I go to an event and hold up the MoU, I seem to get 
blank faces at the moment.Ó (DECC Adviser 1, interview 1)
DECCÕs wish for the MoU to cover all councils was expressed in the LG GroupÕs 
responsibility to Òdevelop and implement plans for reaching out to those councils 
that do not take a full and active part in reducing emissionsÓ (DECC and LG Group, 
2011, p.8). While this symbolised the DECC ofÞcerÕs concerns about ÔlaggardÕ 
councils, the ofÞcer also stated in a subsequent meeting with local authority ofÞcers 
that this responsibility was Òcarefully worded so as not to be too speciÞcÓ (Meeting 
1, Þeld notes), an admission that the details of such plans were uncertain and left 
unspoken in the MoU. The LG GroupÕs aversion to top-down emissions targets 
meant such plans were likely to be conÞned to persuading councils to sign the new 
Nottingham Declaration, reßecting the MoUÕs focus on process over implementation. A 
further constraint on any such plans lay in the resources within the LG Group, 
which cut its stafÞng level by half in 2010. Without any signiÞcant increase in 
resources, the potential scope of any encouragement offered to lagging councils is 
likely to be limited.
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DECC Adviser 1Ôs comment that the MoU had been met by Òblank facesÓ within 
local government was supported by a Þeldwork observation of a well attended 
meeting of district local authority ofÞcers to discuss the Green Deal. DECC Adviser 
2 concluded their presentation by holding up a copy of the MoU and asking if those 
present were aware of the document. Only four of the twelve council ofÞcers 
present raised their hand (Meeting 2, Þeld notes). DECC Adviser 2 responded to 
this by ensuring everyone knew who the key contact for climate policy was within 
LG Group, and emphasising the organisationÕs importance as a representative for 
local government in policy discussions.  The low awareness of a document intended 
to be central to future local policy suggested ineffective communication between the 
LG Group and the local authorities they were representing, and supported DECC 
Adviser 1Õs concerns about whether the LG Group could be considered a legitimate 
representative of local authority views. One local authority manager further 
substantiated the weak links between themselves and the LG Group:
ÒI think the LGA can play a really good role in getting clarity from central 
government about what local government should do and protecting local 
government against excessive demands with no resources to support it.... 
But theyÕll play it with or without us. They do consult us but barely.... I 
donÕt think we get any direct communication from the LGA and 
environment group at all. I only found out about the MoU through 
DECC, not the LGA.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager, interview 2)
By deÞnition, there is a limit to the extent to which any one organisation can 
accurately reßect a large and diverse body of opinion but DECC intended to use the 
MoU as a framework for partnership with local authorities. The Ôblank facesÕ of local 
authority ofÞcers exposed the limitations in mediating a relationship with the local 
government sector through a single representative organisation, while supporting 
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the perception that the LGA concentrated its efforts on a small number of leading 
local authorities. 
As well as working with a LGA reluctant and unable to coerce local authorities into 
action on emissions reduction, DECC also had to interpret a localism agenda being 
articulated strongly by the DCLG. The latter departmentÕs zeal for removing local 
government targets was made clear within a letter from its Secretary of State, Eric 
Pickles, announcing the revocation of NIs along with the wider performance 
management framework:
Ò[T]he annual cost to each authority of the National Indicator Set and 
statutory data returns is half a million pounds. We are committed to 
relieving you of the bureaucracy that diverts money away from the 
frontline. So today I am announcing the end of other burdensome aspects 
of the old command-and-control regime É. My aim is to give you the 
ßexibility you need to protect key services, by É Getting rid of 
unnecessary top-down targets and their related bureaucracy.Ó (Pickles, 
2010b)
This passage presents a challenge to local climate policy on two fronts: the 
disparaging of top-down targets and the emphasis on frontline services. First, by 
associating NIs or other top-down targets with the phrase Ôcommand-and controlÕ, 
PicklesÕs letter associates such targets with the view that Òbureaucratic control has 
replaced democratic accountabilityÓ, presented in the Conservative PartyÕs 2010 
election manifesto as a central ßaw of New LabourÕs approach to local government 
(Conservative Party, 2010, p.73). With the demise of NI186, some local authorities 
supported a Friends of the Earth campaign to introduce Local Carbon Budgets 
(Friends of the Earth, 2010; Local Government Chronicle, 2010), an area-based cap on 
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carbon dioxide emissions linked to the national budgets issued by the Committee 
on Climate Change (2011a). DECC Adviser 1 made it clear that such a move was 
not government policy and did not Þt with the localism agenda. Some local authority 
managers interviewed suspected that some in DECC might favour such a move, but 
that the strength of language used by DCLGÕs political leadership in relation to top-
down targets made such a policy development unlikely.
The second challenge to local climate policy was PicklesÕ framing of local 
governmentÕs spending decisions in the above quote in terms of protecting the 
ÔfrontlineÕ and Ôkey servicesÕ. This contrasted with the perception of the work 
undertaken by climate change ofÞcers as being associated with ÔbureaucracyÕ or even 
as being Ònon-jobsÓ (TaxpayersÕ Alliance, 2010). Such a hostile interpretation of 
climate change work can be traced to the previous discussion of climate change 
being perceived as extra-local (see pages 146-149). Although the notion of frontline 
services was used extensively within funding cut debates around funding cuts, its 
precise deÞnition remained unclear (de Castella, 2011; Keeling, 2011).  Such 
ambiguity, in conjunction with climate changeÕs extra-local nature, allowed the issue 
to be portrayed in the media as separate from the frontline and so a priority for 
cuts (e.g. Chapman, 2011; Copping, 2011). Pickles could not be explicit in his letter 
about climate change ofÞcers being Ônon-jobsÕ, as climate change had been one of the 
Þrst, high-proÞle priorities for the Cameron Government (Cameron, 2010a). 
However, the meaning of PicklesÕs language within the letter left climate change as an 
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issue of secondary importance to local government, and without the capability to 
introduce the targets of the kind which had initially put the issue on local agendas.
In summary, the MoU represented DECCÕs effort to respond to the changes in 
subnational policy arising from DCLGÕs localism agenda. The demise of Government 
OfÞces left DECC without an established means of communicating with local 
authorities on policy matters, a function which the MoU placed with LG Group.  
With the revoking of NIs and broader move by DCLG against top-down targets for 
councils, DECC were left without any means of ensuring that local government 
ambition on carbon dioxide reduction matched the imperatives set by the Climate 
Change Act 2010 and related carbon budgets. In the absence of such instruments, 
the MoU marked a move into process-driven policy with a view to persuading 
councils to take (or maintain) action on the agenda.
7.3.4 Local authority ofÞcers
In contrast to the import placed on the MoU by DECC and the LGA, local authority 
managers expressed indifference to the document; not discussing it of their own 
accord and highlighting its marginality when questioned directly.  The next section 
explains how this indifference took two distinct forms, depending on managersÕ local 
preferences: being perceived either as an opportunity missed to shore up their 
power within the organisation or as a welcome departure from excessive central 
government interference. 
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a) A missed opportunity
On being questioned directly, one local authority ofÞcer was forthright about the 
MoUÕs irrelevance:
ÒYou could drive a bus through it. It doesnÕt mean anything. ItÕs just nice 
words, you canÕt hold anybody to anything, itÕs aspirational stuff. I think itÕs 
time we had a bit more than thatÉ. From a practitionerÕs point of view, I 
have to make this work locally. ThereÕs nothing in there that I can really 
use to help justify what I do. IÕm looking for real hooks that actually mean 
something and do something, and there isnÕt anything.Ó (City 2 Climate 
Change Manager, interview 2)
For the MoU to mean something to this ofÞcer, it had to be something which one 
could not Òdrive a bus throughÓ, something with Òreal hooksÓ to Òhelp justify what I 
doÓ, a role which was previously performed by the NIs. The ofÞcer desired a greater 
degree of control over local government from the centre, a course contrary to the 
localism agenda. The ofÞcerÕs political context was key to their interpretation of the 
MoU. City 2 Climate Change Manager was speaking from a position of relative 
weakness compared to some in other local authorities, having suffered an above-
average cut in funding and experiencing increasing ambivalence to the climate 
change agenda from a new management team. This helps to explain the wish for 
more concrete language than was present in the MoU, as the ofÞcer sought external 
sources of power to bolster the ßagging status of climate policy within the council. 
That the MoU might be a catalyst for such action was not credible to the ofÞcer, an 
interpretation supported by a manager in another local authority who had 
experienced a similar level of cuts:
ÒI donÕt think it [the MoU] has pulled any levers for usÉ. It works where 
you have that lead member or that strong corporate commitment to 
doing something about climate changeÉ. But climate change isnÕt 
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something that drives what we do so theyÕre going to look at the MoU 
and say Ôwell, weÕre not interestedÕ.Ó (County 4 Climate Change Manager, 
interview 2)
This view backed up the concerns expressed by DECC Adviser 1 that local 
authorities outside the leading 20 per cent on climate policy were not being 
addressed under the new arrangements (see page 250). There was no chance of a 
local authority with no corporate interest in the issue being mobilised into action by 
the MoU or any other document focused on climate change as a subject of policy; 
their prior policy preferences were likely to prevail. While the LGA emphasised the 
high ambitions of some local authorities, there were also some who had little or no 
ambition to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
b) A welcome departure
Not all local authority ofÞcers hankered for a Þrmer steer from central 
government. Some, at least, supported the LGAÕs aversion to prescriptive targets for 
carbon dioxide reduction in local areas. On being asked what the MoU meant to 
them, one ofÞcer offered a caveat to the general antipathy they shared with City 2 
Climate Change Manager:
ÒErrrrm, not an awful lot really. Is that the wrong answerÉ? Well some 
bits É the Nottingham Declaration, I think thatÕs more importantÉ. ItÕs 
good to keep it going, continuity is important.Ó (County 2 Climate Change 
Manager 1, interview 2)
The document in itself had no meaning for the ofÞcer although the prospect of a 
new Nottingham Declaration was valued, the development of which formed part of 
the MoUÕs progress milestones. This was not due to any identiÞable effect it may 
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have had on policy within the council, but by contributing to an overall sense of 
ÔcontinuityÕ in policy, keeping the issue on the agenda. In contrast to City 2 Climate 
Change Manager 1, the careful wording of the MoU was advantageous for County 2 
Climate Change Manager 1. There were two reasons for this. First, the continuity in 
policy context symbolised by the MoU was as important, if not more so, than its 
content. The Ônice wordsÕ bemoaned by City 2 Climate Change Manager 1 were a 
price worth paying for a document which legitimised local authority action on 
climate change mitigation. Second, County 2 Climate Change Manager 1Õs dislike of 
top-down targets meant that they were against the MoU offering greater central 
control, and a more prescriptive approach would be a pointless endeavour:
ÒTo put it politely, it [issuing top-down targets] is a made-up exercise.... 
WeÕd be deluding ourselves if we play that game, Þddling while Rome 
burns when they could actually be thinking about more national things 
they could do that could have a lot more effect than our policies locally. 
WeÕre deluding ourselves É if you think local authorities have huge 
amounts of sway.Ó (County 2 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 2)
In this interpretation, central government should concentrate their resources on the 
potential carbon dioxide reductions from national policy and return to its previous 
position of contentment with local areas doing what they can within their own 
limited inßuence. Rather than the ambitious local authority being held back by 
national targets described by LGA Adviser 1, this council ofÞcer saw themselves as a 
realist, doing the best they could with limited resources and limited scope for 
inßuencing emissions within their area. The re-introduction of top-down targets 
would not increase their ability to reduce emissions, and even if more resources 
became available, there would be limited opportunities to bring about emissions 
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reductions. For ofÞcers such as County 2 Climate Change Manager 1, the centre 
was only useful in providing a light steering role, sending useful policy signals from 
time to time but without the need for anything speciÞc directed at local authorities. 
In this case, the MoU was well suited to County 2 Climate Change Manager 1Õs 
desire for a signal which avoided climate changeÕs existing status on the policy 
agenda being lost, without any expansion into a new mode of top-down governance.
In summary, the MoU was intended to set out the way in which progress would be 
made developing local authoritiesÕ role in climate policy (DECC and LG Group, 
2011, p.3). Despite the documentÕs ostensibly high relevance to local authorities, 
managers shared a deep ambivalence to the MoU and the process it was intended to 
bring about. There had been little central government involvement in local climate 
policy from DECC (or previously DEFRA) in previous years (see pages 238-244), 
and LG GroupÕs limited resources restricted the depth of relationship they could 
build up with local authorities. Seen in this context, the MoUÕs failure to make an 
impact with local authority climate change ofÞcers was a continuation of their weak 
relationships with DECC and LG Group. Within the East Midlands, the regional 
partnership had exercised greater inßuence than these national bodies in persuading 
local authorities to sign up and commit themselves to action, but their omission 
from the MoU and Offer risked their being squeezed out of the policy network.
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7.3.5 Regional ofÞcers
Although the MoU excluded regional partnerships and organisations, it held greater 
meaning for some regional actors than for the local authorities it was intended to 
address.  Unlike the local authority ofÞcers interviewed, Regional 4 Climate Change 
Manager 1 raised the MoU without prompting during a discussion about the 
changing factors driving local authority action in climate change mitigation, and the 
potentially detrimental effects on climate policy. While stressing how the constituent 
parts of climate policy could be reformulated to justify local action (see pages 
209-231), there was an acknowledgement of the consequences of a changing 
national context:
ÒThe removal of the performance framework, and the climate change 
National Indicators in particular, has taken away a really key and 
important driver. So in some senses it is more difÞcult to argue for why 
councils should pour ongoing revenue resources into peopleÕs postsÉ. 
But something has just come out, a Memorandum of Understanding 
between DECC and LG GroupÉ. Rather than centrally imposed top-
down targets, which was the approach of the previous government, this is 
more about trying to mobilise local authorities to basically analyse and 
understand the potential for energy generation and carbon reduction 
within their local area.Ó (Regional 4 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 
2)
The manager identiÞed the MoU as a bottom-up successor to top-down targets, 
seeking to mobilise councils to acknowledge and act on the evidence supporting 
carbon emissions reduction. But as Regional 4 Climate Change Manager 1 also 
highlighted, the NIs were a signiÞcant inßuence on the way local authorities allocated 
their resources. Without them, the task of mobilisation rested on the ability to 
provide a business case based on costs, a course more likely to lead the council to 
concentrate on internal energy management (see pages 218-231). For Regional 4 
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Climate Change Manager 1, the MoU was an expression of the morphing national 
context for local action, an extension of DCLGÕs decentralisation agenda where 
climate policy was increasingly reliant on local persuasion rather than a wider 
imperative for local authorities to cut carbon emissions. 
Along with the change in the political agenda, Regional 4 Climate Change Manager 1 
also saw the document as a means of extending the role of LG Group within local 
climate policy:
ÒI think the idea of the new MoU, at least from the local government 
side, is that instead of councils reporting their progress to central 
government they report it to the LG Group. I think the idea is they want 
DECC to provide sufÞcient resources so that LG Group É could 
perform that role.Ó (Regional 4 Climate Change Manager 1, interview 2)
Here, a new role was envisaged for the LG Group as the body collating and 
analysing local authority emissions data. While DECC had been responsible for 
publishing detailed inventories of local area carbon dioxide emissions, it was 
Government OfÞce for the East Midlands that had provided additional 
interpretation of the data for local authorities in their region.42 With the latterÕs 
abolition, there appeared to be another opportunity for the LG Group to assume 
the role of bridge between central and local government. Another regional ofÞcer 
was more direct, drawing a contrast between this potential new role and the lack of 
clarity which had preceded it:
ÒI donÕt really know what LG Group do to be honest [in climate change]
É. My feeling is they will go out with a splutter. As long as they continue 
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42 Eric Pickles adopted a rather different perspective on regional Government OfÞces, describing 
them as the Òagents of Whitehall to intervene and interfere in localitiesÓ (Pickles, 2010d).
to Þght a corner they are a problem É because they confuse the issue. 
But if ... local authorities look to us to provide them with whatever then 
you could say the LG Group are an irrelevanceÉ. ItÕs difÞcult because 
theyÕve been sort of appointed by central government to represent the 
local authority view.Ó (Regional 2 Climate Change Manager, interview 2)
By signing up to the MoU, DECC was seen as formalising the LG GroupÕs position as 
the representative of local government in climate policy. Although not detailed in the 
MoU, the Offer proposed that the LG Group Òoffers to take the lead in developing a 
single journey for all councils in tackling climate changeÓ (LG Group, 2010 p.13). A 
number of national bodies were proposed as potential partners in this, along with 
council executive leaders, but without any mention of regional organisations (LG 
Group, 2010, p.14).The omission of regional organisations from the Offer should be 
placed in the context of the Cameron GovernmentÕs localism and de-regionalisation 
agenda which constrained the policy options available (see page 241). The overall 
effect was for Regional 2 Climate Change Manager to see the Offer as a potential 
threat to the regional partnerships, although they believed that the greater proximity 
and familiarity with local authoritiesÕ own agendas would make them resilient to any 
attempt to squeeze them out of the network.
In summary, the bottom-up approach embodied by the MoU highlighted the shift 
away from a centrally controlled performance management framework to a reliance 
on local preferences to drive climate policy. A function of the broader government 
policy, the regional ofÞcers saw this as something that would make policy 
implementation more difÞcult in the future. The MoU and Offer also highlighted how 
the regional partnership continued to be overlooked by national policy. For regional 
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ofÞcials, this was not necessarily a problem, as they saw the links built up with local 
authorities during the Labour Government, when a regional structure was imposed 
from above, as strong enough to survive in the new era of bottom-up policy-making. 
Potentially more difÞcult for regional ofÞcers was LG GroupÕs proposal of a new 
single journey for local authorities (2010, p.102), which implied a new top-down 
framework of support for councils which excluded regional partnerships.
7.3.6 Interpretive themes of the Memorandum of Understanding 
a) Vagueness
The diverse meanings which the MoU held for actors was in part a product of the 
documentÕs deliberately loose wording.  Tensions between the priorities of DECC 
and LG Group were highlighted by the issue of mobilising councils outside the top 
20 per cent of performers to greater action on climate change mitigation. Within the 
new localism context established by DCLG and in the absence of new resources 
from central government, LG Group was averse to any top-down imposition of 
activity and/or targets, limiting their commitment to encouraging all councils to Òplay 
their full and active part in reducing emissionsÓ (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.7). As 
a broad policy priority of the Cameron Government, DECC were supportive of the 
localism agenda but had to balance it with their overarching obligation to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions, a policy objective driven by scientiÞc evidence of climate 
changeÕs global impacts. This friction between local and national priorities was 
resolved through the vagueness of much of the MoU, concluding with a statement of 
its legal status:
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ÒThis Memorandum is a statement of intent, and should not be 
interpreted as a binding agreement. It does not create legal obligations 
between the parties.Ó (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.8)
Vagueness of language is a familiar concept in partnership documents, as a tactic to 
avoid the exclusion of organisations from a governance network. S¿rensen and 
TorÞng see this as a way of anchoring a network, particularly in its early stages, with 
discourse taking place Òaround relatively empty signiÞers that are open for 
reformulation and reinterpretationÓ (2005, pp.212-213). In the example of the MoU, 
an insistence by either DECC or LG Group on more prescriptive language risked 
widening the gap between their agendas too much to reconcile. The difÞculty of 
representing all local authorities within England and Wales also limited the 
concreteness of language which LG Group could commit to.
While the MoU could be seen as the Þrst step towards the reformation of a new 
governance network, the reaction from other actors suggested a lack of enthusiasm 
for such a move. From local authorities, there were contrasting reactions. For City 2 
Climate Change Manager 1, there was disappointment about the vagueness of the 
MoU, describing it as aspirational. Crucially, the manager then opined that ÒitÕs time 
we had a bit more than thatÓ (interview 2), implying agreement that the MoU 
represented a nascent policy process, and an overriding frustration that local climate 
policy should still be at such a relatively undeveloped stage. For County 2 Climate 
Change Manager 1 there was a greater acceptance of the new localist context with 
an acknowledgement that the MoU was important as a symbol of continuity in 
climate policy, particularly those clauses related to the new Nottingham Declaration. 
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Within this interpretation, there was an inevitability in the need to remake the 
governance network, and a symbol of continuity was a welcome alternative to a 
policy vacuum. However, it was seen, at best, as peripheral to local policy.
b) Dislocation between the national and local 
These two local authority ofÞcers had different expectations and wants of the MoU, 
but were united in their low opinion of its relevance to their everyday work. Why 
was this the case? The partnership between DECC and the LG Group was born out 
of the two national organisationsÕ own interests: DECC looked to maintain a role 
for local government in climate policy, the LG Group tried to strengthen their role 
as the voice of local government to which DECC listened. Both were responding to 
the shift from the centrally coordinated performance management of NIs to 
localism, consistent with the Òemasculation of traditional methods of ÔcommandÕÓ 
represented by a shift from hierarchical to network governance (Bevir and Richards, 
2009b, p.134). The network was envisaged as extending through the LG Group 
down to local authorities but it was hard to identify what the latter would gain from 
such a move. Most local authority ofÞcers already saw themselves as distant from 
the LG Group, an organisation where staff cuts meant support for councils was 
likely to dwindle still further. In addition, it was clear that new resources would not 
be forthcoming for local authorities to tackle climate change mitigation following the 
end of the East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership.  
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The weakness of any climate policy network between national and subnational 
actors was exposed by the new contexts of austerity and localism. As previously 
discussed, climate policy held a tenuous position within local government work, as it 
was understood to be excluded from the priority category of Ôfrontline 
servicesÕ (see pages 253-254). Climate change as a policy issue is less visible to the 
public than such services, and while climate policy continues to have signiÞcant 
implications for all areas of frontline work, it has been treated as a peripheral issue 
which service areas have often been reluctant to engage with. A greater focus on the 
local meanings of climate policy could help central government to further their 
understanding of the role of local government (Demeritt and Langdon, 2004, p.335). 
The omission of regional partnerships from the MoU highlighted national actorsÕ 
misunderstanding of local authorities. The latter attaching greater meaning to the 
regional partnership than any links with DECC or the LG Group. 
The work done by East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership had 
greater involvement from local authorities and made closer reference to speciÞc 
areas of responsibility such as planning and schools. The elements of the programme 
that were seen as successful did beneÞt from the closeness of space and 
understanding gained from operating at a more local level.  The climate change 
element of the East Midlands Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership grew closer to 
the regional climate change partnership (CEM) over time. However, from a national 
perspective, the problem for these partnerships was that diversity between regions 
in their organisation and remit led to a level of inconsistency which made them easy 
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for the national bodies to overlook. They were often hosted by different 
organisations, not all included climate change mitigation in their remit and in some 
other regions, those Improvement and EfÞciency Partnerships who had worked with 
the climate change partnerships had ended up having their funding diverted into 
other policy areas. Localism presented the opportunity for local authorities within 
the East Midlands to continue collaborating without the same number of regional 
organisations which existed under the Labour Government, although regional 
ofÞcers suggested the East Midlands was in a stronger position than many other 
regions where partnerships had been weakened by loss of resources and the closure 
of host organisations.
In the view of DECC and LG Group ofÞcials there was a network which, while 
underdeveloped, linked national policy to local authorities. Local ofÞcers had a 
different view. For them no meaningful network existed as ofÞcers felt dislocated 
from DECC and the LG Group. Although the regional partnership maintained links 
with local authority ofÞcers, holding regular meetings regarding the East Midlands 
Improvement and EfÞciency Partnership climate change programme, they found 
themselves squeezed out of the new conceptualisation of the network within the 
MoU. While they had previously been able to co-exist with DECC and LG Group 
with separate sources of central government funding (DCLG and DEFRA), they now 
found themselves under pressure from the MoU. 
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c) Partnerships as power
It is unsurprising that DECC and LG Group should seek to forge a partnership that 
served their own interests. The ambivalence of local authorities to being included in 
such a network suggested that they identiÞed little beneÞt from such an idea. Even if 
such a move were to be accompanied by extra resources for local government, 
these would have been contingent on greater control from the centre in the form of 
targets. Many ofÞcers would not have welcomed such a move, already seeing 
themselves at the limit of their inßuence to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in their 
area. This leads one to question the purpose of the network if it was likely to bring 
about little mutual beneÞt for its members.
For LG Group, the desire for greater links with central government can be seen as 
part of a wider drive to protect the interests of local government within Whitehall. 
While this is the organisationÕs core function, it came into sharper focus during a 
period of austerity in which DCLG took one of the largest cuts in funding within 
government and there was sustained comment from the Secretary of State and 
Ministers about the level of waste within local authorities and LG Group itself 
(Hope, 2010; Pickles 2010c, 2011). The LG GroupÕs attempt both to strengthen 
organisational links and gain access to resources through the MoU can be seen 
within this context, suggesting a focus on the survival of the institution and the 
sector it represented rather than improving climate policy, an analysis supported by 
one local authority ofÞcer:
ÒI donÕt think the LGA [LG Group] is behaving in a way which is about 
being committed to the environmental outcomes. ItÕs committed to 
267
supporting and ensuring that local government continues to thrive and 
prosper. This is part of the problem of all this partnership working, that 
the commitment to the outcome gets lost in the commitment to the 
organisationÕs desire.Ó (County 1 Climate Change Manager, interview 1)
Under budgetary and political pressure LG Group looked to redeÞne their external 
relationships with a view to moving closer to the source of power (DECC) in 
climate policy, characteristics identiÞed within the bureau-shaping model of 
bureaucratic behaviour (Dunleavy, 1991, pp.203-204). The MoU listed future 
milestones for progress towards a more detailed framework for local government 
policy on climate change (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.10) but the ambivalence 
displayed by local authority ofÞcers made it uncertain whether these developments 
would have any impact on outcomes. The MoU was more immediately focused on 
LG GroupÕs ability to maintain its role and inßuence in a time of uncertainty for local 
government. DECCÕs motives in establishing the MoU could also be interpreted with 
reference to the bureau-shaping model, this time in relation to Òload-
sheddingÓ (Dunleavy, 1991, pp.204-205). As a small department under budgetary 
pressures severe enough to threaten its entire existence (Stratton et al., 2010), any 
assistance from outside agencies in delivering the national carbon budgets was 
attractive. Although LG GroupÕs aversion to top-down targets for local government 
meant this could not be expressed formally, the MoU did specify the Òpivotal role 
councils have in tackling climate changeÓ (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.3), which 
could be seen as preparing the ground for greater control in the future.
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d) Summary
By explicitly setting out the terms of partnership working between DECC and LG 
Group within the new context of localism, the MoU allows us to see the very 
different perceptions of the network amongst its members, comparing their 
interpretations of the MoUÕs development and its meaning for policy work in the 
future. There were clear differences between organisations operating at different 
spatial scales, as well as some more subtle differences between those operating 
within the same spatial scale. The analysis of partnership working has been made 
with reference to the power held and sought within the policy network. DECC 
were a powerful actor within this context, although their relative weakness within 
Whitehall led them to seek out partners to help them deliver their agenda. LG 
Group attempted to assume the role of a bridge between DECC and the local 
authorities, bringing them closer to the source of power within climate policy. 
Within a context of increasing government criticism of councils and LG Group, this 
can be seen as an attempt to boost the latterÕs standing as an actor within the policy 
process. While the Þeldwork period only covered the very early stages of this 
process, it was questionable whether the LG Group could Òreßect the insights and 
ambitions of their member councilsÓ (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.3) when such 
insights and ambitions within climate policy encompassed a wide range. It was also 
unclear how the organisation could reßect a diversity of membersÕ views, including 
those who were disengaging from climate policy, while simultaneously seeking to 
Òencourage all councils to play their full and active part in reducing 
emissionsÓ (DECC and LG Group, 2011, p.7). The well established regional 
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partnership had the potential to be an intermediate between local and national 
government, but with a track record of dialogue and collaboration with local 
authorities. However, acknowledging the value of such partnerships within the MoU 
was precluded by the strong anti-regional stance taken by the Cameron 
Government, having already moved to abolish Regional Development Agencies, 
Government OfÞces and regional strategies. For local authorities there was a 
general ambivalence to the new developments in national-local relations, with 
managers seeing national policy as providing only a vague signal unlikely to change 
the direction of local policy. For all of these actors it was DCLG who, while not 
directly involved in the climate policy process, had exercised their power through 
the localism agenda and removal of NIs. 
7.4 Local councillorsÕ attitudes to central 
regulation: inconsistency, power and politics 
7.4.1 A different comparative method: contrasting discussion and 
silence 
The previous section employed an interpretive analysis of the MoU to highlight the 
weakness of network ties between local ofÞcers and national actors. The document 
marked a fresh turn in local climate policy, generating discussion from a range of 
actors each adopting a different view of the development. This section takes a 
different approach, focusing on the case of a local councillor (City 2 Councillor) who 
sought to strengthen these links as a result not of the MoU, but of the increased 
costs resulting from central governmentÕs changes to the CRC in 2010 (see pages 
225-228).The sources of the councillorÕs desire for greater partnership working with 
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central government are analysed through an apparently contradictory account of the 
CRC regulation and the councillorÕs stated policy preferences.  These contradictions 
are then used to explore the power and legitimacy of City 2 Councillor in the 
context of the indifference to CRC expressed by councillors in other local 
authorities.
The previous section was able to draw on a range of perspectives of a single issue, 
akin to the multiple angles depicted in the photograph taken from the set of The 
Matrix (Image 3.2). Such an approach is precluded here, as City 2 Councillor was the 
only councillor to discuss the CRC, doing so at length. In the previous section, 
where local authority managers did not discuss the MoU unprompted, it was 
unproblematic to directly ask them their views at a later point in the interview; the 
document was clearly within their remit as policy managers. My interview method 
was to minimise pre-determined direct questions in favour of a conversational 
approach, allowing more time to focus on the issues meaningful to participants (see 
pages 110-113). I only intervened to change the direction of conversation 
occasionally, in order to cover issues I considered fundamental to the research 
topic. The direct questioning of local authority managers on the MoU was an 
example of this. However, I did not judge such an approach appropriate for 
councillors and the CRC, despite the lengthy discussion entered into by City 2 
Councillor. Councillors can be characterised as Ògifted amateursÓ representing the 
Òlay persons viewÓ (Gains, 2009, p.58), a position which one would not expect to 
provide signiÞcant insight on the CRC, a regulation often described as complex 
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(Committee on Climate Change, 2010, p.1; Barker, 2011). Councillors were typically 
less focused on details than managers, so asking a question about CRC would have 
both jarred the conversational ßow and have been likely to prompt an ÒI donÕt 
knowÓ answer, jeopardising the rapport built up between myself and the councillor.  
As a result the comparison undertaken here is not between multiple 
interpretations, as with the MoU, but between the expected silences of most 
councillors on the CRC and the unexpected polemic against it of City 2 Councillor. 
Or in the terms of the Matrix image, why did City 2 Councillor turn a camera onto 
the CRC while others were looking away?
7.4.2 Identifying inconsistency: being for and against reducing 
emissions
Two themes quickly dominated the interview conducted with City 2 Councillor. 
First, the budgetary pressure under which the local authority found itself; and 
second, the additional burden being placed on Þnances by the CRC:
Quote 1:43
ÒThe CRC thing is very ambitious for certain local authorities like ours, I 
can't see us being able to deliver on the [carbon dioxide emissions] 
savings in the time frame they've given us which means we'll have Þnancial 
pressure.... I'm planning on lobbying a minister É and relaying this to say 
Ôlook you're setting the bar so high, you're hitting us with two sticks here, 
we do want to do what you trying to tell us to do, but it's not the way to 
put a massive Þnancial penalty in front of us year after yearÕ. We need to 
work in partnership and that includes understanding we're under 
signiÞcant pressure.... If we'd have kept the [climate change] team the 
same size we'd still have had the same type of problem É It is 
frustrating, we want to work with that agenda but we can do without 
signiÞcant penalties for it. I certainly wouldnÕt like to see more and more 
of that coming our way.Ó (City 2 Councillor, interview 2)
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43 For ease of cross-reference, quotes in this section from City 2 Councillor have been numbered 1 
to 4. 
At the end of the quote, the councillor reinforced their commitment to reducing 
emissions from the councilÕs own estate, but saw the scale and speed of the 
reduction being asked for by central government as excessive. On the surface, this 
supported the notion that local government had an appetite to work on the agenda 
and that central government edicts were unnecessarily punitive, diverting resources 
away from tackling the problem itself. However, if we return to a quote from earlier 
in the same interview (Þrst analysed on page 206), the councillor expressed a 
different view:
Quote 2:
ÒSo I said to the team, if we need x per cent effort into CRC and other 
regulations - things we have to do whether we like it or not, and if we 
donÕt there will be a consequence - then I wanted a signiÞcant amount of 
resources É pushed into that area. Then we worked out what was 
left.Ó (City 2 Councillor, interview 2)
Here is a clear account of a council responding to austere localism by retrenching to 
those areas of activity not covered by central government regulation. Backed by the 
threat of punitive action, such regulation was the primary consideration when 
deciding which areas resources would be allocated to. With the demise of the NIs 
measuring progress on carbon dioxide emissions, the councilÕs climate change 
manager described the situation as a Òpolicy vacuumÓ (City 2 Climate Change 
Manager 1, interview 2), the change in policy direction removing much of the 
incentive to direct resources towards climate change mitigation. As City 2 
Councillor described in Quote 2, central government regulations were the key to 
understanding resource allocation within the council. With the withdrawal of NIs, 
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the only area of activity where central pressure for action remained was the local 
authorityÕs corporate energy management (governed by CRC). As a result, the 
budget for energy management was maintained at a similar level to the previous 
year, whereas other areas of climate change work such as fuel poverty and energy 
efÞciency work with small businesses had to be reduced signiÞcantly. This resulted in 
a cut of around half in the total budget for the unit - well in excess of those in other 
parts of the local authority (City 2 Climate Change Manager, interview 2).
This Þnding illuminates a contradiction between City 2 CouncillorÕs criticism of 
CRC and their broad support for action on climate change mitigation (Quote 1). If 
the councillor were a supporter of action on climate change mitigation, one might 
assume they would be in favour of policies which provided reason for the local 
authority to act. This was the view of the councilÕs climate change manager (City 2 
Climate Change Manager 1), who was disappointed by the absence in the MoU of 
any new regulation or targets which might motivate the local authority to take 
greater action (see pages 255-256). But City 2 Councillor took a different view, 
strongly resisting central regulation in the form of the CRC as well as the prospect 
of anything additional being introduced in the future. This contradiction was 
expressed succinctly by the councillor later in the interview:  
Quote 3:
ÒWe want to work with the [climate change] agenda but É certainly 
wouldnÕt like to see more and more of that [regulation with penalties] 
coming our wayÓ (City 2 Councillor, interview 2). 
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The implication of the councillorÕs account of the budgetary process in Quote 2 is 
that only regulation such as the CRC prompted the council into allocating greater 
resources to climate change work. Without such measures from central 
government, climate change would have to compete with other discretionary areas 
of council work for funds from Òwhat was leftÓ after statutory and regulatory areas 
were addressed (see Quote 2). So while the councillor was ostensibly in favour of 
action, they were also resistant to central policies which made such action more 
likely. The next section will examine possible causes for this inconsistency, showing 
how it makes more sense to read the councillorÕs views with reference to the 
location of power within the policy network than as a literal commentary on the 
CRC.
7.4.3 Making sense of inconsistency: policy as contingent on power
As an account of how to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, the councillorÕs views do 
not make sense; there is an inconsistency between the councillorÕs general support 
for climate policy and their resistance to the regulation which stimulated such 
action. The councillorÕs plea that central and local government Òneed to work in 
partnershipÓ (Quote 1) stemmed from a view that Whitehall did not understand 
how hard it would be to meet CRC targets Òin the time frameÓ (Quote 1). What 
partnership amounts to for the councillor is a desire to weaken the CRC, despite 
the further downgrading climate change work would be likely to suffer as a result. 
Here, partnership did not mean the coming together of different organisations in 
pursuit of a common outcome, reduced carbon dioxide emissions. Rather, the 
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councillorÕs concept of partnership represented reclaiming power from the centre 
to set the parameters for energy management policy.
The councillorÕs disempowerment was further expressed through their account of 
climate policy as an agenda driven by global, not local, factors:
Quote 4:
ÒI think [for] governments around the world the trainÕs left the station on 
this. We agreed years ago weÕre going to do this, this and that É. This is 
really ambitious [but] in the mean time weÕre nowhere near out of the 
wood on this Þnancial crisisÉ. SomethingÕs got to give. To my mind it will 
be one of two things. TheyÕll go ÔOK we need more time on this and we 
recognise it's very tough, we may need to look at rejigging our priorities a 
little bit or making it easier on the local authorities or more support to 
deliver these things". At end of day people at local level have to deliver 
these things pretty much.Ó (City 2 Councillor, interview 2)
The councillor presented their self as constrained by the global priorities signed up 
to by central government, who would have to provide the council with either more 
time or more resources if CRC targets were to be reached. In the phrase Òthe 
trainÕs already left on thisÓ (Quote 4), the councillor evokes the image of the policy 
as a train, something that local authorities were powerless to stop even though they 
had a key role in policy delivery.  By searching for partnership with central 
government, the councillor sought to alleviate their own sense of powerlessness in 
the face of the global policy agenda. 
 
Two expressions of powerlessness by the councillor have been identiÞed: Þrst, as a 
way of making sense of the contradiction between support for climate policy and 
resistance to CRCÕs implementation; second, through the emphasis on climate policy 
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as a globally driven agenda, a ÔtrainÕ that could not be stopped despite the issue being 
perceived as extra-local in nature (see pages 146-149). This interpretation of the 
councillorÕs position within the network should be seen within the context of 
central/local power relations. Local government in the UK has historically not been 
synonymous with self-government (Wilson and Game, 2006, pp.26-27), with local 
authorities often lacking the powers and resources to deliver on policy goals set by 
the centre (e.g. Demeritt and Langdon, 2004, p.334). While central government has 
attempted to address these concerns by granting local government the powers of 
wellbeing (Local Government Act 2000, s.2-5) and competence (Localism Act 2011, 
s.1-8),44 the power to raise taxes has continued to reside at the centre leaving local 
government dependent on Whitehall for funding (Jones et al., 2011, pp.18-21). As 
well as regulatory powers such as CRC, the centre holds Þnancial power over local 
government, ensuring that central governmentÕs agenda sets the context for local 
policy decisions (Gains, 2009, p.59). 
Under such conditions, City 2 CouncillorÕs disempowerment may have been an 
expression of a wider malaise felt by local politicians who are elected to represent 
their area but feel unduly constrained by national politics.  If so, then we would 
expect to Þnd similar signals of disempowerment in the accounts given by 
councillors in other local authorities. This was not the case. Despite facing broadly 
similar Þnancial liabilities from the CRC regulation, councillors from other local 
authorities did not share City 2 CouncillorÕs prioritisation of the issue. This 
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44 The Localism Act was passed subsequent to the completion of research Þeldwork.
divergence was manifested through the amount of time devoted to the issue within 
interviews. City 2 Councillor began their interview with an unprompted monologue 
about CRC, returned to the subject throughout the subsequent discussion and even 
admitted towards the end of the interview that ÒI know I keep going on about 
itÓ (interview 2). In comparison, there was almost a complete absence of discussion 
about the topic from other councillors.  
As explained above, most of these councillors were not questioned directly about 
the CRC due to their ÔamateurÕ status. However, in one case it was established that a 
councillor did possess a more detailed grasp of their portfolio than those who had 
been interviewed from other local authorities. This provided conÞdence to make a 
general enquiry about their views on the CRC:
ÒI keep being copied in on the occasional email by Friends of the Earth to 
say weÕre behind with the monitoring or whatever. My priority is working 
with things which affect people in their home Þnance, their job or 
whatever. All this other stuff comes on the back of it in my view.... They 
[ofÞcers] have the technical side of it. ItÕs what makes the difference to 
the people out there who we represent as well.... You go out door-
knocking in my ward, the CRC is not the thing they raise with you.Ó (City 
1 Councillor, interview 2)
City 1 Councillor saw the issue as one that they should not spend much time 
thinking about. There were two reasons for this view. First, it was the sort of 
technical issue best left to local authority ofÞcers who were typically specialists in a 
policy area, not generalists (Gains, 2009, p.54). Second, the councillor prioritised 
issues which impinged on the lives of local residents, something which CRC did not 
do. The quote above represents practically the entirety of City 1 CouncillorÕs 
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comments on the CRC, a marked contrast to the length of time City 2 Councillor 
spent talking about the issue. One might have expected the CRC, a tightly enforced 
central regulation on councilsÕ carbon dioxide emissions, to be highlighted by a 
range of councillors. This would Þt the wider narrative of local government 
weakness in the face of central governmentÕs regulatory and Þnancial power. This 
was not the case: City 1 Councillor dismissed CRC as a concern when raised 
directly and the other councillors interviewed all remained silent on the issue. This 
suggests that despite CRC having far less scope for negotiation between central and 
local government than the similar NI185, the regulation was not regarded as a 
noteworthy manifestation of the centreÕs power by most councillors, and that other 
factors lay behind City 1 CouncillorÕs views.
7.4.4 Political weakness as a condition for inconsistency
When considering City 2 CouncillorÕs unique focus on CRC, one potential 
motivation would be the level of Þnancial penalties City 2 would suffer as a result of 
its introduction. Central government regulations are often countered by lobbying 
from the regulated with the aim to alleviate any negative impacts; CRC proved to be 
no different in this regard (Leftly 2012; Murray, 2012) from previous attempts to 
regulate carbon dioxide emissions (e.g. Jachtenfuchs, 1996, p.181; Smith, 2004, p.87). 
However, there was no evidence that the City 2 local authorityÕs Þnancial liability 
under CRC was exceptional in comparison to other councils, and councillors from 
local authorities performing signiÞcantly worse than City 2 on CRC did not share 
City 2 CouncillorÕs concerns, remaining largely silent on the issue (Environment 
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Agency, 2011; Noble, 2011). While the impact of the CRC on local authoritiesÕ 
already constrained budgets should be considered, City 2 CouncillorÕs focus on CRC 
cannot be explained as an example of special pleading on behalf of a council who 
would be particularly badly hit by the regulation. 
Instead, one can return to the notion of power to explain City 2 CouncillorÕs very 
different view of CRC compared to their peers in other local authorities. SpeciÞc 
factors relating to the political control of the local authority cabinet meant that City 
2 Councillor had a precarious hold on political power.45 City 2 Councillor spoke of 
the need to regularly Òsell myself and my policies to my party and electorateÓ in 
relation to attempts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions (Meeting 3, Þeld notes), a 
situation consistent with local authorities with a weakened political leadership 
(Gains, 2009, p.61). It was unclear whether there were additional local factors which 
contributed to this weakness. What can be said is that drawing on concepts of 
political power and weakness provide a more convincing account of City 2 
CouncillorÕs search for partnership working than a narrow focus on the impact of 
CRC. City 2 CouncillorÕs talk of lobbying ministers and forging closer ties with 
government represented an attempt to regain political power within an area of 
policy where the councillor felt they were controlled by national regulation and a 
globally set agenda.
280
45 Detailing these factors would run contrary to the ethical basis for this research, which stipulated a 
minimisation of the risk of research participants being identiÞable (see pages 133-135).
7.4.5 Summary
This section has sought to unpack the meaning of a local authority councillorÕs 
desire to dilute the CRC, which implied a further reduction in the resources 
allocated to climate policy locally.  Clearly City 2 Councillor felt that local policy was 
being unduly controlled by the national CRC scheme, which was in turn a product 
of the global climate policy agenda. The early signs are that CRC will provide some 
motivation to local authorities to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions, a policy 
aim ostensibly supported by City 2 Councillor. The contradictions in City 2 
CouncillorÕs account highlighted that this aim had become secondary to the 
councillorÕs desire to further their own power. Potential sources of this weakness 
included the perception that climate policy was driven by a global agenda poorly 
linked to local issues and the historic weakness of English local government in 
comparison to the centre. Added to this was the minimal scope for negotiation 
between the central and local government regarding submission to the CRC. The 
regulation was seen as something that was being Ôdone toÕ local authorities, in 
particular the changes to CRC announced in 2010 which caused a huge increase in 
the Þnancial penalties attached to carbon dioxide emissions while removing any 
scope for recycling the schemeÕs proceeds back to the best performing 
organisations (see pages 225-228). While these are all potentially strong sources of 
local authority weakness, the preponderance of silence on CRC amongst councillors 
suggested that other factors must have been at play to explain City 2 CouncillorÕs 
Þxation on the issue. One explanation for this was the political instability within 
which City 2 Councillor operated, a local factor which reduced the councillorÕs 
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legitimacy to exercise their powers and resulted in their perception that they had to 
ÔsellÕ climate policies to other actors (Gordon et al., 2009, pp.16-17). City 2 
Councillor sought a new source of legitimacy through a partnership with central 
government to discuss the CRC. This provides a credible account, particularly when 
considering that councillors from ruling majority parties in other local authorities 
made no mention of such partnerships with central government, suggesting no such 
need to seek out new sources of political legitimacy. 
This discussion illuminates two wider points about partnerships and policy 
networks. First, that actorsÕ notions of partnership are contingent on their 
perceptions of what is important within an area of policy. Second, that these 
perceptions cannot be Ôread off Õ from actorsÕ stated policy aims. Consistency may 
not be entirely Ò[c]ontrary to nature, contrary to lifeÓ (Huxley, 1928, p.125) but 
neither is it the norm. This section has shown that where inconsistency was 
uncovered it was possible to discover the conditions under which actorsÕ 
preferences were constructed (Hay, 2010, pp.79-81). The case of City 2 Councillor, 
when placed against the accounts and silences of councillors from other local 
authorities, highlights that stated policy preferences are subservient to a politicianÕs 
rudimentary need for power and legitimacy.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has traced the political struggles for meaning by actors in a climate 
policy network encompassing subnational government within the East Midlands, 
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central government and the LG Group. It has shown that weak links persisted 
between central and subnational government in the realm of climate policy while the 
regional partnership became institutionalised, as actors pursued funding and lines of 
communication with Whitehall departments. Under the Cameron Government, 
network actors were analysed with reference to the MoU, showing a diverse range 
of interpretations while demonstrating how the new localism agenda of a 
government department ostensibly outside of the climate change network, DCLG, 
had a signiÞcant impact on all actors. 
This chapter has also responded to Bevir and RichardsÕs call for an improved analysis 
of power within a decentred analysis of policy networks (2009b, pp.139-140). A ßow 
of power away from network actors towards DCLG was identiÞed, whose new 
localism agenda and language constrained policy options. In particular, the abolition 
of many regional organisations set the context for the omission of regional climate 
change partnerships from the MoU and the emergence of the LGA as a bridging 
organisation between local and central government. This represented an attempt by 
the LGA to forge a new role for itself within an environment of falling budgets and 
hostile rhetoric from the media and DCLG, both towards itself and the local 
authorities it spoke for. For DECC, localism represented a loss of inßuence over 
local authoritiesÕ ambitions in cutting carbon emissions, further weakening a 
department seen as peripheral and with a comparatively small budget to others in 
Whitehall. Local authorities did regain the power to set their own emissions 
targets, without the negotiation process which preceded the adoption of NIs. While 
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this empowered local authorities as organisations, it led in some cases to the 
disempowerment of climate change managers in those local authorities where NIs 
had been the predominant driver for policy (see pages 200-205). Where the local 
political arguments for climate policy were made more effectively, local authorities 
were less negatively affected by the localism agenda, the MoU being seen as a means 
of policy continuity which was vague enough not to interfere with locally 
determined plans. However, overarching this was the reduction in grant funding from 
DCLG to local government, draining the power of those local authorities who 
remained ambitious to implement their plans.
As well as the movement of power, this chapter has also showed how policy 
preferences and responses to change were contingent on the need to possess 
power within the network. The publication and subsequent interpretations of the 
MoU demonstrated the importance of power in cognitive activity, and the case of 
the councillorsÕ diverse responses to CRC illustrated how inconsistencies in an 
individualÕs account of policy can reveal hidden meanings of their stated preferences. 
With both the MoU and the CRC, actorsÕ perceptions of what constituted 
partnership working within a network was contingent on their own interpretations 
of the world around them, and in particular how they saw their position of power.
Finally, the analysis in this chapter can be linked to earlier discussions of policy ritual 
and myth (see Chapter 5). This chapter has demonstrated how the regime of 
rational policy-making and target setting established by DECC had to accommodate 
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a new localism agenda which was broadly hostile to such targets. The MoU was a 
way of DECC and LGA coping with this change in the policy landscape brought 
about by DCLG, and served the three functions of rituals identiÞed by Kertzer 
(1988, p.9):
¥ channelling emotion: the vagueness of language provided a means of 
smoothing over tensions between DECC and the LGA over funding, top-
down targets and interaction between ofÞcials;
¥ guiding cognition: this was key to explaining the MoU. County 2 Climate 
Change Manager 1 was ambivalent to the document, regarding it as of little 
relevance to their local work. However, the manager still welcomed its 
promise of policy continuity within the new contexts of austerity and 
localism. This linking of past, present and future helps reinforce the 
conÞdence of actors in the face of new policy problems (Kertzer, 1988, p.
10); and
¥ organising social groups: the MoU fulÞlled the function of categorising who 
was ÔinÕ and ÔoutÕ of subnational climate change policy. The LGA became 
more explicitly involved with central government policy than in the past, 
while the omission of regional organisations, despite their stronger links 
with local authorities, signiÞed their loss of status within the new localism 
and de-regionalisation agenda.
As discussed in Chapter 5, for a policy act to be a ritual it must have an expressive, 
symbolic function. Here, the ritual of agreeing and publishing the MoU symbolised 
the beginning of a new policy myth: that widespread local authority action 
on climate change mitigation would continue, even as central 
government pressure to do so decreased. Climate policy was justiÞed by 
globally framed arguments (see pages 28-33) yet the MoU implied that local 
authorities would continue to set their own targets for reducing emissions, 
potentially becoming even more ambitious once freed from central government 
interference. Any laggard local authorities who did not set targets would be 
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mobilised by the LGA to sign up to the new Nottingham Declaration, even though 
they were powerless to insist on any such action
 
This myth, embodied by the MoU, provided continuity from the greater certainty 
that the NIs afforded local climate policy. This reaching back into history was explicit 
within the MoUÕs call for a new Nottingham Declaration; a document which had been 
seen as successful in gaining consensus on climate action, although this consensus 
was shown to be thin during implementation (see pages 187-188). It could be argued 
that the myth of local authorities implementing stretching climate policy may prove 
useful if it anchors the network under conditions of change, and provides the space 
for further agreement at a later date. However, the likely appearance of such 
agreement must be questionable, particularly since the publication of the new 
Nottingham Declaration (now called Climate Local), has little substantive difference 
from its Þrst incarnation (LGA, 2012c).
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8. Decentring climate policy
The conclusion to this thesis draws together the empirical Þndings of Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 with the historical and theoretical contexts presented in Chapters 2,3 and 4. 
The conclusion is split into six sections. First, there is a statement of the original 
contributions of this research to theoretical development, methodology and 
empirical Þndings. Second, the three research questions posed in Chapter 1 are 
addressed. Third, Bevir and RhodesÕs decentred approach is assessed using the 
empirical data, focusing on the categories of tradition and dilemma. Fourth, this 
approach is then critiqued, using YanowÕs (1992) concept of policy myths to go 
beyond tradition and dilemma in explaining change and continuity. Fifth, the 
implications of the research for the future of implementation studies are assessed. 
Sixth, and Þnally, the future of climate policy is discussed.
8.1 What is new in this research?
8.1.1 Theoretical development
This research has partly Þlled the lacuna of implementation studies within the 
decentred approach (Bevir and Richards, 2009b, p.134). In doing so it has exposed 
the tension between implementation studies with their roots in a top-down 
approach to policy-making and a decentred approach focused on the contingent 
nature of the policy meanings created by individuals. It has demonstrated how the 
notions of tradition and dilemma can explain policy change. However, the concepts 
of policy rituals and myths have been fused with the decentred approach to provide 
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a better critical account of how policy can continue in the context of two 
incommensurable traditions (Yanow, 1996). Overall, a decentred approach is found 
to have some weaknesses in dealing with rhetoric - an important part of climate 
policy meaning - and in explaining how and why particular changes take place. These 
criticisms are used to develop an alternative, post-structuralist account of change in 
local climate policy, based upon the work of Glynos and Howarth (2007). Finally, it is 
argued that a focus on meaning provides a challenge to the theoretical basis of 
implementation studies. These theoretical developments are expanded upon below.
8.1.2 New research methods
Both the style and number of interviews with participants have been innovative 
within a decentred approach. A particular style of conversational interview was used 
for this research, which gave participants licence to focus on the issues of interest to 
them within policy work, with minimal guidance from the interviewer. This adds a 
new emphasis to the accounts of interview methods found in the existing decentred 
literature (e.g. Poulsen, 2009, p.123; Durose, 2009, pp.39-40). The conversational 
approach opened up a new methodological avenue, allowing notable rhetoric to 
emerge (e.g. Ôpolicy embeddingÕ) from the talk of managers with minimal guidance 
from the interviewer. Repeat interviews were employed with many participants, 
enabling an improved consideration of change over the Þeldwork period, as well as 
providing the opportunity to check and cross-reference concepts raised by other 
participants in earlier encounters.  
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8.1.3 New empirical knowledge
This research is the Þrst to focus on climate policy implementation in the English 
East Midlands. It is also novel in providing an insight into the repercussions for local 
climate policy of the 2010 general election. While the Þndings echo research in 
another English region regarding the ßaws of National Indicator (NI)186 (Pearce and 
Cooper, 2011, p.215), a focus on the indicatorÕs meaning has enabled an explanation 
of the context for seven out of nine local authorities which included it in their Local 
Area Agreements (LAAs). This research has also punctured the assumption that 
consensus exists on local climate policy, showing how the patchy appetite for action 
was revealed by the Cameron GovernmentÕs twin agendas of austerity and localism.
This research is the Þrst academic study of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU), a key document of the new local climate policy landscape. This analysis agrees 
that the MoU was a signal of continuity in local climate policy (Green Alliance, 2011, 
p.12), but breaks new ground in highlighting how the documentÕs vague language 
enabled agreement between the Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) and the Local Government Association (LGA) and yet ensured its 
peripherality to local authority managers. This research also provides new Þndings 
on the potential role for regional partnerships in the new framework. The regional 
climate change partnership has been changed by the Cameron GovernmentÕs de-
regionalisation strategy, but remains intact as a potential bridge between central and 
local government, contrary to reports in some ÔgreyÕ literature that such 
partnerships have been abolished (Travers, 2011, p.6).
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The next section provides more detail on research Þndings by answering the three 
key research questions posed in Chapter 1.
8.2 Question 1: What factors do actors Þnd 
important in the implementation of climate 
change mitigation policy?
1. Separateness;
2. Passivity;
3. Data;
4. Kindred policies;
5. Power.
8.2.1 Separateness
Local managers were aware that climate change was widely regarded as apart from, 
rather than a part of, mainstream local policy concerns. Within this context, 
managers characterised their practices as Ôpolicy embeddingÕ rather than Ôpolicy 
implementationÕ, connoting both their acknowledgement of climate changeÕs 
peripherality and that their work would be subject to some resistance from other 
sections of local authorities. ManagersÕ disinclination to use the term 
ÔimplementationÕ also challenges the wording of the research question itself. The 
implications of the research Þndings for implementation studies are discussed 
further below (see pages 316-318).
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8.2.2 Passivity
Specialist board meetings held regularly in two local authorities were characterised 
by passivity amongst the individuals responsible for climate policy outside of the 
core team. Improved access to data was seen by climate change managers as key to 
countering this tendency, enabling organisational targets to be disaggregated to 
service areas and giving the latter greater ownership of the policy. However, it was 
questionable whether this rational-scientiÞc approach of creating new targets would 
be effective as service heads may regard emissions reduction measures as beyond 
their control, as well as being unwilling to instigate changes that threaten the priority 
of service delivery. The experience of NI186 supported these suspicions, where 
managers felt the emissions being measured were beyond their control, providing 
the context for their distancing themselves from the indicator.
8.2.3 Data
The introduction of the NI186 dataset was seen by managers as fundamental in 
moving climate change from the periphery to the mainstream of local policy. The 
symbolism of such a development was important enough for NI186 to be included 
in seven out of the nine LAAs within the East Midlands, eclipsing the three signiÞcant 
ßaws which managers were already aware of when deciding on which NIs to adopt. 
Besides measuring emissions beyond their control, managers felt the data was 
published too slowly to be useful for policy-making and that its centralised 
methodology overlooked the importance of local knowledge in calculating 
emissions. The abolition of NIs by the Cameron Government left local government 
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climate policy vulnerable to the sharp cuts in central government grants, revealing an 
absence of the presumed political consensus on reducing carbon emissions. The 
focus on performance management had failed to provide the continued legitimation 
of policy through political argument, necessary for effective and ongoing 
implementation.
8.2.4 Kindred policies
Separateness, passivity and the problems of data all contributed to a weakening of 
climate policy, leading to a greater focus on two kindred policies to climate change. 
First, City 1Õs elected councillor regarded tackling fuel poverty as a stronger 
justiÞcation for policy than reducing carbon emissions per se. While increasing 
energy bills have spread beyond deprived households to become a concern across 
society, householders may favour the comfort of warmer homes over a reduction in 
energy bills and carbon emissions. Second, the Carbon Reduction Commitment 
(CRC) accentuated local authoritiesÕ interest in cutting emissions from their own 
estates. However, such measures are difÞcult to introduce where they threaten long-
established working practices and professional identities. 
8.2.5 Power
Policy implementation has been shown to be contingent on the seeking of power by 
individuals. Cuts to local government grant funding have exacerbated the progressive 
disempowerment of local authorities under the Conservative and Labour 
governments of the last three decades. While being inherently problematic for local 
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managers, the case of City 2 CouncillorÕs particular weaknesses showed how 
practices can be primarily dictated by a search for greater power, displacing other 
activities. The strong anti-bureaucratic agenda led within the Cameron Government 
by the Secretary of State at the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), Eric Pickles, also marked a ßow of power away from the 
regional climate change partnership. Despite the GovernmentÕs abolition of regional 
agencies, the partnership remained active within the region, bringing in new partners 
and maintaining links between local authorities. However, the exclusion of regional 
organisations from the Pickles agenda left the partnership excluded from post-
NI186 climate policy, despite remaining well placed to step into the bridging role 
between central and local government vacated by Government OfÞce for the East 
Midlands. 
8.3 Question 2: How do actorsÕ perceptions of 
change affect implementation?
1. Policy meaning;
2. Localism;
3. Rational-scientiÞc policy-making;
4. Issue awareness raising through data collection;
5. Central-local relationship.
8.3.1 Policy meaning
The case of County 1Õs environmental management system illustrates how diverse 
interpretations of change can affect implementation. The system was seen by the 
climate change team as largely a repackaging of existing policies, while one service 
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within the local authority (Service 1) perceived it as an attempt to impose a 
signiÞcant new programme of action with had the potential to affect service 
delivery. It was the diversity of these meanings, as much as the meanings themselves, 
which stultiÞed implementation. The divergence in meanings was rooted in different 
interpretations of the idea of policy; the climate change team had expected existing 
policies to be followed while Service 1 saw these policies as secondary to the 
pragmatic concerns of service delivery.
8.3.2 Localism
The Cameron GovernmentÕs localism agenda brought about swift changes in 2010, 
with the abolition of NIs and the dismantling of much of the regional tier of 
government. The change in policy was instigated by the DCLG, and was interpreted 
in different ways by others. For both DECC and the LGA, the localism agenda meant 
a reduction in power. For DECC, this came from the loss of their link with local 
authorities through regional Government OfÞces and the removal of any inßuence 
over local government targets for carbon emissions. For the LGA, while the localism 
agenda promised devolved power to localities, strong rhetoric from the government 
and sections of the media on local authority waste and Ônon-jobsÕ also brought a 
meaning of threat to the organisation and the local authorities it represented. 
Establishing closer ties with DECC would move LGA closer to the key source of 
power in national climate policy, improving the position of the organisation itself and 
potentially strengthening the weak links between national and local government in 
climate change mitigation. So although the localism agenda was interpreted in 
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different ways by DECC and LGA, these perceptions drove them towards closer 
partnership working.
8.3.3 Rational-scientiÞc policy-making
By focusing on performance management as the basis for action, managers hoped 
that adopting rational-scientiÞc targets for NI186 would bring about new policies to 
reduce local area emissions. However, such organisational targets did not equate to 
shared priorities. A local authority focusing heavily on writing policy carried a 
presumption that the priorities and values within such documents could be easily 
transferred to those outside the core of policy-makers. Such a top-down approach 
meant that policy became seen as something being Ôdone toÕ those affected by any 
move to cut carbon emissions, heightening resistance and impeding implementation. 
The approach also overlooked the need for implementation to be supported by the 
ongoing legitimation of policy through political argument. Where the need for 
argument as well as data was recognised, greater progress on implementation was 
made through the inclusion of kindred policies.
8.3.4 Issue awareness raising through data collection 
Local authoritiesÕ collection of data on their own energy usage proved much 
lengthier than anticipated, the poor state of record keeping emphasising the low 
priority afforded to energy usage. It was the act of data collection, rather than any 
change in the level of consumption, that had altered the perception of energy usage 
amongst local authority managers and raised its priority amongst Þnance managers. 
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This Ôawareness effectÕ was reinforced by the introduction of the CRC, with the 
latter impacting upon perceptions of energy usage beyond its modest impact on 
corporate energy costs (in its pre-2010 form).While corporate awareness of energy 
usage has increased, this may provide only a limited window in which to act before 
energy costs and CRC penalties become seen as a Þxed cost. In addition, while 
awareness may be raised, demand for energy may prove to be inelastic, due to the 
inherence of fossil fuel usage within local authority activities.
8.3.5 National-local relationship 
Local managers saw national governmentÕs role in emissions reduction as far greater 
than their own. The methodology used to devise NI186 contributed to this feeling of 
disempowerment, as the majority of the emissions being monitored within local 
areas were out of the control of local authority managers. Focusing on the carbon 
dioxide emissions measured by NI186 risked neglecting other sources of 
greenhouse gases over which local authorities exerted greater inßuence, for 
example methane released from landÞll waste sites. The post-NI186 framework for 
local climate policy, the MoU, illuminated the difÞculties of prompting change within 
the new localism agenda. As the document lacked new targets for emissions 
reduction, local managers perceived the new framework as largely irrelevant to their 
needs. The MoU was welcomed by some local authority managers as providing a 
signal of continuity, although where programmes were threatened or already cut, the 
MoU provided no incentive or persuasion for local authorities to renew their 
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carbon-cutting efforts. In all cases, the MoU did not bring about new actions within 
local authorities.
8.4 Question 3: To what extent is subnational 
policy implementation driven by the centre?
1. Issue deÞnition;
2. Austerity and localism.
8.4.1 Issue deÞnition
Following the emergence of climate change onto international and national policy 
agendas in the late 1980s, some local authorities took up the issue as an opportunity 
for policy activism within a context of dwindling local powers. However, it was not 
until 2008 that the issue was clearly deÞned as a priority issue with which local 
authorities should concern themselves, with the inclusion of area-wide carbon 
emissions within the NI performance management regime. This move was key in 
legitimising action for those local authorities who included NI186 in their LAAs. 
However, national government positing climate change as a matter for local policy 
did not overcome the disjoint with the issueÕs global and scientiÞc origins, being 
associated with international negotiations and atmospheric pollution that did not 
respect national borders. Despite the efforts to spread climate change as a priority 
issue from national to local actors, the issueÕs lack of meaning within local 
communities left the agenda being seen as aspirational and vulnerable to budget 
cuts.
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This attempt to transfer policy priorities from the centre to localities reßected a 
top-down approach to policy-making and implementation. This approach was 
supplemented by a focus on rational-scientiÞc goal setting through performance 
management which required comparability between local areas. As a result, the 
methodology for NI186 was produced centrally which removed the burden of data 
collection from local authorities but also contributed to the methodology becoming 
seen by local climate change managers as a Ôblack boxÕ closed to local knowledge. 
Whether this view was justiÞed, it contributed to a distrust in the quality of the data 
and ultimately a disengagement by managers from NI186. As previously discussed, 
NI186 data was slow to be published. This stemmed from the prioritisation of 
international policy commitments, with local statistics prepared after data 
submissions to the United Nations were completed. This reßected the dominant 
global framing of climate change as a policy issue, while seriously impeding the ability 
of local managers to utilise data as evidence in a timely way. 
With the demise of NIs, issue deÞnition became less deÞned under the Cameron 
Government. The MoU and the planned new Nottingham Declaration (subsequently 
published as Climate Local) sought to provide continuity in deÞning climate change as 
an issue. The MoU had to employ vague language to satisfy the demands of DECC, 
who wanted climate change to remain within the purview of local authorities and 
DCLG, whose localism agenda required a hands-off approach from national 
government which did not impose targets on local authorities. While such vagueness 
could be seen as the foundations for future redeÞning of local climate policy, the 
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strength of DCLGÕs rhetoric against bureaucracy and targets, in conjunction with the 
disempowerment of local authorities through reduced budgets, seem likely to 
constrain any return to targets or other obligations for local authorities to act.
8.4.2 Austerity and localism
While climate change was newly deÞned as an issue for local authority policy under 
New Labour, the Cameron GovernmentÕs twin policies of localism and austerity 
provided very different circumstances for climate policy and network relations 
between actors. Localism encompassed a policy of Ôde-regionalisationÕ by the 
government, abolishing Government OfÞces, Regional Development Agencies and 
Improvement and EfÞciency Partnerships. While the East Midlands climate change 
partnership, Climate East Midlands, was able to survive the loss of these member 
organisations, central government policy clearly affected the actors involved at the 
regional level. 
The abolition of NIs, in conjunction with the weak local meaning of climate change 
outlined in the previous section, set the context for action waning in some local 
areas. With the cuts in local government grants arising from the austerity 
programme, local climate change work came under budgetary pressure where 
effective local arguments had not been made for policy to be maintained.  While 
neither austerity nor localism were directly related to climate change work or 
originated from DECC, they have provided strong constraints on local action since 
2010. That DECCÕs attempt to recast local climate policy through the MoU was 
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received with such ambivalence by local authorities underscores how DECCÕs policy 
agenda was subordinate to those of DCLG and the Treasury. The introduction of the 
MoU also marked a return to weaker links between national and local government in 
climate policy. 
8.5 A decentred approach to climate policy
8.5.1 Returning to traditions and dilemmas
The search for the policy meanings created and acted upon by individuals has 
underpinned this research, and helped to reveal aspects of local climate policy which 
would likely have remained obscured by a more instrumental approach to studying 
implementation. A focus on meaning is consistent with a broad interpretive approach 
to the social sciences. However, the decentred approach introduces two further 
analytical categories: traditions and dilemmas. Traditions provide a means of locating 
micro-level case studies within wider debates, without resorting to generalised 
categories and models intended to Þt a wide range of circumstances. Traditions 
capture "a set of understandings someone receives during socialization", providing 
the Þrst, but not the only, inßuence on a person's actions (Bevir and Richards, 
2009a, p.10). A tradition is a set of beliefs and practices which displays a degree of 
consistency and has been passed between generations, intentionally or not (Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2006a, pp.8-9). Traditions are not static, ideal-type categories, but 
families of beliefs which change over time (Bevir et al., 2003, p.8). The decentred 
approach sees such change as arising through dilemmas. These dilemmas come about 
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when a new idea stands contrary to an existing tradition, requiring a pushing and 
pulling to bring the two together (Bevir et al., 2003, p.8; p.10). As a result, one may 
expect the tradition to change and develop over time, although actors drawing on 
stronger traditions may Þnd themselves better placed to defy the potential for 
change arising from new ideas (Bevir and Richards, 2009b, p.137).
8.5.2 Dilemmas of managerialism
a) Local authority managers
Chapter 6 focused on NI186 as the preeminent example of rational-scientiÞc goal 
setting within local climate policy. The setting of targets and top-down performance 
management belong to a managerial tradition which developed from the Thatcher 
GovernmentÕs adoption of new public management to New LabourÕs focus on 
delivery and Òself-sustaining, self-improving systemsÓ (Rhodes, 2011b, pp.27-28). The 
climax of New LabourÕs managerial approach came with the introduction of Public 
Service Agreements which set targets across central government and formed the 
basis for the local government performance management framework of which 
NI186 was a part. The proliferation of targets, monitoring and audits under New 
Labour can be described as an audit culture resting on a belief that ÒidentiÞable 
targets will improve policy outcomes in the long runÓ (Geyer, 2012, p.22).  
In the case of NI186, it was not clear that the adoption of targets led to improved 
outcomes. Rather than focusing policies on meeting their NI186 targets, local 
authority managers sought to distance themselves from the indicator, highlighting 
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their lack of control over the emissions measured, the delay in publishing the data 
and the centralised nature of the methodology (see pages 188-197). This did not 
mean that the organisation as a whole dismissed the targets; however, the targets 
had little inßuence on policy beyond the symbolic effect of putting climate change 
Ôon the mapÕ of local authorities through its inclusion in their performance 
management regimes. An individual operating from within the managerial tradition 
may not see this example as particularly problematic for their worldview. While 
NI186 may have been deeply ßawed, this was a problem of indicator design rather 
than of the broad target-based approach. Climate change managers noted that 
despite these ßaws, directors would still judge performance on NI186, the data from 
which suggested that local authorities were actually performing well against their 
targets. A focus on policy meaning enables an analysis beyond these surface 
appearances, showing that local managers did not tailor their policies towards such 
targets as they saw emissions as largely beyond their control.
The irrelevance of NI186 to local managers was not sufÞcient to derail the 
managerial tradition within the higher echelons of local government. However, it also 
did little to quench local managersÕ own thirst for data, which was seen as a solution 
to passivity within board meetings. That the managerial tradition remained largely 
intact after the NI186 experience is unsurprising from a decentred perspective. The 
dilemmas which lead to the evolution of traditions are more likely to arise from 
changes in intellectual agendas than relatively micro-level events such as NI186 
(Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, pp.37-38). 
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Such a dilemma did arise after the Cameron Government entered ofÞce in 2010, in 
particular with the arrival of Eric Pickles as Secretary of State for DCLG. Pickles has 
been identiÞed as from a strongly Thatcherite strand of the Conservative Party, in 
favour of a limited state (Heppell, 2002, p.313) and willing to embrace radical change 
(Leach and Wilson, 2002, p.677). This Thatcherite tradition informed PicklesÕs 
approach in government (see pages 252-254), rolling back the excessive Ôcommand-
and-controlÕ performance management regime, replacing central auditing functions 
with individuals acting as Ôcitizen auditorsÕ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2011, pp.33-34).  
The rapid dismantling of the performance management regime presented a dilemma 
to local managers. Having focused on putting climate policy on the map through the 
introduction of NI186, the map itself had been swept away by the new Thatcherite 
broom in DCLG. The managerial approach under New Labour, which had expressed 
policy priorities through the NI framework, found itself in conßict with the 
resurgent appetite for a smaller state. This dilemma exposed the weakness of 
managerialism, that excessive focus on measurement per se displaces the political 
arguments needed to legitimise the decisions taken over what is measured. Without 
such political foundations, target attainment provides the only motivation for policy.  
This provides a possible explanation for why local managers found it relatively easy 
to back away from NI186 after they adopted it. Managers working in policy areas 
where political arguments were more robust may Þnd such a course of action less 
viable. That local climate change managers were able to do so supports the idea that 
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the issue was regarded as meaningful for global, rather than local, policy with local 
politicians and residents (see pages 141-148).
Local authoritiesÕ response to the dilemma was twofold: a search for new ways of 
justifying climate policy and for new ways of measuring. Kindred policies which were 
more locally meaningful, such as action to reduce fuel poverty or management of 
local authoritiesÕ emissions from their own estate, signalled a mutation of policy as 
new justiÞcations for action were called upon in the wake of NI186Õs abolition. Such 
a change is similar to the process of the Òorigins, mutations and recombinationsÓ 
described by Kingdon as occurring within a Òpolicy primeval soupÓ, from which the 
right combination may emerge to enable a policyÕs survival (1984, pp.130-131). Such 
a combination takes into account problems, policies and politics (Kingdon, 1984, p.
211). The nature of the policy mutation dictates any move to new ways of 
measuring, the second response to the policy dilemma. While national governmentÕs 
performance management framework was abolished, the managerial tradition 
continued within local government, whose own key performance indicators and 
strategies remained. The mutation of policy also raised the prospect of a mutation of 
indicators, and a move to other indicators such as the number of domestic 
properties insulated (see pages 211-216). This approach was supported by the 
Committee on Climate Change (CCC)Õs report on local authority climate policy 
(published after the period of research Þeldwork), which proposes concentrating on 
monitoring those areas of policy where local authorities can exert most inßuence, 
rather than measuring aggregate emissions (2012a, pp.61-65). For the CCC, these 
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indicators are proxies for the ultimate aim of reducing carbon emissions. However, 
this continuation of the managerial approach implies a persistence with policies 
which are insufÞciently attentive to political argument. In particular, the expectation 
that local authorities can greatly increase the number of renewable energy sites 
entering planning and construction seems implausible given increasing public 
protests and political opposition, particularly to onshore wind (CCC, 2012a, p.65; 
BBC, 2012; Montgomerie, 2012; Jowit, 2012; Nichols, 2012). A less managerial 
approach would emphasise such local political factors over a rational-scientiÞc 
approach to imposing targets. As well as a change in the means of measuring 
outcomes, this would lead to a change in the overall aims of policy. Rather than using 
proxies to measure progress on the existing policy aim of reducing carbon 
emissions, a more locally political approach may see a change in policy aim from the 
extra-local issue of cutting carbon to intra-local issues such as cutting fuel poverty. 
In other words, in moving beyond a managerial approach to climate change, the 
response to the NI186 dilemma changes from proxy indicators to kindred policies. 
Using the analytical categories of traditions and dilemma, it has been possible to 
shed light on the changes in climate policy which took place with the arrival of the 
Cameron Government. The collision of the New Labour managerial tradition with 
the resurgent Thatcherite tradition of Pickles left local managers with a dilemma on 
where to go next with local climate policy.  Possible responses to this dilemma - 
proxy indicators and kindred policies - have been highlighted. However, managersÕ 
ability to respond was restricted by another aspect of the Pickles agenda: the 
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austerity programme which disproportionately affected local government in terms 
of the value of budget cuts. The reasoning behind central governmentÕs decision to 
impose a package of large, front-loaded cuts on local government funding remains 
arguable. Pickles justiÞed the approach by saying that local government needed to 
transform rapidly to be ready for a long period of funding restraint (Phillips, 2011). 
This formed part of a wider discourse identifying local government as wasteful of 
public money and ripe for efÞciency savings in Ôback ofÞceÕ activities (Pickles, 2010c). 
A more critical view would identify the move as part of a Thatcherite tradition of 
attacking intermediary institutions such as local government, not as an attempt to 
reduce the size of government, but as a means of further strengthening central 
power (Bevir and Rhodes, 1998, pp.112-113). Whichever was the aim, local climate 
change managers found themselves enfeebled by a process in which local authority 
budgets were cut and the managerial justiÞcation for climate policy had been 
removed. With the rapid reassessment of priorities required in response to the 
cuts,46 there was little time to build political support for climate policy and 
widespread cuts in programmes followed. In local authorities where the political 
played a greater role in policy-making, such as City 1 (see pages 206-208), the overall 
budget cuts were not necessarily transferred to climate policy as local arguments 
were already in place.
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46 There was a period of four months between the publication of the new Þnancial settlement for 
local government and the start of the next Þnancial year (Hayman, 2010).
b) Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
As with local authority managers, ofÞcials within DECC faced the dilemma of how 
to respond to the Pickles agenda. It is worth reiterating that although the New 
Labour managerialism of NIs contained many elements of top-down governance 
(e.g. nationally determined policy priorities and centralised methodologies for 
indicators), it did not enable government departments to exact direct control over 
local authorities. Rather, NIs represented a response to a dilemma faced under New 
Labour of reconciling the Westminster tradition of Òhierarchy and leaders who know 
bestÓ with the proliferation of network governance (Rhodes, 2011b, p.241). This 
response can be characterised as metagovernance, the state attempting to exert 
control within the framework of network governance - with its maxim of steering 
not rowing (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993, p.25) - through the vertical joining up of 
central and local government. While network governance allowed actors to roam 
the policy ÔlandscapeÕ, metagovernance sought to manage the landscape rather than 
the actors themselves (Rhodes, 2011b, pp.239-241). There was evidence of central 
government attempting such management in the NI negotiation process, applying 
pressure on subnational actors to include at least one climate change indicator, 
preferably NI186, within their LAAs (see page 47). However, most local authorities 
were keen to adopt NI186 of their own volition, so it is difÞcult to ascertain the 
strength of central governmentÕs inßuence.
The Pickles agenda sought to loosen any grip the centre did hold over local 
government through metagovernance. The abolition of NIs and the regional 
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Government OfÞces left DECC with no conduits through which they could 
persuade local authorities to continue with climate policy in their challenging 
budgetary position. As at the local level, the dilemma revealed the extent to which 
actors had relied on the managerial approach to paper over the cracks of historically 
weak central-local relations (see pages 238-244). The removal of the managerial 
architecture of NIs exposed the inherent weakness of this approach and renewed 
the dilemma of how to exert inßuence within a network governance tradition. 
DECCÕs response was to publish the MoU in partnership with the Local 
Government Group (2011). The document attempted to establish a loose 
framework within which local government could set their ambitions for reducing 
carbon emissions. The intention was for local authorities to help the government 
achieve its emissions targets, but without the centre being able to set local targets 
apposite to the task. The various interpretations and motivations related to the MoU 
are detailed in section 7.3 (see pages 244-270). Overall, this renewed attempt at 
metagovernance provided no signiÞcant steering to local authorities beyond a signal 
of continuity. Events subsequent to the Þeldwork period suggest a more decisive 
response by DECC to the dilemma. As managerial control over local authorities was 
weakened, the department disbanded its public sector team entirely to focus on the 
Green Deal - a policy strongly rooted in a managerial tradition - promising delivery 
of energy efÞciency improvements through the private sector. This suggests that 
DECC was more comfortable operating within a managerial tradition than as part of 
a network. 
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8.6 Beyond tradition and dilemma: the role of 
policy myths
8.6.1 Returning to policy myths
While Bevir and RhodesÕs broad focus on policy meaning has provided a useful 
framework for making sense of subnational climate policy, concerns about their 
decentred approach have been expressed within the interpretive literature (see 
pages 82-96). This section returns to those concerns, drawing on the data presented 
in this thesis to build an interpretive critique of the decentred approach. In 
particular, it develops the analysis of policy myths to go beyond Bevir and RhodesÕs 
view of Òstate and political institutions É in perpetual motionÓ (2006a, p.10), and 
instead open up explanations of continuity as well as change. Two policy myths of 
prioritisation and consensus are identiÞed, both linked to the central policy myth of 
rational-scientiÞc policy making identiÞed in Chapter 5. Policy documents suggested 
that climate policy was made rationally based upon scientiÞc evidence, and that 
climate policy is a priority issue enjoying consensus support. However, the data 
presented in this thesis has shown that such policy encountered signiÞcant 
challenges in implementation with two attendant myths to the rational policy making 
myth emerging: myths of prioritisation and consensus.
8.6.2 The myth of prioritisation
The decentred approachÕs attentiveness to actorsÕ cognitive activity brings with it a 
recognition that describing particular events as ÔexogenousÕ to a group of actors is a 
cognitive construction rather than a real world category (Parsons, 1995, p.201).  It is 
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the sense which actors make of such events, rather than the events themselves, 
which is key to understanding behaviour. An actorÕs agency is situated within a wider 
web of beliefs, emphasising that while actors are not subject to structural 
constraints, neither are they entirely autonomous but inßuenced by particular 
traditions of thought into which they are socialised (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006a, pp.
2-8). In this thesis, this view of agency has been tested by the effects on climate 
policy actors of localism (the abolition of NIs) and austerity (the cuts in local 
authority grants from central government). Both of these were instigated by 
government departments beyond the main network of climate policy actors (DCLG 
and HM Treasury, respectively), and constituted signiÞcant changes in their 
circumstances. Actors interpreted these changes in a variety of ways, against a 
background of traditions, as shown earlier in this chapter (see pages 301-308). 
However, in contrast to the decentred approachÕs notion of situated agency actors 
were also subject to constraints beyond the inßuence of traditions. The changes in 
circumstances were so broadly detrimental to the climate change agenda that policy 
actors were obliged to focus their responses largely on maintaining continuity in a 
period of uncertainty.  This evidence provides an important check against reiÞcation 
of agency within interpretive approaches; actors are inßuenced by traditions of 
thought but can also be constrained by changes in circumstances. These changes can 
still be interpreted in different ways, but these interpretations are also subject to 
actorsÕ power (see pages 270-286).
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This leads onto an argument for explanations to move beyond self-interpretation 
and the intentionality of actorsÕ responses to include non-intentional responses 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.83). This non-intentionality is encapsulated in the 
concept of policy myths, constructed as a means of proceeding past seemingly 
insurmountable obstacles to progress in a policy issue. As discussed in Chapter 5 
(see pages 181-182), these myths are neither falsehoods nor intentionally authored 
by actors, instead emerging as stories which actors tell themselves and each other in 
an attempt to reconcile incommensurable goals (Yanow, 1996, pp.191-192). Austerity 
and localism challenged the dissipated build-up of climate policy consensus around 
the Nottingham Declaration and NIs, as shown in Chapter 6, leaving a policy vacuum. 
A Ômyth of prioritisationÕ emerged to Þll this vacuum: that local authorities would 
continue to prioritise climate policy despite funding cuts and the removal of top-
down guidance from central government. The myth smoothed over the tension 
between two apparently incommensurable goals: the need to cut local authority 
spending and maintaining budgets in the non-frontline area of climate change policy. 
Understanding the emergence of this myth explains the importance of the MoU as a 
means of maintaining a sense of continuity and stability for policy actors. The MoU 
was the ritualised embodiment of this myth (see pages 282-286), Þlling the vacuum 
left by NIs and providing a coping mechanism by which subnational climate 
governance could continue (Rhodes, 2011b, pp.285-287), albeit constrained by the 
rhetoric of Pickles and DCLG. While this rhetoric can be understood as part of a 
Thatcherite tradition, the logic of the response of climate policy actors cannot be 
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explained merely through an appeal to a rival managerialist tradition (see pages 
301-308). Rather, it was a search for continuity in uncertain times which drove 
actorsÕ responses to events beyond their control. It was still actors who made sense 
of these events, but how they made sense of them was constrained by issues of 
politics and power, leading to the emergence of a myth of prioritisation.
8.6.3 The myth of consensus
The above observation supports the constructivist ontology adopted by the 
decentred approach: while particular events occur in the real world, they only make 
sense through actorsÕ interpretations. As described in Chapter 3, such constructions 
are akin to a process of joining the dots, foregrounding some acts and objects over 
others and making links between them to come to a particular view of the policy 
landscape at any one time (see pages 86-88). This metaphor helps to unpack the 
processes of interpretation and construction, and illustrate the importance of 
politics and power (Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.114). Rhetoric has been shown to 
be an important part of these processes; for example, the pressure on actors 
deriving from the anti-bureaucratic language of Eric Pickles and various media 
outlets (see pages 253-258). The ongoing attack on Ônon-jobsÕ within local 
government, often contrasted with the notion of Ôfrontline servicesÕ, were 
constitutive of a political logic calling for the narrowing or termination of local 
authority climate change work. PicklesÕs related comments on regional bureaucracy 
also contributed to a regime in which regional partnerships could not be considered 
as part of the new policy framework put forward in the MoU, despite such 
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partnerships providing greater access to local policy knowledge than using the LGA 
as a single bridge from central government to all local authorities. 
This rhetoric is important as the function it performed, that of reducing options for 
local authority climate change work, could not be made explicit by Eric Pickles and 
DCLG as climate change remained a priority issue for the Cameron Government 
(HM Government, 2010, p.16). That is not to say that Pickles was necessarily hostile 
to the climate change agenda per se, only that his rhetoric affected the options 
available to policy actors. Pickles joined the dots between austerity, non-jobs and 
frontline services to a particular political end of providing political cover for 
spending cuts while still toeing the government line on climate change.
Similar issues of unspoken and subdued resistance towards climate policy were 
uncovered in Chapter 5 with the resistance to climate policy by some actors within 
local authorities. This manifested itself as passivity in meetings and in the language 
used to express beliefs about climate change, contrasting ÔtheoreticalÕ environmental 
concerns with the ÔpracticalÕ nature of service delivery (see pages 155-158). 
However, carbon reduction remained a top priority in many local authoritiesÕ 
corporate strategies, so overt resistance to climate policy was verboten (Yanow, 
1996, p.197), a situation exacerbated by the prevailing partnership ethos which 
dampened debate in meetings (see pages 175-177). These tensions led to the 
emergence of a myth of consensus in local and central government that there was 
widespread support for the implementation of climate policy, smoothing over the 
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disjoint between the symbolism of climate policy and the practicalities of service 
delivery.
8.6.4 Accounting for change
The comparison of actorsÕ responses to changes in circumstances in Chapter 7 
shows the importance of their hold on power in mediating those responses. Bevir 
and Rhodes argue that referring to power Òfails to provide any critical or 
explanatory leverageÓ and that tradition performs a similar function in conveying the 
Òinßuence society exerts on individualsÓ (2006a, pp.24-25).47 However, the data 
presented in this thesis does not support such a focus on traditions on a means of 
explaining change. Rather, austerity and localism were Òdecisive pressuresÓ which 
explained the changing policy landscape (Finlayson et al., 2004, p.151).  While 
addressing climate change was a policy aim for organisations Ôon paperÕ, the myths of 
consensus and prioritisation masked a continuation of the peripheral nature of the 
climate agenda highlighted in Chapter 5. This left climate policy actors, in the main, 
poorly equipped to resist the pressures of austerity and localism. 
Those actors who were better placed to resist, such as managers working in City 1, 
were able to do so because of the political arguments that had been made locally for 
climate change and its kindred policies. The appeal to kindred policies enabled 
councillors to tie locally resonant policies, such as reducing fuel poverty, to the 
globally framed issue of climate change (see pages 28-33). While bringing in 
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47 Although Bevir and Rhodes appear to contradict this stance when discussing the importance of 
change, adopting the term despite recognising that it occurs ÒeverywhereÓ (2006a, p10).
additional justiÞcations for policy introduced potentially conßicting policy aims, it 
also helped build a Òlogic of equivalenceÓ for energy efÞciency policies (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007, pp.143-145). City 1 was the exception rather than the rule. As 
shown in Chapter 7, many climate policy actors were unable to resist the pressures 
applied to the subnational climate change agenda by DCLG. 
Previously, the pressures on DECC were explained in terms of a dilemma between 
traditions of managerialism and Thatcherism, highlighting PicklesÕs decisive political 
pressure behind the latter (see pages 307-314). This helps to explain how DECC 
were unable to resist DCLGÕs policy changes, but is less satisfactory in explaining 
why DECC and LG Group published a high-proÞle document which illuminated 
their inability to affect change within subnational policy. As discussed above, the MoU 
was a ritualised response to austerity and localism which embodied the emergent 
myth of prioritisation, a means of mediating this contradiction (Yanow, 1996, p.189). 
It may be that Òa set of evolving traditionsÓ are couched in such myths (Rhodes et al., 
2009, p.29). However, the data presented in this thesis suggests that it is the myths 
themselves, and the circumstances leading to their emergence, which provide 
greater explanatory power than a reliance on tradition and dilemma.
 
A focus on myths helps to redress the balance between dynamism and stability 
which was discussed in Chapter 3 (see pages 88-91): that a focus on change 
prompted by dilemmas risked falling short of explaining why some practices endure 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007, p.108). Bringing myths back into an interpretive 
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explanation offers a rejoinder to the view that change is ubiquitous. There will 
always be some degree of ßux within a policy issue and the actors involved, myths 
refocus attention on the extent to which this ßux is absorbed into existing 
practices. Put simply, while small things change, the big picture can remain the same. 
8.7 The future of implementation studies
Through its focus on meaning, this research has reopened the question of the 
legitimacy of Ôpolicy implementationÕ as a subject for study. Implementation studies 
have typically focused on the gap between policy intent and outcome, a 
problematisation that points policy analysis towards attempts to close that gap:
ÒThe inßuence that ontological logic has had on implementation studies 
has left them largely powerless to deal with meaning making and 
interpretation in social behavior [sic]. Rather than being a manifestation of 
error, the gap may be the expression of the lack of consensus in support 
of policy values É. An interpretive approach suggests [that] É 
organizational [sic] events are seen to be inßuenced by beliefs and values 
prevalent during the policymaking phase, including those inherited from prior 
debates.Ó (Yanow, 1990, p.226; emphasis added).
The importance of prior meanings and practices, bundled together in the decentred 
approach as traditions, stems from an ontological shift from the top-down, rational 
policy approach of early implementation studies. None of the cognitive factors - 
what Young (1977, p.12) called the Òassumptive worldÓ - can justiÞably be studied 
within temporal spaces demarcated by particular policy events pre-determined by 
the researcher. Such a shift is not only justiÞed by an appeal to the interpretive, 
hermeneutic tradition discussed in Chapter 3, but also by the empirical Þndings in 
subsequent chapters.  The interpretation of policy by the County 1 service in 
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Chapter 5 highlights the weakness of delineating research in terms of policy stages. 
For Service 1, ÔpolicyÕ was not a highly meaningful category of action; the pragmatic 
concerns of service delivery took priority over policy and, in some cases, legislation. 
Why problematise policy research based on the chronology of a policyÕs 
introduction, if key actors do not interpret the policy as something to act upon? 
A typical response to this query in the literature is that although the stagist model 
of policy (Figure 3, page 69) is discredited as an accurate representation of policy 
practice, it continues to provide a useful heuristic upon which to base policy studies 
(Parsons, 1995, pp.80-81). In Chapter 3 it was argued that while heuristics can be 
helpful to explanation, they also have the potential to obfuscate rather than explain 
if they present an oversimpliÞed view of the policy process (see pages 69-70). The 
evidence of this research is that this may now be the case for the stagist model and, 
by implication, the study of policy implementation as a discrete practice. The 
implication of studying an implementation stage is that one can identify the making 
of a decision which overshadows any others being made within a policy area. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the Climate Change Act 2008 appeared to be an exemplar of 
this. However, the research Þndings have demonstrated how the ways in which this, 
and any other, policy developments and decisions are interpreted are the product of 
ongoing political argument situated within traditions of practice and thought which 
have emerged over time. Crucially, this means that Ò[i]n order to bring along the 
organizations [sic] and individuals who will carry out decisions, there is a continuing 
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need for legitimationÓ (Weiss, 1991, p.42; emphasis added). Political support, through 
argument, is needed for a policy throughout its existence.
This argument has implications for implementation studies. Many policy practitioners 
recognise that the stagist model is rarely comparable to their own interpretations of 
reality (Hallsworth et al., 2011, pp.38-39). A focus on policy meaning provides greater 
promise in explaining the practices of public policy, and helps to move away from the 
temporal framing of policy and decision events implicit in the study of 
implementation and other policy cycle stages. This marks a return to Barrett and 
FudgeÕs (1981a, p.25) recursive process of action and reaction, the ongoing task of 
maintaining support and legitimacy for a policy. As this research has shown, assessing 
and responding to the meanings that actors attach to policies is fundamental to such 
an endeavour. 
This is not to dismiss the long history of implementation studies. This should 
hopefully be clear through the above reference to Barrett and Fudge, Þrmly located 
within the Ôbottom-upÕ school of implementation studies. Much useful work has 
taken place which has been labelled as Ôimplementation studiesÕ. The argument is that 
such a framing places limits on research which could do more to obfuscate than 
clarify when seeking the reasons for policy-makersÕ actions. 
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8.8 The future of climate policy
This research has found that between 2010 and 2011, signiÞcant change took place 
in the workings of subnational climate policy. In concluding, attention has also been 
given to the future of climate policy. This Þnal section considers the factor which 
underpins the concepts of both change and future: time.
8.8.1 Time and targets
As set out in Chapter 1, this research originated from a curiosity about the UKÕs 
carbon targets. The introduction of statutory targets was no small victory for 
environmental campaigners, and the CCC ensured there was no shortage of advice 
on how such targets could be achieved, but in the world beyond academic 
spreadsheets how plausible was such a radical, rapid reversal of recent trends in 
energy usage? Four years after the passing of the Climate Change Act, the CCCÕs 
progress report to Parliament betrayed a sense of frustration at the time taken to 
bring about change:
Ò[T]he conclusion we have reached in previous reports - that there is a 
need for a step change in the pace at which measures are implemented - 
continues to apply. When we Þrst highlighted this need, we recognised 
there would be a lead time of several years. However, the lead time has 
now elapsed. The step change in pace of implementation is therefore 
needed urgently if we are to remain on track to meeting future carbon 
budgets.Ó (CCC, 2012b, pp.20-21)
This comparatively languid rate of change identiÞed by the CCC makes sense when 
examining some of the meanings of time for individuals acting locally: 
¥ local authoritiesÕ data collection for their own energy usage (NI185) took 
much longer than anticipated;
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¥ area-wide emissions data (NI186) was supplied too slowly to be useful for 
managers;
¥ the time constraints on climate change managers trying to reach a 
compromise on policy with another department; 
¥ the time constraints on non-climate change managers attempting to Þt 
carbon reduction alongside their core priorities; and
¥ the councillor who felt the timescales for emissions reduction under the 
CRC were unrealistic.
Time emerges as a key factor in answering the question of plausibility. In the case of 
the East Midlands, it is argued that the amount of time spent on climate policy on 
the ground fell far short of the CCCÕs expectations. That is not to say that there 
were not individuals within the regionÕs organisations who were highly committed to 
climate policies. However, as the founding text of implementation studies reminds 
us, time is symbolic of the tussle between the multiple perspectives on policy 
priorities:
ÒTime is a scarce resource for men and organizations [sic]. If you want to 
know what a man loves, observe how he spends his time. If you want to 
know what matters most to an organization [sic], chart the activities on 
which its members spend their precious allotment of hours.... It is easy to 
ignore the fact that the sense of urgency manifested by the observer may 
differ widely in the time and hence importance that they allocate to the 
program [sic] in question.Ó (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984, p.121).
Here is a recognition that different ways of seeing an issueÕs urgency exist, and that 
these are likely to have material consequences for actorsÕ commitment to a 
particular course of action. In Chapter 3 it was argued, following Berger (1972b), 
that such a diversity of interpretations is inherent to the social world (see pages 
67-69). The research Þndings have supported this claim and, crucially, revealed that a 
key source of diversity has been the rational-scientiÞc model upon which climate 
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policy is based. Targets have cascaded from the scientiÞc evidence into international 
agreements and national legislation, which in turn have set the context for 
subnational policy. These targets remain unchanged. Indeed, it is written into the 
Climate Change Act that such targets cannot be changed unless there are ÒsigniÞcant 
developmentsÓ in the scientiÞc evidence (2008, s.2). 
The argument here is not that scientiÞc evidence should be sidelined when making 
policy.  Rather, if policy is based solely on such evidence, then it becomes more 
difÞcult to implement as scientiÞcally-derived targets elide multiple political 
arguments across a range of issues and geographies. The case of subnational climate 
policy provides an exemplar of this friction between the rational-scientiÞc world of 
policy-making and the social world of policy implementation. In other words, policy 
implementation can be re-deÞned as the making sense of rational-scientiÞc knowledge in 
the social world. 
One may argue that this is as it should be; one can make a rational plan in many 
walks of life and be prepared to change it as circumstances dictate.48 However, in 
this case the circumstances governing the legislation are restricted to scientiÞc 
knowledge, rather than social world. This makes climate policy scientiÞcally robust, but 
politically brittle, particularly as short term pressures rise under persistent conditions 
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48 On a very small scale, precisely this strategy was followed for the planning and operationalising of 
the Þeldwork and deskwork of this research. Many plans were made and revised.
of low or negative economic growth49. It still appears unlikely that the Climate 
Change Act will be repealed in the near future.50 However, in the absence of any 
formal repeal, government may still come to slowly distance itself from its carbon 
targets, as was seen in the local sphere with NI186. Some emission cuts may still be 
achieved, but signiÞcant slippage would raise further questions of the wider 
democratic effects of government legislating Òwell beyond our current political 
capacity to deliverÓ (Challen, quoted in Harrabin, 2009).51
8.8.2 The future
These observations on climate policy hold particular relevance for the local sphere. 
It may be tempting to surmise that climate change will continue to be seen as a 
global, not local, problem and that efforts at reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
should be concentrated at the national and international scales. There is some truth 
in this reading but different, potentially more fruitful, avenues open up by focusing on 
the importance of moving beyond scientiÞc data as evidence and acknowledging that 
political argument as evidence is essential for maintaining the political legitimacy of 
public policy. As the branch of government operating at closest proximity to the 
public, local authorities carry a message to central government and international 
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49 Describing policy as scientiÞcally robust is not a comment on the robustness of climate science, 
merely on the close relationship between climate science and climate policy. Climate science is 
evolving, in particular with regard to the sensitivity of the EarthÕs climate to increasing carbon 
emissions (for contrasting reviews, see The Economist, 2013; Nuccitelli and Mann, 2013).
50 A recent petition arguing for such a move garnered 1,530 signatures compared to the 100,000 
required for the matter to be considered for Parliamentary debate (Longstaff, n.d.). Some on the right 
of British politics continue to argue for the ActÕs repeal (Keswick et al., 2012).
51 When making these remarks, Colin Challen MP was the chair of the All Party Parliamentary 
Climate Change Group.
institutions: at a time when public faith in politics is waning (Hay, 2007), policy-
makers can ill afford to neglect the need for legitimacy in public policy.  This 
legitimacy comes through the appropriate use of evidence which can, in turn, lead to 
a morphing of policy issues and agendas from their initial problematisation. Following 
scientiÞc evidence, climate change has been problematised as an issue of carbon 
dioxide emissions. However, the indications from this research are that focusing on 
carbon dioxide emissions alone cannot yet draw sufÞcient political support for 
action when set against economic and social factors, Þndings which are supported by 
developments in national and international policy (Prins et al., 2010). There is, of 
course, a vital place for scientiÞc data as evidence for policy, but focusing on data to 
the exclusion of political argument risks hindering, not improving, policy-making and 
implementation. 
Such a conclusion does not sit comfortably with the current policy landscape, and 
represents a signiÞcant shift in my own thinking since beginning this research in 
2008. Bringing greater political arguments to bear on action to support reducing 
carbon emissions means focusing on the logics of equivalence between interests 
within society, and building broader, stronger coalitions which can argue for action. 
The emergence of kindred policies shows how this is already taking place in some 
places, but such a pragmatic, politically driven approach needs to become 
widespread if climate policy is to become meaningful to local residents. However, 
with such pragmatism comes dilution of the original aim of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions. The Þndings of this research show that such a dilution is essential to 
323
restore the primacy of politics and policy ßexibility and ensure that policy is 
adequately contextualised within the routines, local knowledge and traditions 
prevalent in society (van Gunsteren, 1976, pp.150-53). But with this dilution comes a 
tacit acceptance that carbon targets will not be met on time, with all of the 
uncertainties that brings for the future shape of society.
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Appendix. Participant consent 
form
International Centre for Public and Social Policy, School of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Nottingham
Participant Factsheet: 
ÒDelivering climate change mitigation policy in the East MidlandsÓ
Who is carrying out the research? Warren Pearce, as part of a PhD being 
undertaken at University of Nottingham in conjunction with East Midlands Councils.
What is the study about? Regional and local implementation of climate change 
mitigation policy in he East Midlands
What will the participant have to do? Participants may be interviewed face-to-
face, take part in a focus group discussion or be observed attending regularly scheduled 
meetings. Interviews and group discussions are estimated to last approximately one hour 
each. The attached consent form covers each of these aspects for the entirety of the 
project. Interviews will be arranged at mutually agreeable times. Notice of meeting 
observations will be given to attendees in advance.
What are the beneÞts of participating in the study? By participating you are 
helping to broaden the projectÕs sources of data and increase the chances of research 
outputs being relevant to practitioners. The study is a collaborative project with East 
Midlands Councils, a key member of Climate East Midlands.
Are there any foreseeable risks to the individual if they participate in the 
research? Participants should be aware that while every effort will be made to maximise 
anonymity, it cannot be guaranteed that all participants will remain unidentiÞable in the Þnal 
report. At the regional level, some participants occupy unique roles which may not be 
appropriate to anonymise when they are the subject of discussion.  
Are there any costs or inducements to taking part in the research? No.
Participation is voluntary, what should you do if you do not want to 
participate? Inform myself in advance or if you have any particular queries or concerns 
or require any clariÞcation, please let me know as soon as possible (contact details below). 
Consent can be withdrawn at any time, including during an interview, focus group or 
meeting observation.
What happens to the collected information? The audio recording and 
anonymised transcript of the meeting will be archived and then destroyed in accordance 
with University policy. Anonymous quotes may be used in research outputs.
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What are the research outputs? The project seeks to provide an in-depth study of 
the implementation of climate policy within the East Midlands and contribute to the ongoing 
improvement of practice at local and regional level. Research Þndings will be disseminated 
to policy practitioners throughout the course of the project with a full length thesis due to 
be completed in September 2012.
The project website http://realiseclimate.org/ is updated regularly and is the primary source 
of information on research progress, Þndings and dissemination.
What sorts of people are being asked to take part? Local and regional 
stakeholders make up the majority of the participants, along with some relevant central 
government Þgures.
Contact details
Researcher:
Warren Pearce,
School of Sociology and Social Policy,
Law and Social Sciences Building,
University of Nottingham,
University Park, 
NG7 2RD
T: 07545 568270, 
E: lqxwp2@nottingham.ac.uk 
Supervisors: 
Dr. Stephen Cope (above address)
T: 0115 846 8132
E: stephen.cope@nottingham.ac.uk
Professor Bruce Stafford (above address)
T: 0115 846 7439
E: bruce.stafford@nottingham.ac.uk
Complaint procedure
If you wish to complain about the way in which the research is being conducted or have any 
concerns about the research then in the Þrst instance please contact Warren Pearce or Dr. 
Cope. 
If this does not resolve the matter to your satisfaction then please contact the SchoolÕs 
Research Ethics OfÞcer, currently Dr Tony Fitzpatrick Tony.Fitzpatrick@nottingham.ac.uk. 
(0115 951 5230)
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Participant Consent Form: 
In signing this consent form I conÞrm that:
I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and 
purpose of the research project has been explained to me.
Yes No
I have had the opportunity to ask questions. Yes No
I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement 
in it.
Yes No
I understand that my participation is voluntary and I may withdraw 
from the project at any stage without having to give any reason and 
withdrawing will not penalise or disadvantage me in any way.
Yes No
I understand that while information gained during the study may be 
published, any information I provide is conÞdential (with one 
exception, see below). Every effort will be made to maximise the 
anonymity of participants although no guarantee can be given that 
they will be entirely unidentiÞable, particularly to colleagues within 
the network.
Yes No
I understand that the researcher may be required to report to the 
authorities any signiÞcant harm to a child/young person (up to the age 
of 18 years) that he/she becomes aware of during the research. I 
agree that such harm may violate the principle of conÞdentiality.
Yes No
I agree that extracts from the interview may be anonymously quoted 
in any report or publication arising from the research.
Yes No
I understand that interviews, focus group discussions and observed 
meetings will be recorded using digital voice recorders.
Yes No
I understand that data will be securely stored. Yes No
I understand that the information provided can be used in other 
research projects which have ethics approval, but that my name and 
contact information will be removed before it is made available to 
other researchers.
Yes No
I understand that I may contact the researcher or research supervisor 
if I require further information about the research, and that I may 
contact the Research Ethics OfÞcer of the School of Sociology and 
Social Policy, University of Nottingham, if I wish to make a complaint 
relating to my involvement in the research.
Yes No
I agree to take part in the following aspects of the above research 
project:
¥Focus group Yes No
¥Meeting observations Yes No
¥Interview Yes No
ParticipantÕs name (BLOCK 
CAPITAL)
ParticipantÕs signature Date
WARREN PEARCE
ResearcherÕs name (BLOCK 
CAPITAL)
ResearcherÕs signature Date
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